And where workers are unorganized, workers welfare invariably suffer. Indeed, working conditions are exacerbated by many "labor flexibilization" schemes that are designed to accelerate the pace and extend the length and scope of the working day. The hiring of apprentices, casuals and contractuals "" with no security of tenure and denied certain benefits mandated by law for regularized workers "" to do the same or more intense work as workers with secure tenure effectively pushes down wages and labor standards for all workers. In short, workers condemn labor flexibilization for increasing their exploitation.

In the Philippines, export processing zones and other special economic zones are known for enforcing an unwritten "no union, no strike policy" despite the formal (Constitutional) recognition of workers' right to form unions and the right to strike. For example, in the government-run Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ), the country's largest "industrial estate", there are 20 unionized factories out of 227 operational firms; 2 are company unions, and 7 are affiliated with conservative federations as of 2000.

From May to October of 2000, EILER conducted case studies of three (3) TNCs located in special economic zones in the Philippines in order to document the hiring and human resource management (HRM) techniques and practices of these firms. Specifically, these practices were evaluated in terms of their implications on workers' organizing and concerted action. It is hoped that this research would generate information that would be of direct relevance to the organizing of workers "" and their struggle for better working conditions "" in TNCs with similar HRM practices and perhaps in export zones in general.

Scope and Limitations

Three companies were selected for social investigation: a Korean-owned garments exporter located in the Cavite Export Processing Zone, a Japanese-owned car manufacturer located in the Laguna Technopark, and a Japanese-owned electronics assembler located in the Light Industry and Science Park I, also in Laguna Province. All three are unionized.

The garments firm was selected to examine the implications of contractualization (a.k.a. casualization, contingent employment) on workers organizing and concerted action since the garments industry in the Philippines is notorious for employing workers without job security.

The electronics industry, on the other hand, is reported as employing mostly regular workers (i.e. workers with formal job security) but is also known for its low unionization rates. Examining the experience of workers in a unionized electronics firm, it was hoped, could shed some light on the reasons behind the apparent difficulty in organizing in firms from this industry, and possible ways to overcome these obstacles.

Lastly, the union in the car manufacturing firm selected in this study forms the core of an enclave-level (or zone level) alliance of unions. Examining the successful experience of this union, it was hoped, could point to a higher level of organizing in special economic zones known for their repressive anti-union local regimes.

Information was gathered from company management (personnel/human resource managers), from union officers, union members and secondary sources. In the case of the garments firm, unorganized contractual workers and subcontractors were also interviewed. Key-informant interview and focus-group discussion were the methods utilized for all data-gathering using guide questionnaires.[2]

A major limitation of this study is its ambitious scope relative to the size of its sample and timeframe for investigation. Given the time and resources available, the study could have focused on very specific HRM/IR issues such as contractualization or the use of labor management councils or company unionism or tripartism. The key informants interviews should also have been supplemented by sample surveys, particularly of rank-and-file union and non-union members. Nevertheless, the small sample covered directly by this research is supplemented by citing the results of other studies.

With these in mind, the results of this investigation as reported in the present paper should be treated as suggestive rather than representative and conclusive. Nevertheless, this study was validated by the unions involved and as such, now forms part of the evolving praxis and ongoing struggle of workers in these firms. For EILER and other activist research institutions, it is a point of departure for future research work which can pursue the many issues dug up and brought to the surface by the present study.

The Companies[3]

The garments firm in this study is a subsidiary of a Korean trading company which is also its major supplier of raw materials. It has a sister factory operating inside an industrial park in Guatemala.

The company manufactures garments exclusively for export including t-shirts, dresses, shorts, pants, jackets, knitted dresses/blouses, nightdresses, and the latest additions are the baby dresses, nighties and maternity dresses. The company exports their products primarily to Canada and the US but they also export to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea. The company's products fall under the brand names of Gap, American Eagle, Pierre Cardin, J.C. Penny, DKNY, Old Navy, Cherokee, Fashion Bug, Architect, In Due Time, Circlo, Mossimo and Baby Crest.

One of the earliest locators at the Cavite Export-processing Zone, Chosen Wear International started operating in the Philippines in 1990 with an initial investment of just US$175,000 (PhP 4.46 million) and employing 200 workers. Its investments and assets rapidly increased. Its assets by the end of 1992 was PhP 81.2 million.

As of June 2001, the company has a total of 844 workers including the management and staff. Of this number of workforce, 387 are contractuals. This excludes an undetermined number of workers for its subcontractors based in the nearby communities. The management actually denied the existence of these subcontractors but the workers know of their existence and EILER managed to interview 2 of these subcontractors.

The company's average monthly sales for sweaters and knitwear to its top 5 major buyers in the US alone total US$ 909,500 or PhP 46.3 million. It reported an accumulated net income of PhP 10.98 million for the period 1994 to1998 (with an increasing trend)[4].

Electrotech Corporation

The third case study subject is a 100% Japanese-owned electronics company with sister companies in Thailand, Singapore, China and the US. It set-up operations in the Philippines in 1987 in Muntinlupa. In 1994 the company moved their production to a two-hectare lot inside the Light Industries and Science Park I (LISP I) in Cabuyao, Laguna. Its product line includes motor assemblies, metal stamping, plastic injection, FDD/ZIP unit assembly, LED/SMD assembly, camera parts assembly, LBP gear unit assembly, and plating.

It started with 41 employees with initial paid-up capital of PhP 213,034,950. It now employs 1,318 regular rank-and-file workers with 37 probationary workers. In addition, the union reports that the company has recently hired 160 workers through a manpower agency. Its net income for 2000 was over PhP 1 billion with sales of more than PhP 9.7 billion.

The company supplies electronic parts and components to both local and foreign buyers, mostly Japanese electronics companies. Among its major buyers are NIDEC Corporation and Copal Co. Ltd. in Japan, Toshiba Multimedia Devices, NEC Technologies and Canon in Hong Kong and the Philippines, Telefunken Electronics GmBh, Matsushita Communication Corporation and Matsushita Business Machine Corporation Philippines.

Topcar Philippines

The car assembler in this study is an affiliate of a major Japanese car company. It was incorporated in the Philippines in October 1990 under the government's car development program with an initial investment of PhP 7,007,000. It is a joint venture where 26% of its stock is owned by Filipino banking families while the remaining stock is controlled by Japanese corporations including its parent car company. It started production of imported complete knock down (CKD) units at the Laguna Technopark in 1992. It assembles passenger cars and four-wheel drive vehicles for the domestic market.

Topcar Philippines had invited 17 other subsidiaries and automotive parts suppliers to set up shop in the Philippines, most of whom are operating in the same industrial park. It also exchanges products and supplies with its sister companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan under the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme. It imports CKD units from Japan and Thailand for assembly.

Topcar Philippines, together with three (3) other major Japanese car companies account for 81% of the domestic market for passenger cars. All four are consistently among the top 1000 corporations in the country. Topcar has been the market leader for passenger cars in the Philippines since 1996, with a net income of PhP 12.87 million in 2000.

The company has 1,004 employees (including supervisors and managers), around 800 are rank-and-file regular workers according to the union plus 32 undergoing on-the-job training. They produce 50-55 units per day on the average, working one 8-hour shift per day, six days a week.

Summary of Findings

In Chosen Wear, a little over 57% of production workers are women. This is somewhat below the industry average of 72%[5] (Ofreneo 1999). Indeed, the garments industry is known for having a highly feminized labor force.

Likewise, some 58% of production workers in Electrotech are female, 42% are male. This compares with the industry average of 73% "" the electronics being another highly feminized industry "" according to the Bureau of Labor Relations.

These figures are consistent with data from the Economic Zones both in the Philippines and other developing countries that show a disproportionate share of women workers in labor-intensive industries such as garments and electronics. The predominance of and preference for women is connected to the nature and labor intensity of production especially where work continues to be organized along an assembly line in which the tasks of individual workers are simple and highly repetitive, and/or characterized by the very small size and delicate nature of the numerous parts that must be handled.

Around the world, there has been a preference for women for these types of production jobs based on a number of gender stereotypes. First, women are considered more manually dexterous with nimble fingers appropriate for small parts assembly. Second, women are regarded as more diligent and patient, which is deemed necessary due to the long hours of repetitive work. Third, women are considered easier to manage, more docile and less likely than male workers to join trade unions or "cause trouble". Finally, women are also assumed to be more willing to work for low wages and have a higher rate of voluntary turn-over due to their supposed status as "secondary wage earners" in the family (CAW 2000). The first three of these stereotypes were articulated by the HR managers interviewed in this study.

In contrast, more than 70% of the production workers in Topcar Philippines are male.[6] Female production workers are rare in the automotive industry in the Philippines. This fits with the observation that male workers predominate in production work requiring the heavy use of machinery and a considerable level of technical skills "" the opposite of what is conventionally considered "women's work." Even in Electrotech where majority of rank-and-file workers are women, the majority of machine operators are male while all agency-hired (contingent) workers are female.

... age ... education... civil status...

The HR manager in Chosen Wear stated that age is a "moderately important" criteria when they hire workers, educational attainment is "least important", civil status is "not important" while "related skills" was considered "very important." Sewers had to know how to operate machines like single, double-needle machines, etc.

According to the workers, the preference is for workers from 18 and 25 years old but once hired, age is no longer a determinant of job security. The respondent's ages ranged from 20 to 49, half of whom were older than 26. Approximately 40% of the respondents are married.

The workers are aware that educational background is not an important qualification in Chosen Wear. According to them, as long as you have the necessary experience and skills in knitting and/or sewing, you can land the job easily. Nevertheless, most of the workers interviewed have at least graduated in secondary level. The few who have only graduated in the primary level were hired because of their previous employment experience in other garments factories. Thus, relevant work experience compensates for the lack of a high school diploma.

In Electrotech, age, gender, educational attainment and experience are considered "moderately important" factors by the HR manager while civil status was considered "very important" in assessing the qualifications of applicants. According to one respondent worker, "an applicant had to be single, at least 5'2" in height, at least a high school graduate and between 18-25 years of age." Five out six respondents were single, all were high school graduates.

In Topcar Phils., technical knowledge appears to be given a premium in hiring workers but not work experience. In fact, former employees of other car companies are not qualified. Workers must be at least high-school graduates but workers from technical schools such as Dualtech, Don Bosco Technical School and Sisters of Mary had better chances of getting hired in Topcar Phils.

These demographic preferences are not inconsistent with the findings of other scholars in the field. Mckay (2000) for instance writes,

"Unlike the garments industry, which often prefers to recruit skilled rather than unskilled workers, electronics companies overwhelmingly prefer workers with no previous work experience. The most important criteria is not pre-existing skills but "trainability." This is in part because skills are often firm-specific and companies prefer to do to their training based on their own needs."

Topcar Phils. prefers skilled workers but those who have acquired such skills in technical schools rather that from previous employment. According to several scholars, firms also prefer those with no previous experience because they find them easier to train and inculcate with company-specific values and culture. According to McKay (2000), many recruiters liken recent graduates to "fresh clay"; easier to mold and shape than those whose work habits and ideas have already "hardened."

... domicile ...

Workers in Chosen Wear came from different parts of the country, mostly rural areas where their families' primary source of income is in agriculture""farming and fishing. This is in contrast to the oft-repeated claim that the CEPZ was created to provide jobs for people from the immediate vicinity "" particularly the many peasant households who had been displaced when the farms they were tilling were converted to industrial use.

Many of the workers at Chosen Wear live in boarding houses one ride away from the economic-zone. Boarding houses are usually situated in Rosario, Tanza, Maragondon, Kawit and almost anywhere near the vicinity of the CEPZ. Those who are natives of Cavite live with their families""with their parents and siblings, or with their husband/wife and children.

In contrast, workers in Topcar Philippines, are mostly local residents. Indeed, of the 10 respondents interviewed, all are married with families residing in the nearby towns. In Electrotech all of the workers interviewed are residents in nearby towns even though five out of six of them are still single.

Other field studies on special economic zones in the Philippines observe the same contrasting preferences in terms of workers' domicile. Kelly (2000) surmises that employers may be ambivalent about whether it is preferable to hire a local or a migrant from another part of the Philippines. Keen to maintain good community relations, many industrial estate managers will encourage investors to hire local residents. It is also easier to conduct background checks on local employees, compared to migrants workers. In the words of one industrial estate manager in Laguna: "It's very difficult to check on the character of these people [migrant workers] if they are not yet known in the neighborhood, so we're giving them the last preference actually." (quoted in Kelly 2000)

According to some workers, however, some employers may actually prefer non-locals. With no local support network to fall back on in case of unemployment and anxious to avoid the prospect of returning home penniless, migrants may be perceived as more hardworking than their local counterparts (ibid.).

... application requirements...

The application requirements in the three companies examined were the same. These include bio-data, birth certificate, police clearance, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, mayor's clearance, barangay clearance, medical certificate, diploma and/or transcript, social security number and tax identification number for those with previous employment experience, and marriage certificate for married applicants.

The purpose of the mayor's clearance or the barangay clearance is ostensibly to certify that applicants are resident within a specific jurisdiction. But they clearly serve a more significant role. Kelly (2000) quotes one industrial manager:

"The reason why there is such a clearance is because we are preventing labour strikes from happening. The reason why barangay clearance is required is to make sure that when these people could be identified, we can trace where they come from and ask the barangay captain to pacify the families of these strikers. In the Philippines, there are three or four big unions. A strike is a vested right of the unions, but sometimes, the responsibility for this is not properly explained to the workers. And so as a precautionary measure, we usually ask the barangay captain to make sure that these people were never involved in strikes in the past." (Industrial Estate Manager, Laguna, 1998)

In Electrotech and Topcar, most workers are referred or recommended by current employees.[7] This serves as a screening device like the barangay clearance or mayor's permit. Employees would think twice to recommend potential "trouble makers" (in the eyes of management) who could jeopardize their own status in the company. This strategy also ensures that the new employee is "socialized" into the values and culture (CRR) of the company.

In addition, Topcar Phils. hires an agency to do a background check on prospective applicants. This is on top of a thorough application process which includes an IQ test, a physical exam, and a series of interviews with management.

Contractualization or Casualization

Of the three companies in this study, only the garments firm had a significant contractual workforce with nearly half of all production workers in the factory having no regular status of employment. In addition, regular workers had to undergo 4 months of apprenticeship plus 5 months of probation before they became eligible for regularization.

The literature consistently notes that contractualization is quite common in the garments industry (Ofreneo 1999, IBON 2000). Contractualization has been the preferred "adjustment strategy" of companies in the Philippines (especially those which are unionized) to stay ahead or afloat in the brutally competitive international garments industry where TNCs use their global subcontracting chain to source the cheapest labor in the third world. In the Philippines, average wages of garments workers are considerably higher compared to their counterparts in China, Indonesia, Vietnam and others. To offset this, local garments companies reduce their regular workforce and increase subcontracting and the hiring of agency workers[8] who are typically paid between 40-50% less than their counterparts with regular or permanent status.

In contrast, all workers in Topcar Phils. have regular status. In Electrotech, over 88% of workers in have regular or permanent status while less than 10% are agency-hired plus 2% probationary (with prospects of regularization). This is better compared to the electronics industry as a whole where only 73% of workers are regular or permanent employees while 16% are contractuals or apprentices and 11% are probationary (BLR 1999). In fact, it was only recently that Electrotech hired contingent workers for its plant in LISP 1 through manpower agencies and this appears to be in response to unionism in the plant.

The propensity to hire regulars despite the benefits of contractualization for capitalist-employers can be explained by the need for a more skilled, trained, stable and committed workforce, particularly in companies requiring firm-specific skills such as electronics firms. Writing about electronics MNCs in Calabarzon, Mckay (2000) notes, "The increased demand for high quality and fewer defects has meant that many MNCs must train workers for up to three months before they achieve sufficient productivity levels. Given their increased investments (of both time and money) into each worker, firms want to retain them for longer periods and provide workers with a more stable environment to build work loyalty."

But this also prompts capitalist-employers to devise more stringent screening methods for its workers as already noted above in the case of both Topcar and Electrotech. Apart from imposing strict requirements and background checks on their applicants, both these companies also stretch the probationary period for workers before they become regularized. In Electrotech, new workers are hired for a probationary period of 5 months before they become regulars employees. At Topcar, the regular workers interviewed had to undergo "training practice" (OJT) for one month, then they were hired as contractuals for five months, followed by a probationary period of six months before finally becoming regular and permanent workers.

Wages and Working Hours

Regular workers at Chosen Wear are paid PhP 217 per day (as basic pay), or the legal minimum wage in the area which also approximates the median wage for the garments industry as a whole. However, only one of the contractual workers interviewed received the legal minimum wage while the rest were paid from PhP 162 (or 75% of the legal minimum) to 217 per day. Workers for Chosen Wear's subcontractors are paid by the piece-rate. Their earnings are very erratic, ranging from 150 to 1,000 per day, depending on orders from Chosen Wear and how much time they are willing to work. But they do not enjoy any of the statutory benefits enjoyed by regular workers directly hired by Chosen Wear.

Employees at Chosen Wear work in 8-hour shifts, 6 days per week plus overtime.

At Electrotech, the basic wage of the workers interviewed ranged from PhP 285 to 330 per day. This would seem to compare favorably with the median wage for the electronics industry, estimated at PhP 239 per day in 1999. Unfortunately, EILER was unable to interview any of the agency-hired workers.

Workers at Electrotech used to work three 8-hour shifts per day, 6 days per week. But management now implements a "compressed workweek" (since September 2001) where workers render 10 hours of work per shift, 2 shifts a day, 5 days a week (plus alternate Saturdays or even Sundays when demand is high).

The "compressed workweek" is an increasingly common tactic of capitalist-employers in special economic zones in the Philippines for lengthening the working day without raising the wage bill. For workers, this is tantamount to forced OT without the OT premiums mandated by law. Indeed, Electrotech's HR manager claimed that they followed regular 8-hours shifts.

The upshot is that workers at Electrotech are not much better off than the minimum wage workers of Chosen Wear in terms of base pay.

Compared to these two companies, workers at Topcar Philippines received much higher compensation. The basic pay of Topcar workers interviewed ranged from PhP 400 to 509 per day. This is a considerable amount even when compared to the median base pay of workers in the automotive industry as a whole, estimated at PhP 318 in 1999.

As in Chosen Wear, there is only one 8-hour shift per day at Topcar Philippines, 6 days a week plus overtime. There used to be 2-3 shifts but since 1997 crisis, down to one shift.

However, none of the Topcar workers interviewed claimed that they are forced to render OT, unlike workers in Chosen Wear where most of the respondents complained of "forced OT/ON" (forced overtime/overnight). Indeed, according to Chosen Wear's Company Rules and Regulations, "unjustified refusal to render overtime work when so required" is considered an offense. Overtime averages 4-5 hours per day in Chosen Wear during the "peak season" which lasts from July to January.

Industrial Relations

In 1992, the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) recorded 3,125 garment and textile manufacturers and exporters with at least 10 workers each, generating some 300,000 jobs. On top of this, there was approximately the same number of jobs in the various home based enterprises involved in subcontracting work for the registered companies.

On the other hand, the DOLE reported for the same year, only 424 registered unions in the garment and textile industry. However, most of these unions were in the big garment and textile firms (with over 100 employees) where there was a greater concentration of workers. It is in this sense that the industry is considered one of the most unionized (Ofreneo 1999).

There are no indications that the number of unionized firms in the industry has increased since 1992. Rather, there are signs that the total number of organized establishments is gradually declining as the big uncompetitive firms are closing down, while others are reengineering themselves into small but non-unionized firms under new names (ibid.).

At Chosen Wear International, workers first formed a union in 1995, five years after the company started operating in the Philippines. Workers demanded a wage increase, a higher meal allowance, no more forced overtime/overnight, seniority pay, separation pay, and a moratorium on "forced retrenchment."

In response, Chosen Wear's bosses agreed to grant seniority pay. At the same time, the union officers were offered better jobs in Korea as well as cash rewards. Rumors abounded that some of the union officers had "sold out." Union members were reshuffled, some were "encouraged" to apply for work elsewhere.

There were also internal problems in the union. There was no transparency in financial matters which further fanned the rumors against the union officers. There was no trade union or political education for the union members which could have helped consolidate the membership. The particular concerns of women workers "" who comprised the majority of the workforce and union membership "" was not given sufficient attention according to the workers interviewed.

By 1996, the union had been dissolved.

But the same problems festered, prompting the workers to once again establish a union at Chosen Wear in August, 1999. In the following months, the union prepared for collective bargaining with management. They held educational discussions with the workers, produced leaflets, held ribbon wearing and other forms of concerted action. In April 2000, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) cancelled the new union's registration, citing technicalities. Emboldened, Chosen Wear's management dismissed 6 union officers while offering monies to union members who agreed to resign.

The union held a general assembly in April 30, 2000 attended by a little over 100 regular rank-and-file workers. They elected a new set of officers and subsequently registered the union at the DOLE for the second time. In May, the union campaigned for a boycott of overtime work in support of the dismissed workers as well as in protest of its coercive nature. Management backed down, recalling the dismissed workers.

In August, management suspended a union official for attending a hearing at the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the union's petition for certification elections which was a pre-requisite to enterprise collective bargaining. In protest, 83 union members again boycotted overtime work. All 83 were subsequently suspended for boycotting overtime!

After negotiations, management agreed to lift the suspension of all workers but refused to compensate the union official who had been suspended earlier.

In November 2000, 83 workers boycotted overtime work in order to join political rallies calling for the resignation of then President Estrada who was being investigated for plunder at the time. Some 67 workers were slapped with 15-day suspensions. In protest, the union held picket rallies, ribbon wearing and boycotted overtime. One picket protest was violently dispersed by the police. Management held firm, citing Company Rules and Regulations.

After serving their suspensions, union members faced discrimination in terms of job schedules and were dispersed to different departments. It has since become considerably harder to organize and mobilize workers at Chosen Wear and the union has been weakened. In September 21, 2001, the union lost the first certification elections (CE) held at Chosen Wear. Management actively campaigned against the certification of the union as the sole bargaining agent of the workers in collective bargaining.

Electrotech Corporation

According to the Bureau of Labor Relations/DOLE, there were 367 firms in the industry in 1997 with a workforce of approximately 190,000 "" but only 36 registered unions with a total membership of 7,642. Those actually covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are even less: there were only 4 establishments with CBAs that covered only 2,074 workers. Thus only 1% of the industry and 1% of the workforce are covered by a CBA (cited in McKay 2000).

This means Electrotech is one of the few electronics firms in the country that is unionized. But there are unions and there are unions. The original union at Electrotech was a company union, organized in 1988 under the auspices of management even before its relocation to LISP. According to the workers interviewed, only the union officers attended meetings with management and there was no collective bargaining agreement in force. Union dues were collected from workers but were used to supplement the incomes of the union officers.

In 1991, a new set of officers were elected with contacts to a militant labor federation. The new leadership made plans to transform the union. From 1991 until the company moved to LISP in 1994, a few union members attended labor seminars with the militant federation and even initiated some actions such as ribbon wearing to protest overtime work.

In response, management sent six union officers to Japan for six-months of "training" in 1994. At the same time, management initiated "closed-door negotiations" with the remaining officers. After a few months, several union officials resigned from Electrotech while the union president was promoted, though later on terminated after being caught stealing.

In August 1996, a new union was set-up affiliated with the militant labor federation. At around the same period, three other unions started organizing at Electrotech, all affiliated with yellow labor federations. In 1997, the new union filed a petition for certification elections with the DOLE, and conducted delegations. DOLE approved the petition for CE but management questioned the legitimacy of the militant union and filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the conduct of certification elections. Management declared that a CE would be illegal until and unless the Supreme Court decided in favor of the union's petition.

Faced with the prospect of protracted legal proceedings in the courts, all the unions at Electrotech became dormant for the next 2 years. Even the militant labor federation became inactive at Electrotech during this period because of turnover and reshuffling among its organizers.

But in 1999, the new organizer from the militant labor federation assigned to Electrotech discovered that the alleged TRO against the petition for CE was never actually granted. Management had been bluffing all along. This meant that there was no legal obstacle to the immediate conduct of a CE. The CE was finally scheduled for June 2000.

For the first half of 2000, the union actively campaigned among the over 1,000 workers of Electrotech "" conducting educational discussions, distributing leaflets in the shuttle busses, going from house-to-house. Union officers now recall that the union president "wasn't very active" during this crucial period.

During the last week before the CE, managers and supervisors stayed nightly in the factory to persuade the workers to boycott the CE or vote against the new union. Various tactics were employed:

• First, they told the workers that the company will close if they would pursue the CE.
• Second, they announced that the CE is postponed because they had secured a TRO.
• Third, they threatened the union officers that they will be terminated from work. They even filed a libel case against the union accusing them of "slandering managers".
• Fourth, workers were encouraged to vote for either the old yellow union or "No Union".
• Fifth, they conducted a "survey" "" calling workers one by one to ask them about their intended vote. The bosses then broadcast that "no union" will win in the CE.
• During the CE, several administration personnel were allowed to vote by management.

But the new union prevailed, winning 506 votes against 34 votes garnered by the old yellow union and 326 "no union" votes. The new union earned the right to represent the workers at Electrotech in collective bargaining.

Immediately after the CE, Electrotech management filed a protest once again questioning the legitimacy of the new union. A month later, management formed an "Employer-Employee Council" (EEC) ostensibly to serve as a venue for workers grievances and demands. Electrotech's HR manager admitted that the EEC was formed to draw workers away from the new union.

The new union's president, vice president and several shop stewards were convinced to join the EEC representing workers. Free shuttle services were now provided to all workers.

In August 2000, management and the union officers called for a general assembly of the new union wherein they pushed for a resolution calling for disaffiliation with the militant labor federation and the setting-up of an independent union. Management made it clear that it was not going to negotiate with a union affiliated with a militant labor federation. Some 800 workers signed the resolution.

Management registered the new "independent" union at the Bureau of Labor Relations and "voluntarily recognized" it as the sole bargaining unit at Electrotech. By December 2000, a new collective bargaining agreement was signed between the "independent" union and Electrotech management "" granting nearly the same performance-based increases as was granted during the time of the old yellow union.

In 2001, the militant labor federation along with the union officers who did not sign the resolution for disaffiliation filed an appeal at the DOLE regional office. In August 16, 2001 the Bureau of Labor Relations ruled in favor of the militant labor federation recognizing the brazen maneuvers of Electrotech's management.

In September 2001, Electrotech's management filed a motion for reconsideration in behalf of the "independent" yellow union and continued to ignore the duly recognized federation as bargaining agent for the workers. The company hired the organizer of the old yellow union as the new HR manager and promoted the "independent" yellow union's president and vice-president. Electrotech also employed 160 new workers through a manpower agency. Union members who are identified with the militant labor federation are discriminated against in terms of work assignments "" they are dispersed and isolated. At the same time, supervisors spread rumors that the company was prepared to transfer its operations to Malaysia.

In light of these pressure tactics and the co-optation of the union's leadership, most union members have become demoralized and inactive. The union has so far been unable to convene a general meeting.

Topcar Philippines

Workers started organizing a union in Topcar in 1993. They sought assistance from a progressive labor institution based in the same province which provided labor seminars and helped in core-group building in the different sections of the company. It was only in 1994 that the union came out in the open seeking formal registration at the DOLE. To their surprise, another union came out claiming that they were and had been the duly recognized bargaining agent of workers at Topcar Philippines since 1991. The workers were not even aware of this union's existence before this time! It was affiliated with the same federation as the old yellow union at Electrotech.

Since the yellow union's legal papers were in order, the new independent union decided to maximize the time for organizing the rest of the workforce and for consolidation through regular trade union and political education seminars. By this time, management began sending the union's active members to satellite plants and resorted to red-baiting of known union leaders.

When the yellow union's term expired in December 1995, the new independent union began campaigning in preparation for certification elections scheduled the following year. [9] Management offered cash bonuses to workers in exchange for voting against the new union. But the latter won handily in August 1996.

The new union promptly negotiated a new CBA for the period 1997-1999.

In 1998, in the fallout of the Asian Financial Crisis, Topcar terminated more than 200 probationary workers while an additional 340 regular workers availed of management's "voluntary separation program" (VSP). The union initiated modest protest actions (ribbon wearing, and the like) against the spate of retrenchments disguised as VSP. However, there was internal disunity in the union since the incumbent president at the time was not in favor of concerted actions. Indeed, the president resigned from the union. Almost immediately after, he was promoted by management to section team leader. Local elections were held to choose a new set of union officers.

In August 2000, negotiations for the economic items of the existing CBA (to cover 2001-2002) commenced.[10] Prior to this, the union had been organizing/ networking with supervisors as well as administration personnel. They eventually provided confidential company materials that became useful during the CBA negotiations.

As the negotiations dragged on, management reached out to workers families and the communities. But the union was also active in the community. Active union members distributed leaflets to residents of the surrounding communities. They put up posters, and formed "mobile propaganda teams" to inform the public of the workers' demands and other grievances. They solicited support from other unions through the progressive alliance of workers unions in the region.

A previous trip of the union president to Japan "" which was part of management's attempt to co-opt him "" proved fruitful because he was able to network with Japanese unions. Japanese unions were able to provide international support during the CBA negotiations by writing the parent company in Japan, sharing company information with the union at Topcar, etc.

At the shop floor, the union scheduled a series of 5-minute noise barrage sessions to be held every morning before work starts. On second day of the noise barrage series, management issued a memorandum of dismissal against the union officers . Undaunted, the union proceeded with a third day of noise barrages. This time, more than 200 workers were slapped with 30-day suspensions, citing Company Rules and Regulations.

The suspended workers put-up a picket line outside the factory while workers inside held another noise barrage. Suspended workers also held march rallies outside the industrial park.

Last January 2001, the suspended workers returned to work. This time, the union organized a work slowdown. Production went down to 4 cars per day.

Both parties declared a deadlock in CBA negotiations last January 27 with the union demanding a 60 peso hike in the daily wage while management offering only 20 pesos. Three days later, the union held a "strike vote" wherein the workers voted overwhelmingly in favor of launching a strike.

Last February 7, management called for "backroom negotiations" with the union's top leadership. The union president was offered 5 million pesos to convince the union to settle. He declined. Formal negotiations were resumed in February 24 - 25. At this point, management agreed to the union's demand.

In March, capitalizing on the community work and alliance-building it had initiated during the CBA struggle, the independent union of Topcar initiated the formation of an alliance of unions in Laguna Technopark composed of 7 member unions, 6 of whom are suppliers of Topcar. This is the first enclave-wide workers formation in Laguna.

Conclusions and Recommendations

At Chosen Wear, skilled workers are preferred including those with relevant employment experience in sewing. At Electrotech, workers with relatively higher general education but no previous work experience is preferred; "trainability" is sought after. At Topcar, workers with vocational-technical schooling are preferred to operate the machines.

2. But careful worker selection through demographic profiling is also used to minimize the "risk" of unionism and industrial action in the shop floor.

Female workers are preferred for the labor-intensive, repetitive and poor-paying jobs in Chosen Wear and Electrotech (and in the garments and electronics industries in general) to take advantage of patriarchal social conventions that limit women's participation in political action. Young workers, especially those without previous experience, are more easily trained and inscribed with values that the company wishes to inculcate in them.

3. Contractualization is arguably the most common and convenient way to avoid or undermine unionism and lower labor costs in the Philippines today.

Chosen Wear illustrates how. The union at Chosen Wear is one of the most active and politicized in the CEPZ, evident in its support for workers' struggles and organizing in other factories in the zone as well as attendance in political mobilizations. Yet even in their local struggle to assert their basic rights (e.g. against forced overtime work), the union could not mobilize more than a fraction of the workforce. More than half of the workforce are contractuals and not members of the union, let alone the undetermined number of subcontractors. In such a situation, it is not surprising that the union finds it extremely difficult to pressure management through concerted action that relies primarily on existing union membership (not all of whom are active at that, which is usually the case).

4. Firms where the nature of production requires that they maintain a relatively stable and committed core of skilled workers cannot rely as much on contractualization as a labor control strategy. Hence, these firms tend to be more stringent in worker selection, extend their surveillance and control strategies beyond the factory, and promote corporatism or unitarism at the workplace.

Electrotech and Topcar, for instance, require background checks, personal referrals ("guarantees") from local government officials and extended probationary periods for their workers.

In addition, their company rules and regulations stress "company values" and "codes of conduct" for workers. For example, Electrotech devotes an entire handbook (written in English and Filipino, with diagrams and illustrations) on the company's philosophy stressing "3 Qualities and 6 Values." Workers at Topcar are referred to as "associates" in all company literature. "Workers' committees" and "self-managed activities" are supposedly encouraged although their scope is actually quite limited (e.g. housekeeping, recreation, canteen, productivity-enhancing suggestions).

In contrast, Chosen Wear's Company Rules and Regulations merely enumerate the do's, the don'ts and the penalties that await offenders.

5. The three firms examined utilized the same arsenal of tricks in the face of genuine union activity in the company. These include, but is surely not confined to the following:

• co-opting union leaders, bribery
• using company unions/yellow unions
• discriminating against active members
• anti-union black propaganda, red-baiting
• strict application of company rules and regulations (CRR)
• "community outreach"
• dilatory legal tactics

6. Of the three cases studied, the independent union at Topcar has met the most success in terms of organizing and winning economic gains for workers through concerted action. Comparing the history of struggle of the 3 unions point to positive external factors and internal strengths in favor of the union at Topcar:

a) Topcar assembles cars for the end consumers while Electrotech produces parts for other electronics TNCs and Chosen Wear manufactures garments for major retailers in the affluent markets of industrialized countries. Topcar is an industry leader catering to the domestic market while the other two are subcontractors/ parts suppliers of major TNCs in the global market.[11] The "threat of exit" is therefore less credible at Topcar given that shipping costs are still significant for vehicles (completely-built-units) compared to garments and electronics components, and tariffs still provide a modicum of protection to local automotive assembly in the Philippines. In short, Topcar is less subject to the brutal downward competitive pressures (race to the bottom) of TNC global subcontracting that is so pronounced in the electronics and garments industries "" at least for now. This is about to change as tariffs are eliminated under the ASEAN Free Trade Area(AFTA).

b) Since the nature of production at Topcar requires a technically skilled and relatively stable workforce, the firm has relied upon a workforce with security of tenure, working single 8-hour shifts and residing in nearby locales. This combination of factors "" a "classic" profile for unionism and industrial action "" have made it relatively easier to organize and mobilize workers at Topcar compared to Chosen Wear (more on Electrotech below).

c)Domicile, in particular, proved to be one important factor in favor of Topcar workers' struggle. The fact that they were nearby residents meant that they could be more easily organized along with their families. Moreover, support was more easily mobilized from the community during their CBA struggle.

d) Like Topcar, Electrotech also had a relatively stable (regular) workforce, most of whom were local residents. But unlike Topcar, Electrotech had a long history of yellow unionism. Even when its yellow union was on the way to being transformed into a genuine union, management succeeded in co-opting the union's leadership. This has left ordinary rank-and-file workers confused, demoralized and distrustful of unionism in Electrotech.

e) Moreover, Electrotech has a younger and feminized labor force yet all but one of the union's officers are male. In fact, the union has a weak presence in sections of the company where almost all workers are female (e.g. CD-Rom assembly). At the very least, this suggests that the union needs to be more conscious of gender issues and the particular concerns of women workers in Electrotech.

f)The long hours at work required of workers at Electrotech and Chosen Wear also worked against organizing and consolidation among the rank-and-file. Most workers hardly had time left for housework, rest and relaxation let alone union seminars and political education. This meant that the union had a narrow base of active and politicized members while the majority were largely passive.

7. The challenge to unions, therefore, is to arouse, organize and mobilize the remainder of the workforce, particularly contractual workers and women workers.

Contractual workers in interviewed were generally aware of the union at Chosen Wear. They also had a generally positive attitude towards unionism in principle although most of them could not see the direct relevance of the union to their lives and were ambivalent as to their willingness to join. A few expressed their willingness to join the union but only when they become regular workers. In order to reach out to contractuals, the union must articulate and defend the interests of all workers "" regular and contractual. At the same time, the union must devise appropriate approaches to organizing and mobilizing contractual workers while minimizing their exposure and the risk of management's reprisal (termination).

Likewise, unions need to consciously address the particular concerns and constraints faced by women workers. This is particularly pronounced among married women workers who endure the double burden of working fulltime (and overtime) at the factory and bearing primary responsibility for homemaking. This limits their full participation to union activities.

8. Genuine unions also need to devote greater attention to organizing beyond the factory and alliance-building.

In Topcar, the union's efforts at organizing and networking in the community bore fruit during its CBA struggle. In general, union locals and rank-and-file can form expansion teams aimed at contact-building and organizing workers in other workplaces, as well as irregular workers in the communities. This is especially true for communities adjacent to or surrounding areas of industrial concentration such as industrial belts, industrial parks and export zones. In many cases, temporary workers and even regular workers can be better reached and their organizing sustained in the communities where they reside. Communities also serve as the hub for contacts, for information gathering, as a base for education, as source of material and non-material support for local concerted actions and campaigns.

In industrial enclaves or industrial belts, unions can form territorial alliances for mutual support and concerted action.

9. There are a number of issues touched upon but not fully investigated in the present study. These issues can be the subject of further research and social investigation, including:

• relations between TNCs and government officials at different levels in terms of "containing" labor unrest;
• industrial enclave management;
• internal dynamics of the union "" attention to gender issues, education work, alliance work, internationalism, etc.

References

CAW [2000], Dolls and Dust, Committee on Asian Women and Wayang, Bangkok, Thailand.

IBON [2000], The Philippine Garment and Textile Industries, IBON Foundation, Inc., Manila.

ILO [1998], World Employment Report 1998, International Labour Organisation, Geneva.

Kelly, Philip [2000], The Political Economy of Local Labour Control in the Philippines, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

McKay, Steven [2001], "Globalization and the Electronics Industry in the Philippines" in the Philippine Journal of Labor and Industrial Relations (PJLIR), University of the Philippines Press, UP Diliman, Q.C.

Ofreneo, Rene [1999], "A Profile of the Garments Industry in the National Capital Region", manuscript.

Company Rules and Regulations of Chosen Wear, Electrotech and Topcar.

Financial Statements of Chosen Wear, Electrotech and Topcar.

1 EILER, Inc. is an independent non-profit institution providing popular education and research services to workers and workers organizations in the Philippines.

2 Data gathering and research assistance was provided by Jess Aquino, Ma. Generlita Babon, Jerico Bertillo, Iris Mae Lusung, Jo Antoinette Ong and Joan Velasco, student volunteers from the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development.

3 The proper names of the firms have been changed to protect the unions and workers who provided much of the following information.

4 These figures are possibly understated. Some 93.7% of Chosen Wear's raw material purchases "" averaging over US$500 thousand monthly "" come from its parent company in Korea. This gives it a lot of room for transfer pricing between parent company and subsidiary.

5 Both these figures exclude subcontracting homeworkers.

6 Management refused to give exact figures. But the workers interviewed claimed that there could be no more than a handful of women in production.

7 However, relatives (up to 3rd degree of consanguinity) of employees at Topcar Phils. are not eligible to apply "to avoid nepotism" according to the manager interviewed.

8 Many firms in the Philippines hire workers through manpower agencies. In many cases, these aren't placement agencies but labor-only contractors which are prohibited under the labor code. Firms resort to labor-only-contracting to deny employer-employee relationship and workers' rights contingent to this relationship: right to security of tenure, right to collective bargaining, and so on.

9 In the Philippines, a collective bargaining agreement (or an enterprise agreement) covers 5 years. At the end of this 5-year period, there is a "freedom period" wherein another union can seek election as the recognized bargaining agent of the regular workers for the next CBA. This is called a certification election (CE).

10 In the Philippines, a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covers 5 years but the economic items of that agreement can be renegotiated at the end of the third year, applicable to the remaining 2 years.

11 Although Electrotech's net income is nearly 10 times that of Topcar's.

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