As a concept, an ASEAN Community lays a firm foundation to construct an ASEAN that is more relevant to its people. Indeed, the word 'community' itself can generally be understood as 'a united body of individuals; the people with common interests living in a particular area; [or] a group of people with a common characteristic or interest living in a common location' (Merriam-Webster's 11 Collegiate Dictionary 2003 - electronic version). Since the terms 'people' and 'group of individuals' make up the definition of a 'community', it is, therefore, logical that people should be at the centre of an ASEAN Community. As such, it is also logical for ASEAN to allow greater participation of civil-society groups in many of its regional integration initiatives. At the same time, Southeast Asian civil-society groups are equally responsible to take active roles in the regional integration initiatives of the Association.

This paper analyses the roles of Southeast Asian civil-society groups in the making of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). More specifically, it seeks to identify possible entry points in which Southeast Asian civil-society could engage itself vis- ƒÆ’  -vis ASEAN regional economic integration initiatives. In order to facilitate our discussion, several important elements will be discussed in this paper, including: (1) the exploration of the meaning of an ASEAN Economic Community; (2) the AEC in the view of regional economic integration theory; (3) the challenges and opportunities in the deepening of ASEAN economic integration; and (4) the roles of Southeast Asian civil-society groups in the making of an AEC.

What is an ASEAN Economic Community?

The Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II spells out the definition of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as an end-goal of ASEAN economic integration initiative as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020,¹ which aims to create a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN economic region (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). In the view of draftsmen of this document, free flow of goods, services, investment, and capital are deemed necessary if ASEAN expects to achieve equitable economic development, poverty reduction, and narrowing the socio-economic gap amongst its population by 2020. The AEC is also expected to be the backbone of the establishment of a single market and production base initiatives in the region. Despite this, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II also implies that the establishment of an AEC will be based on the convergence of interests amongst ASEAN member countries to deepen and broaden their economic integration efforts.

Prior to announcing the establishment of the AEC, ASEAN Economic Ministers have commissioned a leading consulting firm, McKinsey and Co., and an ASEAN High Level Task Force (AHLTF) to provide some general frameworks and ideas needed to make the AEC into realisation (Soesastro 2005: 3-4). In its recommendations, McKinsey's ASEAN Competitiveness Study, which was carried out for nine months, from May 2002 until February 2003, recommended ASEAN to undertake bold liberalisation measures in a number of prioritised sectors. In addition, it was recommended that ASEAN should undertake four initiatives within those prioritised sectors, including: (1) the elimination of non-tariff barriers (custom efficiency, harmonisation of procedures, and the removal of duplication in testing and licensing procedures); (2) to enhance tariff reforms (eliminating intra-regional tariffs to reduce the amount of paperwork and speed-up custom clearance); (3) to create a level playing field for capital (eliminating restrictions on cross-border investments); and (4) to improve regional collaboration (achieving single market through targeting co-operation in several important areas, such as the flow of skilled labour across the region and technical assistance for newer member countries).²

Meanwhile, the AHLTF gave three key recommendations as a first step towards realising the AEC. The recommendations, however, provided flexibilities for newer member countries, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam (also known as CMLV countries), that may not be able to meet the recommended deadlines. The first key recommendation of AHLTF was to strengthen the current economic co-operation initiatives, including economic co-operation for trade in goods, trade in services, investments, and intellectual property rights (IPRs). The second set of recommendation was the introduction of new initiatives and measures in integrating the economies of ASEAN. A key element in the second set of recommendation is the introduction of 11 priority sectors, including wood-based products, automotive (Indonesia), rubber-based products, textiles and apparels (Malaysia), fisheries, agro-based products (Myanmar), electronics (Philippines), healthcare, E-ASEAN (Singapore), air travel, and tourism (Thailand). Finally, the third set of AHLTF's recommendation dealt with the institutional strengthening of ASEAN economic initiatives, which includes reaffirming ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) as co-ordinators of all ASEAN economic integration initiatives as well as resolving issues of policy.³

Several elements of recommendations from McKinsey and AHLTF were later adopted by the ASEAN Economic Ministers (Soesastro 2005: 4). Amongst others, ASEAN was committed to: (1) institute new mechanisms and to strengthen the implementation of the existing regional economic integration initiatives (such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)); (2) address the development divide between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV countries by incorporating technical and development co-operation in ASEAN economic integration initiatives; (3) realise an integrated economic community through the implementation of liberalisation and co-operation measures; (4) accelerate the integration of the 11 identified priority sectors.

There are some relevant questions that need to be addressed in relation to the establishment of the AEC. The first question is why there is such a need to construct an economic community. The second question is the extent to which all elements that make up the definition of an AEC are representative of the needs of the Southeast Asian people. In addressing the first question, Hew (2003) argues that the establishment of an AEC is necessary given the increasingly competitive globalised environment. The growing markets of China and India are perceived as increasing threats to the overall economic competitiveness of the ASEAN region. From this perspective, as Hew further argues, the AEC would allow ASEAN to revitalise and remain competitive vis- ƒÆ’  -vis the rising challenges of globalisation.

However, the deepening of economic integration in Southeast Asia is not merely due to widespread concerns over the increasing competition in a globalised world per se. Discussions about the possible deepening of economic integration in Southeast Asia had long emerged before the idea of the AEC surfaced. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s stimulated the emergence of various regional economic integration initiatives all over the world. At that time, ASEAN policy-makers saw the necessity to strengthen economic co-operation to counter the growing economic threats from larger economic blocks, such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). In addition, calls to use the term economic integration in the region also became prevalent amongst economists from within and outside the ASEAN region (Chirativat et al 1999: 30). AFTA then came to reality with the objective 'to increase the international competitiveness of ASEAN industries and [to make] the ASEAN region an investment location' (Tongzon 2002: 182).

Subsequently, a stronger push towards the establishment of an AEC was made possible through the emergence of the 1997 regional economic crisis. The economic crisis has not only shown how closely related most East Asian economies were (Cuyvers et al 2005), but it also stimulated the growing Pan Asian nationalism, highlighting the East Asian resentment towards the great powers, particularly the US and multilateral financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Byung-Joon Ahn 2004: 25). Therefore, the strengthening of economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, if not East-Asia, was deemed necessary to minimise the possibility of future crisis to emerge.

AEC and the regional economic integration theory

The strengthening of ASEAN economic integration cannot be separated from the regional economic integration (REI) theory. One prevalent model of REI that has been used as a benchmark for many regional groupings in the world is the Western European model of economic integration. REI in Western Europe has evolved from merely a sectoral co-operation into a highly complex form of co-operation, including the unification of monetary and fiscal policies of member countries. The underlying concept within the study of REI has been the theory of the customs union, which refers to the creation of the advanced stages of REI in linear succession. These stages normally include the formation of a preferential trading agreement (PTA), FTA, customs union, common market, and, finally, economic and political union (Ballasa 1961; Robson 1987; El-Agraa 1997; Jovanovich 1998). As with most other regional groupings in the world, with the exception of the EU, REI in Southeast Asia has only advanced at the FTA level.⁴

Previously, many scholars expressed pessimisms about the possibility of ASEAN economic integration to move beyond the FTA level. Amongst other things, the key problem in Southeast Asia is the reluctance of member countries to surrender part of their sovereignty. At an advanced level of REI, a regional grouping must suppress any discrimination in commodity movements as well as impose an equalisation of tariffs towards non-member countries (custom union), abolish restrictions on factor movements (common market), harmonise national economic policies amongst member countries (economic union), and, finally, unify monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies (total economic integration). During the end of the early phase of global regionalism phenomenon, also known as the 'first wave of regionalism' (late 1950s until early 1970s), many regional groupings, particularly those formed amongst developing countries, failed to sustain their existence. One major problem encountered by these regional groupings was that they used the EEC as their model of regional integration (Langhammer and Hiemenz 1991: 173; Breslin et al. 2002: 3). The EEC is a very complex model for many developing countries. It requires economic heterogeneity and the willingness of member countries to pool their resources together, and also to surrender part of their sovereignty. To date, Central American Common Market (CACM) and ASEAN are the only regional groupings amongst developing countries able to survive the transition period between the first wave and the second wave of regionalism, which began to emerge after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. Another main obstacle to regional integration during the first wave of regionalism was the issue of forms of new identity (Jelin 1999: 47), as well as internal conflicts that thwarted cooperation (Banega et al. 2001: 235). Successful regional integration attempts, therefore, depend upon the success of participating governments in addressing these issues and not simply mirroring REI attempts in other regions.

Therefore, the strengthening of ASEAN economic integration through the establishment of the AEC should be understood in a different context to that of the EEC or European Union (EU). In Europe, for example, the establishment of EEC in 1958 pushed countries in that region to apply common external tariff (CET) vis- ƒÆ’  -vis non-EEC member countries. If one was to compare ASEAN and Western European economic integration, it would be difficult to see the former applying similar methodological approach of economic integration to that of the EC model. Amongst other things, external tariff harmonisation would be difficult to achieve owing to huge discrepancies of external tariffs amongst ASEAN member countries (Economist 2004). In this context, external tariff harmonisation would only be made possible if, for example, Singapore, which is basically a free port and does not impose tariffs, agrees to re-impose tariffs to its non-ASEAN trading partners, or the other nine ASEAN member countries agree to lower their import tariffs (Reyes 2004; Cuyvers 2005: 11). In either case, the issue of CET imposition is still highly sensitive, at least for the time being.

The former Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, once stated that, 'in the longer term, ASEAN will have to consider whether it wants to work towards an "ASEAN Economic Community" not unlike the European Economic Community of the 1950s, or whether it wants to remain a free association of independent states that voluntarily synchronize their policies, or evolve into a European Union-like entity' (World Economic Forum 2002). However, ASEAN's rejection to fully imitate the Western European economic model was made clear by ASEAN leaders after the signing of the ASEAN Concord II. At the time, the former Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, stated in his speech that, although the AEC could somehow be compared to a certain degree to the establishment of the EU, 'it will never become the ASEAN Union' (The Jakarta Post 2003). If ASEAN is reluctant to mirror the EC model of economic integration, then there is a necessity to decide a clear definition as to what the 'economic community of ASEAN' actually means. Although the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II provides the definition to the term AEC, it is by no means perfect. The participation of civil-society groups in the establishment of AEC should, therefore, be crucial in broadening the very definition of an AEC.

Challenges and opportunities in the deepening of ASEAN Economic Integration

There have not been so many comprehensive assessments that specifically address the issue of problems and opportunities derive from the establishment of an AEC. Many data surrounding this issue are scattered throughout a number of academic works related to the subject and various media reports. Initially, when ASEAN introduced AFTA in 1993, proponents of this economic co-operation scheme argued that the deepening of regional economic integration in the region should be able to 'help to attract foreign investment and " ¦ strengthen Southeast Asia's global trading position' (Petri 1997: 191). Such an analysis draws largely upon the insistence that AFTA is not an isolationist policy enforced by ASEAN member countries to create a trading bloc, as some have previously suggested. In addition, Chirathivat et al (1999: 31) maintain that AFTA will enable member countries to extend and to combine their natural resources, thereby limiting national barriers. Equally important is the fact that the formation of AFTA can help the Association prepare itself for further regional and global trade liberalisation programmes. This, in turn, will help member states to realise the necessity of having ASEAN for addressing various regional issues and problems. Moreover, AFTA was deemed crucial in increasing ASEAN's global competitiveness. In Soesastro's (2000: 24) analysis, for example, ASEAN represents more than AFTA and the objectives of free trade are not merely to increase intra-regional trade or to support regional import substitution schemes. AFTA is only a stepping-stone, which enables the Association to achieve a necessary competitive edge in the global economy. This is why ASEAN continues to expand its economic co-operation framework, which can be seen in the concept of AFTA Plus.⁵ Therefore, according to such an analysis, AFTA should provide a necessary learning ground for ASEAN members before departing into a more complex regional and multilateral economic co-operation.

Under the neo-liberal economic approach, the benefits of an enhanced economic integration under the AEC scheme would be much higher than those derived from AFTA. Two studies conducted by Schwarz and Villinger, and Lim and Walls (2004) confirm this premise. Their analyses generally reveal that the strengthening of ASEAN economic co-operation allows firms to increase economies of scale and scope, competition, and productivity, which, subsequently, leads to the increase of investment flows, intra-regional trade, and the emergence of vitally competitive ASEAN enterprises. Judging from the experience of the European Union (EU), Schwarz and Villinger also argue that the benefit of an enhanced economic integration in ASEAN would be around 10 percent of the regional GDP (p. 3). Apart from that, the AEC would also simplify custom procedures and reduce red-tape at the borders, as well as help in reducing intra-ASEAN smuggling because tariffs would be down to zero percent amongst ASEAN member countries.

However, the above-mentioned studies also stipulate that the widespread uncertainties amongst policy-makers and the business community towards the end-goal of economic integration would pose significant problems to the creation of an AEC.⁶ Such uncertainties are not without reasons. So far, the enhancement of ASEAN economic integration is based on the notion of economic openness, mostly due to most member countries' perception that open trade regimes lead to economic growth and poverty reduction in poor countries (Dollar and Kraay 2001). The inclination of most ASEAN member countries to opt for an open trade and investment regime is reflected in the analysis of trade as a proportion of GDP (see Table 1). Most of the older member countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and Thailand are generally open, whilst two newer member countries, such as Lao PDR and Myanmar, are still relatively closed.

In reality, however, the adoption of economic openness is still solely used to facilitate foreign direct investments (FDI) from non-ASEAN countries in the Southeast Asian region. The conventional schools of thought of the ASEAN region argue that FDI has, indeed, played an integral part in the contemporary economic development of Southeast Asia, with the industrialisation of many states in the region depending significantly on the investment from non-ASEAN multinational corporations (MNCs) (Dent 2004: 32). Some ASEAN countries lacking domestic financial resources to support their export-oriented economy have even relied on FDI as a cornerstone of their industrial growth.

Furthermore, according to this line of thinking, FDIs allow ASEAN states, particularly the five core ASEAN members, to overcome the constraints of small domestic markets and resource bases, exploiting comparative advantage and scale economies, and to access foreign capital and technology, marketing, and managerial expertise (Chia 1999: 249). In addition, numerous studies have even tried to link between FDI with economic growth (see for example Balasubramanyam et al 1999 and Baliamoune 2000), which generally assume the significant contribution of the former towards the latter.

Fortunately, there are some opponents of neo-liberal structural reforms who argue that many of those aforementioned benefits are questionable. Indeed, the difficulty remains as to how the transfer of technology and knowledge can be ensured, and how infrastructure development projects can be implemented (Arnold 2004: 7). Some recent studies have argued that there is no causal link between FDI and growth (see, for example, Carkovic and Levine 2002). Instead of receiving the above-mentioned benefits from the implementation of FDI policy, the Southeast Asian region still see 'the predatory practices of Microsoft, the environment depredations of Shell, [the] irresponsibility of Monsanto and Novartis in promoting genetically modified organisms, Nike's systematic exploitation of dirt-cheap labour, and Mitsubishi, Ford, and Firestone's concealment from consumers of serious product defects' (Bello 2002: 7).

Table 1. Trade as Percent of GDP

Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2004) Notes:Brunei - exports include re-exports. Indonesia and Vietnam - computed based on dollar values of exports, imports, and GDP. Dollar value of GDP derived by converting GDP using the average exchange rate during the period. Myanmar - 'p' in 2001 means preliminary. GDP data on fiscal year (March to April).

Another key challenge in the formation of an AEC is the contribution of this regional economic integration initiative towards poverty reduction in the Southeast Asian region. There are now more than 116 million people, out of a total of 550 million, living under the poverty line in this region (see Table 2). Advocates of neo-liberalism would argue that an enhanced economic integration would contribute to poverty alleviation in the Southeast Asian region. In the view of Reyes (2004), for example, ASEAN economic integration is on the side of the poor. The making of ASEAN as a more attractive production base through the conduct of trade and investment liberalisation would not only create new job opportunities in the short-term, it would also lower production cost, which would benefit producers, workers, and consumers in the long run. However, these benefits are to be achieved only if the ASEAN market is functioning in a fair and fully competitive way. Yet, in reality, the predatory nature of foreign firms and local conglomerates undermine those objectives. It is, therefore, imperative for ASEAN to establish an economic practices monitoring system if it is to ascribe fully to the neo-liberal standards of running its economy.

Table 2. Poverty in ASEAN

Source: Asian Development Bank (2005)

In trade-related matters, the homogeneity of ASEAN economies often hampers intra-regional trade. To date, intra-ASEAN trade stands at US$ 130 billion, or accounting for about 22 percent of total ASEAN's trade. Recently, however, at the 37th ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting, 28-30 September 2005, the ASEAN Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong, believes that ASEAN could increase intra-ASEAN trade to US$ 200 billion by 2010, or about 30 percent of ASEAN's total trade (Basri 2005). The key issue in relation to efforts in increasing intra-ASEAN trade is not only identifying economic convergence amongst the six core ASEAN countries, but also the way in which the development gap between the older and newer ASEAN members should be addressed. Without these efforts, it is unlikely that ASEAN will be capable of increasing its intra-regional trade.

To start with, ASEAN is still unable to address the basic problem that lies underneath the relatively low intra-ASEAN trade. It is common knowledge amongst observers of ASEAN that the economies of this regional grouping are highly competitive, with member countries often possessing similar natural resources and produce similar line of productions. To date, the only possibility of increasing ASEAN trade is to utilise the ability of multinational firms, from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN member countries, and to diversify their production base and market. This approach is commonly used in the automotive, food, and toiletries industries. Cars, snacks, and shampoo consumed by Indonesians today are produced in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and vice-versa. This tendency, however, as mentioned earlier, poses a problem for the poor people in ASEAN because the control of multinational firms over the Southeast Asian region often grows at the expense of the economically most vulnerable.

The only alternative to increase intra-ASEAN trade that has been proposed to date is the expansion of ASEAN economic co-operation to include the three Northeast Asian countries, namely China, Japan, and South Korea, under the auspices of the ASEAN plus Three (APT) mechanism. The economic complementarity between ASEAN and these countries are significant, and, therefore, capable to help ASEAN to increase its intra-ASEAN trade. However, the behaviours of multinational firms from the three Northeast Asian countries are not better than those coming from the non-APT countries. Accordingly, a mechanism to monitor the activities of these firms is crucial to ensure that the benefits derived from the establishment of an AEC would go to those in need.

Another possible solution to increase intra-ASEAN trade is to encourage the dissemination of ASEAN economic integration initiatives in local languages. I have suggested elsewhere (see Chandra 2004) that one of the key reasons why intra-ASEAN trade has been relatively small is due to the lack of information generated to local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in ASEAN countries. Since the signing of the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) in 1997, the participation of ASEAN SMEs in the regional economic integration initiative is highly recognised because this segment constitutes the majority of the economies of ASEAN member countries. Despite this, bureaucracy red-tape and the lack of information available in local languages often hinder the participation of these segments of the economy in the ASEAN economic integration initiatives.

Meanwhile, efforts to narrow the gap between the core members of ASEAN and the CLMV countries should also be done to expand intra-ASEAN trade. Initially, the admittance of CLMV countries into ASEAN was seen as a possible drawback for ASEAN because it might sabotage the Association's earlier efforts to achieve meaningful integration (Bello 1997). Prior to the implementation of the current ASEAN economic integration scheme, AFTA, for example, some observers, such as Akrasanee (2000), believed that the expansion of ASEAN membership will force the Association to adopt measures and schemes that are acceptable for the new members. This speculation turned into reality when ASEAN leaders, for instance, agreed to form an AEC without the existence of common external tariffs (CET). However, in his comparative study of the EU's and ASEAN's enlargement processes, Pomfret (1998: 8) concludes that the entrance of new members into the Association will be generally beneficial for the Association, apart from some minor discussions regarding the new member countries' lack of experience in dealing in the WTO type tariff reduction measures. At the same time, internal trade disputes between the old and the new members will be minimal since the issue of intra-trade remains an issue of only minor importance for ASEAN. One major benefit that the enlargement will bring is the enhancement of ASEAN's international bargaining position in international fora. To date, ASEAN has introduced the ASEAN Integration System of Preferences (AISP), which is a useful mechanism to narrow the gap between ASEAN's original members and the CLMV countries. However, as stated by Ong Keng Yong during the 37th ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting, the challenge now is for the ASEAN-6 to improve their preferences given to the CLMC countries, both in terms of product average and AISP rates.⁷

Another challenge for the creation of AEC is the emergence of bilateral free trade agreements (BFTAs), which are not only conducted between ASEAN and non-ASEAN member countries (i.e. China) or other regional groupings (i.e. EU), but also between ASEAN and non-ASEAN member countries. The latter has the potential to undermine ASEAN cohesion, thus, the overall ASEAN economic integration initiatives. The proliferation of this type of trade agreement has been made possible, amongst other things, owing to the difficulty of creating a full global trade liberalisation system under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Overall, there are two opposing views about this type of trade agreement in the ASEAN region. As a supporter of BFTAs, Ong Keng Yong once stated that 'bilateral deals can help iron out thorny issues between two trading partners before they stymie larger negotiations', whilst critics of this trade arrangement, such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the former Malaysian Prime Minister, believe that the signing of BFTA deals between ASEAN and non-ASEAN member countries 'risked providing countries, such as the US, with a back door into ASEAN and a way to undermine local industries with cheap manufacture'.⁸

The roles of civil-society groups in the making of an AEC

The roles of civil-society groups are obviously significant in the making of an AEC. Since the emergence of the economic crisis of 1997/98 and the increasing democratisation in the region, for example, the total number of NGOs and CSOs has doubled in Southeast Asia, from 6,558 in 1990 to 11,270 in 2000 (Chandra 2004: 159). The roles of these types of organisations at the national level are similar to those at the regional level. In many ASEAN countries, NGOs and CSOs do not only act as a channel for social and political participation, but can also sometimes act as opponents to the existing political regime. In other words, the roles of civil-society groups are crucial because they ensure a situation of check and balance in a democratic society. At the regional context, the roles of these non-state actors are equally important. In his analysis of the East Asian regionalisation process, for example, Dajin Peng (2002) contends to argue that non-state actors' activities, particularly those conducted by economic players, including in the forms of regional production network, ethnic business network, and sub-regional economic zones, are key elements in strengthening the needs to form a regional institution in this region. The same also applies in the Southeast Asian region. In the future, the creation of regional community and identity are not only made possible by business and academic networking, but also through the increasing wider regional civil-society participations, including those from the NGOs and CSOs.

In the building of an AEC, the roles of ASEAN civil-society groups are to ensure that the objectives spelled out in the ASEAN Concord II can be achieved. It is unquestionably true that the ASEAN Concord II and many other ASEAN documents provide qualitative objectives, which are not easily achievable in reality. For example, the fifth point of the AEC section in the ASEAN Concord II specifies, amongst others, that the realisation of a fully integrated economic community should also include an enhanced co-operation in the areas of human resources development and capacity building. ASEAN and its member governments are incapable to achieve this objective by themselves, and require the assistance of non-state actors. In May 2004, the ASEAN Secretariat announced that it was only able to pursue 35 percent of its projects because of the lack of funding, with activities, such as the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) project requiring 20 percent more funding (Lim and Walls 2004). The problems are not always funding-related, but can also derive from the limited human resources capability of implementing those projects. In recent years, many analysts suggest the necessity for the expansion of the ASEAN Secretariat. However, the involvement of civil-society groups in the ASEAN activities that has the potential to assist the ASEAN Secretariat, which is too overwhelmed to fulfil many objectives stated by ASEAN leaders, and the grouping's member governments, many of which are too preoccupied with domestic politics and problems.

Specific to trade and economic-related issues, the roles of ASEAN civil-society groups are to ensure that ASEAN economic integration projects, including the establishment of an AEC, should benefit the people of Southeast Asia. The roles of ASEAN NGOs and CSOs, are particularly crucial in this regard. Indeed, these organisations are capable to generate alternative ideas and proposals challenging the mainstream views about the process of regionalisation. For example, ASEAN NGOs and CSOs can ensure that the strengthening of ASEAN economic integration will not be used to facilitate the interests of national conglomerates and large multinational corporations.

In addition, ASEAN NGOs and CSOs also bear significant roles in questioning the utilisation of BFTAs strategy conducted between each ASEAN member country and its respective trading partners. The implementation of these trade arrangements carries far more damaging results in comparison to ASEAN regional trade arrangement that still allows trade liberalisation measures under a voluntary basis. BFTAs, in contrast, do not only allow more aggressive trade liberalisation measures to take place other than those adopted at the WTO level, and they are also undermining ASEAN cohesion as a whole.

Conclusion

The establishment of an AEC poses new challenges not only for ASEAN, but also for the civil-society groups in the region. On the one hand, ASEAN should make sure that its enhanced economic integration initiative is relevant to the people of Southeast Asia, whilst, on the other hand, civil-society groups should be able to play significant roles in ensuring a pro-people economic co-operation amongst ASEAN member countries. This paper has provided a general analysis of the roles of Southeast Asian civil-society groups in the making of an AEC, as well as some entry-points in which these organisations could enhance their engagement with ASEAN. There are, of course, many other potential areas of co-operation between ASEAN and its civil-society groups that have not been addressed in this paper. However, each civil-society group has its own field of expertise and focus on problems that may derive from the AEC, or deal with specific area that may encourage the successful implementation of this economic integration initiative. The main task for ASEAN and Southeast Asian civil-society groups is to increase communications between them in order to identify areas that may increase the possibility of pro-people economic co-operations amongst countries in the Southeast Asian region.

ENDNOTES:

¹ The ASEAN Vision 2020 was adopted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 15 December 1997, which specifies 'ASEAN Economic Region' as the goal for this regional grouping by 2020 (Ong 2003).

² See also Schwarz and Villinger (2004).

³ For further details of the Recommendation of the High-Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration, visit the official website of the ASEAN Secretariat (accessed 16 November 2005), at: http://www.aseansec.org/hltf.htm

⁴ In the past ASEAN has also practised economic co-operation under the framework of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (ASEAN-PTA) in 1977.

⁵ The AFTA Plus concept involves mainly the expansion of agreements made within the AFTA framework. To date, such expansion includes the formation of various measures to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers for products that are not covered by the original CEPT agreement, which can be seen in the aforementioned enhanced economic co-operation initiatives, such as in service, intellectual property, AICO, AIA, custom harmonisation, etc.

⁶ In addition, Schwarz and Villinger also discuss other problems that will pose key challenge in the making of an AEC, which include the lack of political will amongst ASEAN member countries, as well as the limited power and resources that the ASEAN Secretariat possess to ensure the Association's integration initiatives are on-track. In a similar line of argument, Lim and Hank also argue that each ASEAN member country still fails to fully identify its own comparative advantages. In addition, ASEAN, as a regional grouping, still lacks the mechanisms and deadlines to implement many trade facilitation measures that have been incorporated in the grouping's existing trade and investment agreements, such as AFTA and AIA.

⁷ As reported by Basri (2005).

⁸ As reported by Arnold (2005).

REFERENCES

Akrasanee, N. (2000), 'ASEAN in the Past 33 Years: Lessons for Economic Co-operation', in S. S. C. Tay, et al., eds., A New ASEAN in a New Millennium,

Jakarta and Singapore: CSIS and ISEAS, pp. 35-42.

Arnold, D. (2004), Attracting FDI Through the Spread of Free Trade Agreements: Unravelling the Rationale and Impact on Labour Conditions in ASEAN, Hong Kong, SAR: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, available online at:http://www.thailabour.org/docs/fdi_asean.pdf

ASEAN Secretariat (2002), Statistics of Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN, available online:http://www.aseansec.org/14549.htm

ASEAN Secretariat (2003), Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, available online at: http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm

ASEAN Secretariat (2004), ASEAN in Figures 2003, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Asian Development Bank (2005), Key Indicators 2005, Manila: Asian Development Bank, available online at: http://www.adb.org/Statistics/regional_tables.asp

Balassa, B (1961), The Theory of Economic Integration, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Balasubramanyam, V. N., M. Salisu, and D. Sapsford (1999), 'Foreign Direct Investment as an Engine of Growth', Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Vol. 8, pp. 27-40.

Baliamoune, M. (2002), Assessing the Impact of One Aspect of Globalization on Economic Growth in Africa', WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002/91, World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University, Helsinki.

Banega, C., B. Hettne, and F. S ƒÆ’ ¶derbaum (2001), 'The New Regionalism in South America', in M. Schulz, et al., eds., Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors, and Processes, London: Zed Books, pp. 234-249.

Basri, N. B. (2005), 'ASEAN Aims to Increase Intra-ASEAN Tradeto US$200 bln in Five Years', Bernama, 27 September, available online at: http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v3/news_business.php?id=157723

Bello, W. (2002), Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy, London: Zed Books.

Breslin, S. R. Higgot, and B. Rosamond (2002), 'Regions in Comparative Perspective', in S. Breslin et al., eds., New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy, London: Routledge, pp. 1-19.

Byung-Joon Ahn (2005), 'The Rise of China and the Future of East Asian Integration', Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 18-35.

Carkovic, M., and R. Levine (2005), 'Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth?', in T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomstr ƒÆ’ ¶m, eds.,

Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?, pp. 195-220.

Chandra, A. C. (2004), 'Indonesian Non-State Actors in ASEAN: A New Regionalism Agenda for Southeast Asia?', Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 155-74.

_____ (2005), 'Indonesia and Bilateral Trade Arrangements', Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 541-64.

Chia, S. Y. (1999), 'Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Economic Development of Southeast Asia', The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 249-70.

Chirathivat, S., C. Paschusanond, and P. Wongboonsin (1999), 'ASEAN Prospects for Regional Integration and the Implications for the ASEAN Legislative and Institutional Framework', ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 28-52.

Cuyvers, L., P. De Lombaerde, and S. Verherstraeten (2005), From AFTA towards an ASEAN Economic Community " ¦ and Beyond, Centre for ASEAN Studies

(CAS) Discussion Paper No. 46, Antwerp: CAS and Centre for International Management and Development Antwerp.

Dent, C. M. (2004), 'The Political-Economy of Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asia: Economic-Security Perspectives', in N. J. Freeman and F. L. Bartels, eds., The Future of Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, pp. 32-48.

Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2001), Trade, Growth, and Poverty, Development Research Group, The World Bank, June.Economist (2004), 'Free Trade in Southeast Asia, More Effort Needed', Economist, 29 July.

El-Agraa, Ali M. (1997), Economic Integration Worldwide, London: Macmillan.

Hew, Denis (2003), Towards an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020: Vision or Reality?, Viewpoint, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), available online at:http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/dhjun03.pdf

Jelin, Elizabeth (1999), Dialogues, Understanding and Misunderstanding: Social Movements in MERCOSUR, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Jovanovich, M. N. (1998), International Economic Integration: Limits and Prospects, 2nd edition, London: Routledge.

Langhamer, R., and V. Hiemenz (1991), Regional Integration among Developing Countries, UNDP-World Bank Trade Expansion Program, Occasional Paper No. 7, Washington, DC: World Bank.

Lim, H., and M. Walls (2004), 'ASEAN after AFTA: What's Next?', Dialogue and Co-operation, Issue No. 3, pp. 91-103, available online at: http://www.fesspore.org/pdf/D+C%203_2004/Lim&Walls.PDF

Ong Keng Yong (2003), ASEAN Economic Community, Speaking Notes presented at the 17th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 9th August 2003, also available from the official website of the ASEAN Secretariat, at::http://www.aseansec.org/15333.htm

Petri, P. A. (1997), 'AFTA and the Global Track', ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 190-200.

Pomfret, R. (1998), Enlargement to Include Formerly Centrally Planned Economies: ASEAN and the EU Compared, Paper presented at the Third Conference East Asia-EU Business, 'ASEAN-EU Economic Relations', in Como, Italy, on 23-5 April, available online at: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/romfret/como/pdf

Reyes, R. A. (2004), 'The ASEAN Model of Economic Integration', Jakarta Post, 19 July 2004, available online at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20040719.F01

Reyes, R. A. (2004), 'Will ASEAN Economic Integration Help the Poor?, available online at:http://www.aseansec.org/16507.htm

Robson, P. (1987), The Economics of International Integration, London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Schwarz, A., and R. Villinger (2004), 'Integrating Southeast Asia's Economies', McKinsey Quarterly, No. 1, electronic version, available online at: http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1392&L2=7&L3=8

Soesastro, H. (2000), 'ASEAN 2030: The Long View', in S.S.C. Tay, et al., eds., A New ASEAN in a New Millennium, Jakarta and Singapore: CSIS and ISEAS, pp. 187-227.

_____ (2005), Accelerating ASEAN Economic Integration: Moving Beyond AFTA, a Paper presented at the Second ASEAN Leadership Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 17 March 2005, available online at::http://www.csis.or.id/papers/wpe091

The Jakarta Post (2003), 'Bali Concord II Set as ASEAN New Courses', Jakarta Post, 8 October, available online at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archives/ArchivesDet2.asp?FileID=20031008.@01

Tongzon, J. L. (2002), The Economies of Southeast Asia, 2nd edition, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Inc.

World Economic Forum (2002), 'Deepening Regional Integration and Cooperation', World Economic Forum, 8 October, available online at: http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/_S7369?open&country_id=

| More...