Tharavadee period, Buddhist century 11-16:

Glutinous rice characterized by big and fat grains was grown.

Srivichai period, Buddhist century 13-18:

Glutinous and paddy rice varieties were grown especially in Southern Thailand.

Lubburee period, Buddhist century 16-19:

In the northeast region, glutinous rice was grown while both glutinous and paddy rice varieties were grown in the central region.

Chiangsan period, Buddhist century 17:

Glutinous rice variety characterized by fat and long grains as well as paddy rice were grown.

Suklothai period, Buddhist century 19-20:

Glutinous rice varieties characterized by fat and long-grains were grown. During this period paddy rice variety was also grown increasingly.

Ayuthaya period, Buddhist 1350-1767:

Fat-grain glutinous rice variety was grown in the north and northeast of Thailand and the flood plain areas in the central region were planted with long-grain paddy rice varieties.

In the Ayuthaya period, when King Bharomtrilogana engaged in trade relations overseas, rice became an export commodity. European countries were the major customers who bought Thai rice for their colonies.

Earlier, rice exportation was done by the Royal Chamber and foreign traders like the French, Dutch, Chinese and Indians. The major countries that imported rice from Thailand were the Netherlands, France, China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Manila, Lanka, Japan and different countries in the Malaya peninsula like Malacca, Java and Patthavia.

Later, in the beginning of Rattanakosin period, especially during King Rama III era, rice trading with China prospered. It was recorded that in 1850, 95% of the total lands was cultivated with rice and the volume of exported rice was 80,000 Kean (1 Kean = 1 ton) per annum. However, rice trading and exportation had been more systematized in King Rama IV era because of the Bowring Treaty that was signed between Thailand and the British in 1855. This was claimed to be an unequal bilateral contract, as Thailand did not have the choice to refuse or even negotiate.

During that time the British had employed military force against China in the Opium War. It threatened national sovereignty in China as well as in the region. Given that threat, the Siam Kingdom had to conform to the British on the trade agreement even to its disadvantage.

The actual purpose of the Bowring Treaty was that the British wanted to expand maize markets to Asian countries as it launched the Maize Act in 1846 that provided domestic subsidies on maize production and trading. [2] Therefore, the Bowring Treaty was the first wave of trade liberalization intruding in Thailand. The treaty was all about trade liberalization, where Siam reduced tariff or removed non-tariff barriers for British products. The Bowring Treaty signaled Siam's readiness to open the kingdom for international trade. After the treaty was signed, the volume of rice exportation increased from 17% to 47% and rice production shifted from domestic consumption to international trading purposes.

After World War I, rice exportation became the policy of the Thai government as the country had to pay for war compensation to the Alliance. The government had to control the domestic consumption to ensure that it would have enough rice to pay for the said compensation Price and marketing interventions on rice were implemented since then to finally result in the enactment of the first Rice Trading Act in 1964. The Act granted the Thai government monopoly over rice trading and pulled down domestic prices of rice lower than the world market to the detriment of small farmers.

When the first National Socio-economic Development Plan was implemented in 1961, the state policies changed Thailand's agricultural structure from self-reliance to market-oriented production. Infrastructure development projects such as irrigation systems like the Bhumipol dam, the biggest dam in Thailand and Sirikrit dam were constructed in 1964 and 1974 respectively. Both projects aimed to extend the irrigated area to the central region and promote rice as a cash crop. Moreover, the Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives (BAAC) was established in 1966 to provide loans for small-scale farmers that shifted from self-sufficient to modern production system that focus on cash crops. Cash crops such as cassava, jute, and sugarcane besides commercial rice were introduced to replace the traditional food crops of Thailand.

Rice has been main the staple food and important export commodity of Thailand in the past until the present [3] . Thailand is a major rice exporter to the world market that earns the country huge incomes as shown in the below table.

Table 1: The Volume and Value of Rice Exportation

Thai rice has captured the biggest market share for a long period, especially for premium grade rice. According to statistics, the market share of Thailand in the world market was 26.7% in 1999/2000 and slightly increased to 26.8% in 2000/2001 [4] .

The vital question, however that this paper will seek to answer is--whether or not Thailand is going to benefit from the multilateral trade mechanism according to the Agreement on Agriculture. More particularly--whether or not the small-scale farmers are going to benefit from the agreement.

How does the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) affect small-scale farmers?

In order to analyze the state's development approach and philosophy, one needs to determine the policies of two major ministries that have responsibilities in controlling agricultural production and marketing such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Commerce.

1. The policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives from 1994 to 2001 [5]

• Control the volume of produce by calculating domestic consumption and export demand.
• Control the export production area especially through zoning for premium grade rice growing area located in central, north and northeast regions. The policy promotes the growing rice varieties fitted to market demand like Jasmine rice 105, Basmati Rice and the Japanese rice varieties.
• Promote high yield rice varieties instead of indigenous rice varieties, as the latter were perceived to have low productivity/yield per rai. This was also aimed at increasing small-scale farmers' income and the same time decreasing state subsidies for small-scale farmers. The target area, according this policy was 2.44 million rai (1 rai is equivalent to approximately 1,600 square meters or 0.4 acre.).
• Promote the adoption of modern farm technologies. Initially, the state provides loans for farmers to purchase modern machineries from the private sector to improve farmers' productivity.
• Reduce rice cultivation in areas not suitable to rice, especially in the northeast region where there has been lack of irrigation and low soil fertility, including some areas in the central, east and west regions where productivity is likewise poor. Instead, upland and short-term crops shall be introduced. The policy led small-scale farmers to shift into contract farming and grow cash crops such as asparagus and baby corn to supply market demands.

2. The Policies of the Ministry of Commerce [6]

Rice policies before 1986 aimed to balance the domestic and export markets.

• Rice premium surcharge was a surcharge that the government collected from rice exporters to establish the farmers-aid fund [7] .
• Export tariffs collected from rice exporters was pegged at 5% of the value of rice exportation. It was reduced to 2.5% in 1984 and finally was given up in 1985.
• Rice Stock measure: Since 1962 rice exporters had to sell rice at prices lower than the market price to the Public Warehouse Organizations equivalent to the volume of exportation. By this measure, the state can reserve rice to prevent shortage of domestic supply. However, this policy was given up in 1982 because the state wanted to decrease the exporters' burden.
• Export quota measure: The policy aimed to control or limit the export volume to balance rice trading in the domestic market. The Ministry of Commerce would allocate export quota to exporters by considering their history. However, this policy was not implemented since 1981. At present, rice exporters are requested to report the volume of their rice exports to the related government and concerned agencies.

Rice policies of the Ministry of Commerce and Rice committee at present: Increasing private intervention and the use of marketing schemes as inducement to production

• Empowering the private sector: Rice exportation is mainly dominated by private mechanisms. The state would take action only in the mode of selling and dealing between governments.
• Maintaining rice stocks in order to have enough supply for domestic consumption.
• Maintaining the stability of rice prices and volumes by different measures that are directly operated through the cooperatives, farmer organizations, rice mills, central markets and traders.
• Assign Bank of Agriculture and Cooperatives as the major institutional loans provider for farmers
• Provide low-interest loans for un-milled rice traders and exporters. The particular measure is supported by the Bank of Thailand and Bank of Export and Import.

The projections of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) show that the world population has been increasing, especially in Asian countries whose peoples consume rice as staple food. The FAO expected that rice consumers would increase by around 1,400 million in 2025. As such, there will be a total of 4,400 million rice consumers in the world in the next 24 years. Hence, it becomes the market challenge to Thailand being the major rice exporting country to increase rice production to supply the expanding market. [8]

The state policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and Ministry of Commerce illustrate that food security and rice production have been led by market demand and exportation absolutely.

The policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives valued rice as a commodity. Its productivity must then be improved by replacing local rice varieties with high-yield varieties (HYVs) that highly respond to chemical inputs like chemical fertilizer, pesticide and weed killer. In reality, the high-yield varieties are actually high-response varieties (HRVs) that need intensive chemical inputs, without which they produce lower yield than indigenous varieties [9] . Moreover, the state policies under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives aim to reduce rice cultivation in the unfavorable areas by shifting to cash crop production to increase farmers' income.

However, market-oriented production has never increased the net income or secured the economy of small farmers. The state policy of changing and reducing rice or food cultivation areas abandons the small farmers and left them alone in the battle of marketing, price fluctuation and against the capitalists.

At the same time, the policies of the Ministry of Commerce were adjusted from protecting domestic production to export market promotion. The state policies promoted private intervention from the local level to international levels in favor of the capitalists. While the capitalists have continuously been supported by the state through low or non-interest bearing loans and removal of obstructions to market access, the small farmers have been relegated to the role of being the raw-material producers who produce 'commodity' to supply market demand. From the state policies, farmers have no power to negotiate with the capitalists or even with the state itself. It can be seen that the state subsidies are operated mainly through the business sectors than directly by small farmers. The classic illustration of this case is the price intervention measure where the state supports money to middlemen. While farmers need price guarantee measures, these have never been implemented. Even as they are implemented, these would not be successful because of the complicated process and each step in the intervention process has been riddled with corruption.

3. Policy changes under the Agreement on Agriculture [10]

In the WTO Uruguay Round in 1995, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that aimed to control market access on the agricultural products was taken. Thailand as member-country has to adopt international obligations like reducing tariff-rates in all agricultural products (740 items) and change non-tariff barriers to tariff-quotas in the major agricultural products (23 items), including rice and rice products. The agreement was claimed to make trade fairer and countries like Thailand shall have easier access to world markets.

Through the Agreement on Agriculture, Thailand has to adjust its state policies on rice marketing as follows:

Table 2: Market Access

Domestic Subsidy

Thailand binds to reduce domestic subsidies for agricultural products in 1995 to 21,816.40 million baht and further reduce to 19,028.48 million baht in 2004. For rice and its products, the amounts of subsidies, however, increased from 8,849.10 million baht in 1995 to 12,694.50, 12,138.70 and 16,282.81 million baht in 1996,1997, and 1998 respectively. The subsidies increased because the price of rice has declined continually and the farmers consistently waged demonstrations demanding for price subsidies every year. The measures of subsidies were however, changed. The subsidies were provided to farmers in two channels: one is the subsidy on production (provision of free or cheap chemical inputs) and the other is the subsidy on marketing, which is changed from price guarantee to mortgage. The mortgage measure has been implemented since after AoA, which from farmers' experiences proved to have not achieved its end of supporting small farmers.

Export Subsidy

Thailand could not provide export subsidies because there were no export subsidies reported during the first round of negotiation.

In reality, the major principle of the AoA is to open the domestic market for imported products and to reduce the domestic subsidies for small farmers. Decreasing the budget for subsidy to provide support and service to small farmers in order to promote trade liberalization is pulling down the agricultural sector tremendously. It may destroy the sustainable basis of the agricultural sector and lead all small farmers to a more difficult struggle for survival.

Table 3: The Export Rice Market in Year 1995 -2000

Value: million baht

Source: Trade Information center, Department of Business Economics by collaborated with Department of Custom, 2001.

At least 50% of the total volume of Thailand's domestic rice has been exported to the different countries around the world. Thailand is the leading rice exporting country for over 20 years. The major markets are Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, USA, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia.

Exported rice can be classified into 3 grades according to its quality: premium grade (Jasmine rice, White rice 100-5%), medium grade (White rice 10-15% and Glutinous rice 10%) and low grade (White rice 25% and Rice bran).

From the above table, there is no significant factor that would imply that free trade under the AoA has expanded rice exportation. From 1995 to 2000, increases in rice exports both in volume and value have been varied depending on world economic trends and particular economic situation of the client countries. The removal of trade barriers as imposed by the AoA has not functioned to open export markets for Thailand. For example, Indonesia, the main consumer of Thai rice has decreased its rice imports from Thailand and at the same time, has become a rice-exporting country. According to FAO, in 2000, Indonesia exported 181,000 tons of rice to the world market making it a new competitor country to Thailand.

The Research Institute of Rice of the Department of Agricultural Academics [11] analyzed that Thailand has to improve rice production especially the premium grade rice in order to have better competitive edge in the world market. In response, the Thai government aims to:

1. Increase productivity/yield per rai and reduce production cost;
2. Increase premium grade rice production for exportation; and,
3. Increase value-added by processing rice.

FAO study also shows that the international rice trading structure will change to directly affect Thai rice exportation. Thailand's clients will become competitor countries; so, rice exportation in the world market will face strong competition because both the numbers of competitor countries and volume of exported rice are increasing. In addition, world markets tend to demand good quality rice rather than medium and low quality rice. By the situation, the Division of Marketing Research under the Department of Business Economics [12] proposed the adaptive plan for Thai rice exportation as follows:

1. Increase premium grade rice production and stop low quality rice production;
2. Reduce production cost in order to increase competitive edge;
3. Improve rice packaging and exportation of rice products; and,
4. Promote image of Thai rice as the premium grade rice.

Quality control and standardization are however the big problems of small farmers even as they have the skills in rice production. They normally produce in the traditional way for their own consumption and supply local markets with rice that has different quality from those demanded by world market consumers. Thus, small farmers may not be able improve their standard of produce to meet the world standards. This means the exportation of their produce may not be viable. [13]

Still, the Thai government is concerned with exportation as its policies emphasize the building of its competitive capacity to supply international markets than being conscious with the true value of rice as food to feed the world. The state policies mainly aim to expand production, reduce production cost and produce for trading than ensure food security for the small-scale rice farmers who bear the costs of commercial production. In the course of implementing its improvement plan, the Thai government has to determine whether or not it has the potentials to survive in the highly competitive international trade.

As can be seen from the competitor list (USA, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and China), USA is the great competitor in good quality rice while Vietnam, China and Burma are the big exporting countries in low quality rice.

According to the analysis of the Thai responsible Ministries, the competition in the high quality rice market is more difficult because Thailand has a difficult competitor like USA. USA has an advantage in the trading management system by implementing the Farm Act that has functioned to set the floor-prices and provide compensation for US farmers. The law sets up the guaranteed price of agricultural products including rice and US farmers are compensated when the market price is lower than the guaranteed price. Farmers receive half of the compensation in terms of rice products, which they can sell back to the state at the guaranteed price. Moreover, the mortgage measure allows farmers to redeem the total volume of rice that has been mortgaged to the state with only half the mortgaged price. Furthermore, there is a direct export subsidy, which the government will doubly refund to exporters if the compensation price is higher than the world market price. Besides, the US provides incentives for clients, especially the poor countries. For instance, 'PL480' provides discounts, credits and rewards to poor clients, and also provides export subsidies to exporters [14] . All those mentioned policies virtually infringe on the Agreement on Agriculture.

The effect of these measures on Thailand as the competitor is that U.S.A. can take away Thailand's rice market especially in Africa and Latin America because American rice is cheaper (as a result of export subsidies) than that of Thailand's. To support the rice export business, therefore, Thailand has to reduce the farm gate prices even if it adversely affects the farmers, who are the direct producers but have been excluded in negotiating the agreement.

Other than the US, other competitors are improving their competitive edge, such as China, which is increasing premium grade rice exportation. Moreover, regional trade collaborations like European Common Market (EU) and the group of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are other factors that impact on the international trade. These groups emphasize on encouraging internal trade within in their groups; thus, many distinctions are adopted such as special policies and tariff barriers to impede the flow of the products from the other countries into their territories.

Thus, the Agreement on Agriculture has not improved market access of Thai rice. On the contrary, the agreement discriminates other countries, obstructs equal trading rights, and provides opportunities for the few industrialized countries to continue trade protectionism even under the WTO regime. The practical situation contradicts the declared objective of the Agreement on Agriculture. In reality, the agreement cannot reduce poverty nor distribute income more equitably between small-scale farmers and the powerful business sector.

Part 2: Reflection from the field

Most Thais are made to understand that Thai products could access the world market easier due to the absence of trade barriers. This information is provided by the governors and organizations that advocate for free trade.

In the farmer leaders' understanding however, free trade together with its agreements is the gate to calamity for small-scale farmers.

"After trade liberalization, the price of rice is cheaper, and it leads us to ruin, because the market price and production cost of Thai rice is lower and higher respectively than other countries... "Said a rice farmer from Ban Tung Yao, Muang district, Lumpoon province

The above analytical message from a farmer can be supported by facts in the field and many explicit farmers' experiences can illustrate the truth.

Ban Tung Yao: The food treasure of Northern Thailand

Ban Tung Yao or Ban Jukkhumbhimook is located in Sunthong sub-district, Muang district of Lumpoon province. It is an old community that was established a century ago. Presently, it is a big agricultural community with a total population of 1,089 people from 284 households. By geography, Ban Tung Yao is in the Chiang Mai - Lumpoon flood plain zone, near Mae Ping River. Being close to the river, the place is irrigated. As such, farmers normally cultivate rice two times a year (major crop and second crop) and in case of water shortage they benefit from the artesian well.

According to the survey of 30 households, 100% of the population are farmers and earn their living from rice cultivation. Fortunately, some members of each family have extra incomes from working in either agricultural or non-agricultural sectors, especially in factories located in the Lumpoon industrial park. A comparison of average income from the different sources is shown as follows:

- Income from the agricultural sector 63,102 baht/year/household

- Income from the non-agricultural sector 37,629 baht/year/household

Even though the major incomes come from the agricultural sector, over half of household incomes come from the non-agricultural sector. Therefore, farmers' life style is a combination of rural and urban culture. This study probes the difficulties of the agricultural sector to survive under the present conditions.

The first evidence of farmers' struggle for survival was the peasant movement for land occupation. It was recorded that when people settled in the community, they destined themselves to be farmers because they have the precious wisdom in farming. Unfortunately most of the lands in Ban Tung Yao were owned by the North Majesty. Earlier most lands in the north were under the rule of the Lanna Kingdom. Likewise, lands in Ban Tung Yao belonged to Lord Juk Khamkanathorn who was the governor of Lumpoon. In the feudal period, farmers did not have rights over the land. They had to rent the land (called "Na Muang") from noblemen and the rental rate was 1/3 of products [15] . Later, when the Lanna Kingdom became a part of Thailand, some noblemen sold their lands to the Thai government and capitalists. The study found that at present, lands in Ban Tung Yao are owned by the Department of Treasury and the capitalists, with whom the farmers pay rents as follows:

- Rental rate of Department of Treasury 150-180 baht/rai/year

- Rental rate of the capitalists 500 baht/rai/year

It has been the practice of some capitalists to lease lands from the Department of Treasury then rent them out to farmers at 500 baht/rai/year, higher than the rental rate of the Department of Treasury.

From the survey, the average land tillage area is 13.46 rai per household. Land occupancy and tenurial security statuses vary as follows:

Table 4: Land Ownership Pattern of The Sample Group

Table 4 implies that land ownership is the crucial factor in the farmers' way of life and their production pattern. To increase income, farmers prefer to produce cash crops than food crops. Like the production pattern of Ban Tung Yao that is limited by the land ownership, cultivation areas are devoted to produce rice for sale. The payment of land rents in cash tends to influence the production pattern. They have to engage in commercial cropping to increase the cash income to defray the costs of living, production and land rents. Thus, farmers tend to abandon growing glutinous rice even as it is their staple food. They produce and sell another kind of rice and spend more than a half of income for buying glutinous rice for family consumption.

Irean Kwa [16] , in analyzing the relationship between land lease and the agricultural system, found that while landlords earn higher incomes merely from land rents, landless farmers have to toil more and even shift to modern agricultural production to produce incomes. The production system consistently shifts from traditional to modern and commercial methods even if farmers have to be overburdened by the increasing cost of production. As they fail to improve and develop from the new production system, farmers are transformed to farm laborers or migrant workers as a consequence.

The land lease system based on cash rents on one hand, and the overall export-oriented framework of agriculture on the other, forced the farmers in Ban Tung Yao to adopt chemical inputs such as pesticides, herbicides and hormone into their farming system. As farm incomes fall way below production costs, farmers have to resort to heavy borrowing until they are caught in the debt trap. The respondents point at the following as their major problems:

• The prices of chemical inputs are consistently high and farmers have absolutely no control over price movement. This increases cost of production.
• Landlessness, as farmers have to lease lands at rates that are determined by the capitalists.
• High cost of labor, as farmers have to hire external labor in order to ensure their products can supply markets on the time.
• Lack of capital, as the farmers have to borrow money every time production starts.
• Soil is infertile due to increasing use of chemical fertilizers.

The above problems speak of the failure of new agricultural system and other agricultural state policies to alleviate the sorry plight of the farmers.

Changes under export orientation and the trade liberalization

1. Loss of the community assets.

The community assets, among others, can be defined as the farmer potentials, i.e., wisdom and skills in production that are of higher value than money. Even though we cannot fully claim that these assets have been destroyed due to free trade, it can be said that capitalist-oriented trade liberalization in agriculture consistently erodes these assets.

Other important community assets are the indigenous plant varieties. The indigenous rice variety like 'Meun Nong' glutinous rice was lost from the community many years ago. By reason of market demand, farmers in Ban Tung Yao use only commercial seeds such as Supan aromatic rice, Jasmine rice as well as Rice series 6 and series 7.

Moreover, the traditional wisdom in production and processing that have been self-sufficient was replaced by the commercial and external-inputs-dependent production system. Farmers have to work doubly hard the entire a year in their intensive farms depriving them of quality time to maintain and develop their nice culture and custom. Even as they work hard everyday, their earnings are hardly enough to pay their debts or spend on daily expenses. June to December of the year is the major cropping period and immediately following the first harvest the second cropping begins. It was found that in some cases, farmers grow vegetables that earn them an average of 100-150 baht per day. Besides, farmers would work in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to earn extra money during the post-harvest season.

Production cost is another significant factor that cause the drain of farmers' assets. The case study reveals that the cost of rice production in Ban Tung Yao is 3.20 baht/kg. for major cropping [17] and 2.90 baht/kg. for second cropping [18] . The table below illustrates the situation.

Table 5: The Production cost in Crop Year 1999/2000 and 2000/2001
Calculated by Rice Farmers in Ban Tung-Yao
Unit: baht per rai

Remark: The kinds of rice that adopted in the field are different and they affected to the yield per rai. For major crop farmers grow Hom-Supan Rice and Jasmine Rice, while for second crop they grow Rice No. 6 and Rice No. 7

The list of expenses in the table shows that farmers lose approximately100,000 baht/household/year, calculated as (total cost of production per rai times the average land tillage area of 13.46 rai/household). Vilad Techaphiboon [19] analyzed that modern agricultural inputs like agro-chemicals are industrial products, especially from petrochemical industry the prices of which have risen much higher than agricultural products. While the need for chemical inputs is increasing because soil is infertile due to intensive farming, it causes the imbalance of trade. In the past 30 years in the Asian region, the increasing rate of chemical fertilizer usage is 30 to 40 times higher than rate of rice productivity. It was recorded in Thailand that during year 2000-2001, the national income from agricultural products increased 25% while the importation of agro-chemicals increased 3 times, the value of which was 4 times higher than the increase of income from agricultural exports. Therefore, farmers' cash resources are drawn out of the community at the micro level and from the country at the macro level as most of the agricultural inputs are imported.

Chemical usage not only directly effects in the drain of community assets but also the deterioration of community health. According to a study of the Pesticide Action Network Asian and the Pacific [20] (PAN AP), farmers who use chemicals in production have high risks of heart and skin diseases, cancer and deteriorating reproductive health. The study is compatible with the statistics of Ban Sanmana Health Center that reveals disorders in the respiratory and digestive systems and in the skins as common ailments in the community. It can be inferred that changes in the production system significantly relates with farmers' ailments. When farmers use more dangerous agro-chemical inputs in the new agricultural system, community health is adversely affected.

Labor patterns in modern agricultural production have also changed. Currently, the agricultural production in Ban Tung Yao relies on external labor because household-labor is inadequate for bigger scale production that has to produce and supply the market at the right time. Farmers in Ban Tung Yao hire labor of other families in the community or nearby communities or other provinces. The hiring of external labor positively generates local employment on the one hand but on the other, unfavorably increases the production expenses of farmers. Moreover, farmers have to increase tillage areas to increase production and income to meet production cost and household expenses. Chattrip Naksupa [21] explained that the increasing scale of production to meet market demand through increasing use of production inputs, expansion of tillage areas, and labor expansion led to the unsustainable use of natural resources. When farmers expand chemical farming, resources are reduced or depleted and the community will deteriorate in the end.

As shown in Table 5, household-labor wage is not included even as the common practice is that farmers' household members are working daily in their farms. The table does not also include land rents. The inclusion of these two items would practically result in figures much higher than what the table presents. It can therefore be said that the above discussions are only the minimum evaluation of the loss of community assets.

Commercial and export-oriented production aim to increase productivity through the use of commercial technology such as the use of growth hormones and intensive use of chemicals inputs. These lead to the loss of the communities' tangible and intangible assets. As a consequence, capitalism in agriculture has overburdened the small farmers of production roles that are beyond their capacity, thus, making them over-dependent on externals.

2. Loss of Economic Security

As can be seen from the table below, after the Agreement on Agriculture was implemented from 1995 onwards, there has been no significant indicator that can provide proof as to the favorable achievement of AoA in relation to the market price of rice. This is especially valid for the export price of F.O.B. [22] that has only either decreased or fluctuated.

Table 6: Rice Price Before and After the Agreement on Agriculture
Unit: baht per metric ton

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