1. Only recently has the ASEAN played an important role in the geopolitical interests of the United States.

2. With the first summit held in 1976, ASEAN Summits have been held annually only since 2001. There were only three summits its first 24 years (1976, 1977, and 1987), three more in the 1990s (1992, 1995, and 1998), and then every year since 2001 (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).

3. Consecutive Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR September 2001 and 2006) however articulated a shift in emphasis from Europe to Asia with corresponding demands for an increasing U.S. military presence. At the same time it also stressed an increased focus on developiong a global military force that relies not only on static fixed bases but also on mobile expeditionary and deployable forces.

4. The QDR 2006 was even more specific and pointedly stated:

1. "Of the major powers, China has greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counterstrategies." It also spoke of "ending tyranny" in North Korea.

2. Particularly relevant for Southeast Asia is how both QDRs defined the U.S. thrusts in its overseas military presence to include maintaining permanently stationed forces in fixed bases and also to give greater stress than before to rotating forces in "forward operating sites" (FOS) and "cooperative security locations" (CSL)

5. The U.S.’s main strategic objectives in Southeast Asia are to:

1. Ensure dominance in the sub-region and use this for developing and maintaining its hegemony over the rest of Asia.

2. Preserve its free access to, if not outright control of, the major sea lanes from the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.
   Southeast Asian sea routes account for more than half of the world's annual merchant shipping traffic with trade and energy shipments worth some US$1.5 trillion. These sea routes are vital, other than for commerce, for U.S. military "force projection" in the Indian Ocean to as far away as West Asia. The unique geophysical characteristics of Southeast Asia give it strategic significance.

3. Create, deepen and expand trade and investment opportunities. Although manufacturing is a key area, the U.S.'s main thrust is currently in opening up neocolonial financial service sectors.

6. U.S.-ASEAN "partnership"

1. U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership signed in 2005, among whose main objectives are to increase political and security cooperation (i.e. "promote closer cooepration on combating transnational crimes…")

2. This Enhanced Partnership's Five-Year Program of Action (POA), finalized in July 2006, covers a wide range of security, economic, and political issues. The longest sub-section is conspicuously on "Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Issues", which lists 23 points of action especially on combatting terrorism and transnational crimes

Overview on East Asia and the Pacific: Background of Present Geopolitical Configuration

1. Cold War

1. Imperialist versus socialist movements that seized power : North Korea (1948), China (1949), Vietnam (1954), Laos (1975) and Cambodia (1975)

2. Military Confrontation: Korea War (1950-53) and Vietnam War (1961-75), where 1/5 of their military spending in the 20th century went to this; air strikes were launched against Laos and Cambodia.

3. U.S. Military Bases: at its peak the U.S. had some 350 bases spread across East Asia and the Pacific

4. Pro-U.S. military dictatorships: in Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to quell mass movements and armed struggles for national independence and liberation.

2. Post World War II

1. Japanese Capitalism: U.S.-accommodated, economic anchor of a regional capitalist order; primary Asian military base of U.S. versus Sino-Soviet influence

2. Japanese subservience to the U.S.: restrained Japanese military; principal anchor of U.S. military and economic engagement in East Asia.

3. East Asian “Tigers” accommodated by the U.S.: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, economic and military outposts against Communism.

3. Post Cold War

1. No essential changes in strategic hegemonic direction even as threats, focuses, and thrusts may have been altered.

2. Trade and investment links with counterparts who were previously on the other side of the political-ideological-economic divide were formed:

1. U.S. and Russia in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum

2. Japan and China in the East Asian Summit (EAS)

3. The U.S. with Russia and China in the Six-Party Talks

4. The U.S. and North Korea in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

5. ASEAN members and Vietnam

6. ASEAN members and China in ASEAN+3

3. Situations in the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula remain volatile.

4. U.S. military and diplomatic positions are as rigid as ever.

5. China’s continued rise supposedly challenges the U.S. in the region but its military and economic strength still remains checked and manageable, even as the U.S. aggressively maneuvers to strategically pre-empt it.

6. U.S. military and economic presence still overbearing

7. More military bases: global network of some 850 bases in 138 countries, covert sites, rotating but sustained U.S. presence forces under the guise of trainings or exercises: 386,000 U.S. troops deployed in 150 countries (2005), with 70,000 in East Asia and 100,000 in the U.S. Pacific Command as a whole.

8. Cold War era U.S. mutual defense treaties remain: five of seven pacts are with East Asian countries.[1]

4. Deepening Crisis of Imperialism

1. Imperialism wracked by deepening economic crisis since the 1970s

2. Seized on the “collapse of Communism” to intensify its neoliberal “globalization” in the late 1980s and 1990s.

3. Trade and investment liberalization of neocolonial economic regimes.

4. Southeast Asian “Tiger Cubs” as symbols of “free market” hope: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, to a lesser degree, the Philippines.

5. “Asian Financial Crisis” in 1997 clarified the crisis, showed weaknesses

6. International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed harsh austerity measures and forced greater financial sector liberalization on Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea.

5. “Rise” of China, or China projected as a “threat”

1. Integration into world capitalist system on the basis of brutal foreign exploitation of vast labor force.

2. Southern and coastal provinces: region-wide neocolonial chain of industrial enclaves—an imperialist-dominated manufacturing base producing for faraway U.S. and European markets.

3. China’s military spending more than doubled in the last five years and security and military relations with neighbors increasing.

4. Economic might lacking: foreign investment abroad remains small both in terms of world investment and relative to the size of its economy.

5. Yet influence over Asia increasing: through formal trade and other agreements in bilateral and regional forums

6. U.S. as sole Superpower

1. Largest economy, pre-eminent military superpower

2. Intention of fully pursuing unchallenged perpetual supremacy.

3. The U.S.’s 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) was unambiguous in fully articulating U.S. imperialism's doctrine of pre-eminence, pre-emption, and unilateralism—which are moreover affirmed in the latest 2002 NSS.
   The 2002 NSS opened with the declaration: "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world." In later key sections it states:

1. "It is time to reaffirm the essential role of Americal military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge."

2. "(As) a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed."

3. "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively."

7. New Sub-Regional Alliances, Asian “regionalism”

1. From the dissolution of political-ideological-economic lines of the Cold War blocs; and the increasing importance of imperialist-dominated cross-border production and supply networks

2. New arenas and pressures for big power struggle for spheres of influence

3. Profitable ventures regardless of prior ideological alignments. Security, trade, and investment links with former Cold War enemies:

1. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): with U.S. and Russia, China and Taiwan

2. East Asian Summit (EAS)[2]: Japan and China

3. Six-Party Talks [3]: U.S. with Russia and China

4. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) [4]: U.S. and North Korea

5. ASEAN : anti-Communist original ASEAN members and Vietnam, etc.

PRE 9-11: REORIENTATION OF U.S. FORCES ALREADY EXISTED

1. 2001 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) already called for a shift of U.S. overseas military presence from Western Europe and North East Asia to other areas where "potential threats" are emerging

2. Even before 2001, the Visiting Forces Agreement (1998) between the U.S. and the Philippines stressed on “forward operating sites” (FOS) and “cooperative security locations” (CSL). This was reinforced by the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (2002).

Post 9-11: Overview

1. September 11 has conveniently been used to expedite and provide greater impetus to the geopolitical military strategy of the U.S. even before 9/11

2. The U.S. sets the tone for the “Second Front”

   1. Articles from the U.S. press describe describe Southeast Asia as a “haven” for the Al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist groups.

   2. Early 2002, arrests were made in Singapore and Malaysia of “terrorists”.

   3. Time magazine writing in early February (2002): “Terrorists are being uncovered throughout South East Asia with nefarious plans, bombs—and intriguing connections.”

   4. No evidence was offered for these allegations, other than the unsubstantiated claims of police and intelligence sources.

3. Soon after the World Trade Center bombing, in 15 February 2002, Bush announces the “Second Front” of the WOT in Southeast Asia, in Southern Philippines.
   Southeast Asia as a “major front” in the global War on Terror (WOT): attractive “theater of operations” for regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has allegedly been funded by the Al-Qaeda.

   
   The U.S. claims financial, operational, arms, and recruitment network of “terrorists” linking the Jemmah Islamiyah to other organizations.

4. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, the Philippine counterpart of the response of the U.S. to the 9/11 attacks, launched in January 2002, with more than 4,650 American soldiers deployed, to combat the Abu Sayaff
   This is used as the pretext of the second Balikatan exercises, held near a combat zone in Basilan and nearby islands in the southern part of the Philippines. The exercises were opposed by many groups in the Philippines. Bush and Arroyo use the WOT as further justification for the training.

5. Banner terror incidents in Southeast Asia: Bali and Davao

1. October 1, 2002 triple suicide bombing attack on Indonesian resort island of Bali “demonstrated” that the terrorist threat “persists” in Asia. Jemayaah Islamiyah admits to being the perpetrators.

2. Bombings in the Philippines in February 2003: three bombs go off almost simultaneously in different cities: Manila, Davao, and General Santos City. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) claims responsibility.

6. In Pursuit of Axis of Evil “Terrorists” in Southeast Asia

1. The ASG is linked to Jemmah Islamiyah, as are the MILF, and other armed groups.

2. The link to the J.I. becomes the connection of Southeast Asian armed groups to the Al-Qaeda.

7. Regional Anti-Terror Bodies Formed

1. Counterterrorism training to law enforcement officers:
   Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the U.S.-Thailand Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. Trainers from the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Britain, France, Russia, and Canada participated in regional counterterrorism courses, lectures, and workshops.

2. Capacity Building (e.g. Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) )

3. Multilateral regional and transnational counterterrorism cooperation through existing economic or multilateral bodies and organizations:

1. United Nations Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC)

2. G8’s Roma-Lyon and Counterterrorism Action Groups (CTAG)

3. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum

4. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

5. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Second Front of the War on Terror

1. War on Terror: Rationale for Military Presence

1. U.S. working hard to manufacture rationales to justify increased military presence; make it more acceptable

2. U.S. claim: military presence is indispensable for maintaining peace and security in Asia, vital for economic progress and development.

3. Terror scare in Southeast Asia:

1. Wide global base:
   Terrorists are inevitably portrayed as fanatical, devious and lethal with a wide and expanding global base of active and “sleeper” cells able to strike anywhere and at any time.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
   They are also said to have or be in the process of acquiring “weapons of mass destruction”.

3. Terrorist breeding ground:
   Various internal vulnerabilities such as poverty, porous borders, weak law enforcement capabilities, and large Islamic populations (stigma from 9/11).

4. Important to override “nationalist” stirrings in Asian countries against long-standing U.S. domination of the region.

5. Increased worldwide military presence as actual consideration:
   2002 NSS: “The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” As it is, the U.S. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) ominously opened with the declaration: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war.”
   "Southeast Asia is the front line of the war on terror in the (U.S. Pacific Command)". (Adm. William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (2006), “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture”, March 7, 2006.)

2. The “Terrorists”
   Jemmah Islamiyah (J.I.)
   The main terror threats being drummed up are the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) – linked to the major 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia and scattered smaller ones in the Philippines, among others – and an allegedly Al Qaeda-supported network. These groups are said to be operating in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Brunei, and Singapore with supposedly strong links to counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East.
   Shadowy international "terrorist" networks can be frontally engaged, unlike China, so these are played up by the U.S. as the primary threat.

3. Other targets tagged as “terrorist”
   Other perceived threats to U.S. imperialism are also being made targets of attack by over-extending the terrorist angle.

1. “Rogue” Nations
   Other perceived threats to U.S. imperialism are also being made targets of attack by over-extending the terrorist angle. At the international level, “rogue nations” are supposedly responsible for supplying terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.

2. Democratic Movements
   Included legitimate revolutionary struggles, national liberation movements, insurgencies, and even civilian unarmed militant groups are criminalized and demonized as “terrorists” through propaganda and legal offensives, excluding perpetrators of state violence.

3. “Non-traditional security concerns”
   Further over-extension: for a broad range of so-called transnational crimes especially involving illegal drugs, piracy, smuggling, and trafficking in persons. Even included are countries in the Asian “Rim of Fire”, a disaster prone area, where disaster relief operations can be used to engage national militaries.

4. U.S. style of counter-terror waged locally
   There is drastically increased political repression and worsened anti-democratic tendencies in the countries of the region. Governments have liberally used the "terrorist threat" to crack down not only on suspected terrorists but on political opposition arbitrarily, or maliciously, labeled as terrorist

U.S. Military Aggression

1. Overview: United States Quadrennial Defense Reviews

1. Shift in emphasis from Europe to Asia with corresponding demands for an increased U.S. military presence. Stressed increased focus on developing a global military force that relies not only on static fixed bases but also on mobile expeditionary and deployable forces. Current military set-up “(was) inadequate for the new strategic environment, in which U.S. (economic and security) interests are global and potential threats in other areas of the world are emerging.”

2. Excerpts from Quadrennial Defense Reviews 2001

1. “Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia;

2. “Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges and bases;

3. “Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence requirements; and

4. “Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, pre-positioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny access to U.S. forces.”

3. Excerpts from and based on Quadrennial Defense Reviews 2006

1. “Of the major powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counterstrategies.”

2. It also spoke of “ending tyranny” in North Korea.

3. For Southeast Asia: how both QDRs defined the U.S. thrusts in its overseas military presence to include maintaining permanently stationed forces in fixed bases and also to give greater stress than before to rotating forces in “forward operating sites” (FOS) and “cooperative security locations” (CSL).

4. Purpose of Training Exercises (Balikatan, Cobra Gold, etc.)

1. Distance of East Asia from the U.S. mainland – and, indeed, the vastness of the Asian continent – establishes a need for locating a large minimum concentration of troops, equipment and materiel in the region in fixed bases.

2. The idea however is for this presence to be augmented by the temporary stationing of U.S. forces under the guise of trainings, exercises and transit in the so-called FOS and CSL.

3. This temporary stationing lasts anywhere from a few days to six months or more and includes rotational deployments of combat aircraft, naval surface combat ships and submarines.

5. Trade Routes and “Maritime Security”
   The major sea lanes transiting Southeast Asia also explain the U.S. emphasis on “maritime security”. East Asia – including the big economies in Northeast Asia – is still heavily reliant on oil coming from the Middle East and these largely go through the strategic straits of the sub-region. The geopolitical implications are substantial with, for instance, 70 percent of China’s imported oil going through just the Malacca Straits. Disruptions in energy supplies will be detrimental for any nation’s economy and, indeed, its war-fighting capacity.

6. Southeast Asia EA as the front line of the WOT
   “Southeast Asia is the front line of the war on terror in [the U.S. Pacific Command].” [5] The vast U.S. Pacific Command, or PACOM, covers the entire hemisphere from the west coast of the U.S. to the east coast of Africa halfway around the world.

2. U.S. Military Bases

1. U.S. bases in Southeast Asia with Real Property*:

Only Singapore and Indonesia.

	US Navy	US Air Force	US Army
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia	NAVMEDRSCHUNIT Teo Dhakarta, Jakarta, Java
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore	NAVREGCONTRACTR, Singapore		Sembawang Hsg, Sembawang
Thailand
Vietnam

*Department of Defense: Base Structure Report: A Summary of DoD’s Real Property Inventory, Fiscal Year 2005 Baseline, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense: Installations and Environment

2. Table on Military Bases and Troops (see jpeg)

	Country hosting U.S. base and troops	Hosting U.S. troops	Bases under negotiation	No evident U.S. military presence
Brunei		X
Cambodia		X
Indonesia	X
Laos		X
Malaysia		X
Myanmar				X
Philippines	X
Singapore	X
Thailand		X
Vietnam



3. U.S. Military Deployment

From 2004 – 2006, total U.S. military personnel decreased for East Asia and the Pacific (Southeast Asia, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and afloat). This decrease stands for a decrease in Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. Marine Corp personnel increased from 2005 -2006 by more than a hundred.

The numbers for Southeast Asia seem minimal, with the biggest deployment consistently going to Singapore for 2004-2006, followed by Thailand.

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (309A): United States Department of Defense




Country	Total			Army			Navy			Marine Corps			Air Force
Year	04*	05^	06`	04*	05^	06`	04*	05^	06`	04*	05^	06`	04*	05^	06`
Burma	9	9	10	3	3	3	0	0	0	6	5	6	0	1	1
Cambodia	5	5	10	5	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0
Indonesia (Includes Timor)	26	23	26	9	8	9	4	2	3	10	11	0	3	2	2
Laos	4	3	4	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	5	1	2	2
Malaysia	13	16	11	2	3	1	2	3	2	5	6	34	4	4	3
Philippines	99	55	58	11	10	8	7	5	9	74	34	24	7	6	7
Singapore	164	169	180	5	6	9	95	93	101	14	24	59	50	46	46
Thailand	115	114	137	45	42	42	7	8	8	34	35	0	29	29	28
Vietnam	14	13	16	5	4	6	0	0	0	8	9	2,068	1	0	1
TOTAL SOUTH EAST ASIA	449	407	452	86	82	84	115	111	123	153	124	2208	95	90	90
TOTAL EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	86,730	78,854	78,369	28,226	23,159	21,895	17,080	16,578	16,345	18,164	16,365	17,425	23,260	22,752	22,704
	*December 2004
	^September 2005
	`June 2006




4. U.S. Joint Military “Training”

1. Overview

1. All U.S. military activities in foreign territories are, without exception, conducted in the framework of “stability operations” that cover a wide range of activities: from humanitarian/civic actions to support for pro-U.S. insurgents to shows of force.[6]

2. Improving interoperability (of procedures, equipment, communication, etc.) with national armed forces is just one of the aims of the exercises. More major is the sustaining of U.S. presence and co-opting or otherwise consolidating surrogate militaries.

3. Critical for sustaining the U.S. military posture in different places across the region and, significantly, the corresponding training and exercise areas in each country constitute the sprawling and expanding U.S. web of FOS and CSL (“forward operating sites” and “cooperative security locations”) in the region.

4. The US PACOM conducts more than 1,500 exercises and other engagement activities with foreign militaries each year.

5. Whether euphemistically called “counter-terrorism training locations” (Philippines), “training bases” (Thailand) or “field operations centers”, their underlying purpose is to provide base-like facilities as well as the groundwork for actual fixed bases in the future when these become necessary. In many cases these have already resulted in a U.S. presence in parts of countries far beyond and over much larger areas than had ever been reached by the fixed garrison bases of the Cold War era.

6. Disguised as development: infrastructure works, etc

Many of the trainings, exercises and operations are accompanied by high-profile civic actions and engineering projects. These have the immediate aim of image-building and cultivating social acceptance among local populations.

However the infrastructure works are self-serving: necessary roads, airport, seaport and storage infrastructure to be functioning launching points for future military operations.

7. Utilizing military deployment in natural disasters

The U.S. is even opportunistic about the frequent natural disasters in Southeast Asia, which are seen not only as public relations occasions but also openings for additional military-to-military coordination, especially inasmuch as most major disaster relief efforts involve local militaries.

U.S. troops join relief operations to soften criticism or apprehensions about concentrated foreign military power and to make this more acceptable to policymakers and the general public.

2. BILATERAL EXERCISES

1. CARAT

Biggest: Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise of the U.S. Pacific Fleet with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. “CARAT's focus is on improving combat oriented operational interoperability among U.S. Naval forces and each host nation's naval forces.” Began in 1995. Coordinated sets of sequential bilateral exercises.

CARAT is a series of bilateral exercises designed to increase U.S. Sailors' understanding of Southeast Asian cultures in the event the navies are called upon to work together in real-world operations.

2. BALIKATAN: U.S. – R.P.

2002

• PURPOSE proclaimed by Defense Secretary: eliminate the Abu Sayyaf and free a Philippine nurse and an American missionary couple [(Martin and Gracia Burnham) taken hostage in May 2001. The Abu Sayyaf is also holding a Philippine nurse, Deborah Yap.
• IN EXCHANGE: The US government increased military assistance to the Philippines from $2 million in 2001 to $20 million in 2002.
• PHASES: In 2002, US troops began military exercises with Philippine soldiers against Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, who have been linked to the al-Qaida terrorist group. These exercises in 2002, named “Balikatan 02” were scheduled in three phases: the preparation phase (02-1), training and field exercise phase (02-2), and redeployment phase (02-3)
• TERMS OF REFERENCE: Balikatan 02-1 in Basilan was governed by Terms of Reference [TOR], in response to concerns that the US troops would engage in combat with Abu Sayyaf. US forces can advise, assist and train Philippine units, but they are not supposed to engage in direct combat. American soldiers in the Philippines can engage in combat in self-defense if they come under attack.
• In late March 2002 it was revealed that a total of 2,665 US soldiers would take part in the RP-US Balikatan 02-2 exercise, beginning in April 2002. This only ended in mid-July 2002—a six-month long
• The joint military excercises began on 15 January 2002 and include 1,650 US troops including 150 special forces troops. The excercises were conducted with the Philippine armed forces in Zamboanga and Basilan Island, which are roughly 1000 km south of Manila. Most of the American troops trained at a base near the city of Zamboanga, across the water from Basilan. This phase of the joint campaign was to last six months.
• Both Manila and Washington said the six-month operation was a success, with the killing in June 2003 by Philippine troops of top Abu Sayyaf leader Abu Sabaya.

2003

3. The exercises, with eight battalions totaling 4,000 troops, in Luzon and Mindanao would be the biggest and longest to be undertaken by Filipino and American soldiers.

3. COBRA GOLD: U.S. – Thailand

• In May 2002, the massive Cobra Gold Exercise on Counter-Terrorism was undertaken involving some 14,000 U.S. Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel and 7,000 Thai troops, along with some dozens of observers from other ASEAN countries.

• Cobra Gold is a regularly-scheduled joint/combined exercise and is the latest in the continuing series of U.S. – Thai military exercises designed to ensure regional peace and strengthen the ability of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to defend Thailand or respond to regional contingencies. The US funds Thai military and civilian professional development training under the international military education and training program (IMET). Thailand is a generous host to US Navy ships that make frequent port calls at Pattaya and Phuket.

• Began in 1998. For Cobra Gold 2000, 14,000 U.S. forces participated.

• In Cobra 2000 and Cobra 2002, Singapore also particiapted.

• During Cobra Gold 2001, the observer program includes 35 representatives from nine countries: Australia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

5. MULTILATERAL/REGIONAL EXERCISES

1. Team Challenge

At the regional level PACOM has its umbrella security network Exercise Team Challenge (ETC), which is moreover used to coordinate with the militaries of Australia and New Zealand.

Team Challenge is a joint/combined exercise held in conjunction with Australia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. It links three existing traditional bilateral exercises into one regional exercise: Balikatan (RP), Cobra Gold (Thailand), and Tandem Thrust (Autsralia).

Team Challenge was a linked regional exercise that sought to foster several security communities. Tandem Thrust combined U.S., Australian and Canadian forces, while Balikatan and Cobra Gold focused on combined commander-in-chief Pacific forces.

2. SEACAT

In 2002, the U.S. organized the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEA-CAT) in Thailand – including the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – as a region-wide mechanism for coordinating intelligence work and security operations on terrorism and other transnational crimes.

SEACAT has been held annually since 2002. The exercise involves liaison officers from countries that also participate in the exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT). While distinct and separate from CARAT, SEACAT 2004 occurred in conjunction with CARAT 2004 and used CARAT assets.

3. EXERCISE DEEP SABRE

A multi-national maritime interdiction exercise conducted in August 2005 in South China Sea.

It involved some 2,000 personnel from the military, coast guard, customs and other agencies of 13 PSI countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US. 

PSI is a multinational initiative to address the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. U.S. Military Aid

The 300% increase in U.S. military funding from 2001-2002 is very noticeable, and is mainly due to the large increase in military funding of the Philippines from 2001-2002: a whopping 1,600% increase.




Table. US Military Funding for Southeast Asian Countries (USD million)
Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	TOTAL
Philippines	2.9	3.8	66.1	54.4	127.2
East Timor	8.5	8.5	7.1	5.4	29.5
Thailand	3.9	3.9	4.3	4	16.1
Cambodia	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	10.9
Indonesia	0	0	8.4	1.3	9.7
Vietnam	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.6	7.4
Laos	1.5	1	1.3	1.2	5
Malaysia	0.7	1.1	1	2.1	4.9
Singapore	0	0	0	0.2	0.2
TOTAL	21.7	22.7	92.4	74.1	210.9
Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants (“Greenbook” of USAID)

In the Philippines (biggest U.S. Military aid recipient in SEA): Military Intervention under guise of defense reform and modernization.

The recommendations of a Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) of the Philippine armed forces, drawn up by the U.S. PACOM and U.S. Defense Department, are being actively implemented by the U.S. military under cover of modernization assistance through Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). The far-reaching JDA studied and identified ten key areas of intervention including the critical security areas of planning, training, doctrines development and logistics procurement. Some indication of the substantial intervention of the U.S. in the Philippine armed forces is given by how, in 2004, the Philippines spent US$17.5 million for PDR implementation with the U.S. accounting for a further US$7.0 million or almost 30% of the total. As it is, the Philippines is the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Southeast Asia and has received some US$310 million since 2001.


The support of President Arroyo on Bush's "war on terror" was given only after aid was granted. She herself, in 2002, had reservations about the Abu Sayaff having close links with the Al-Qaeda

President Arroyo herself told French daily Le Monde in mid-January 2002 that there was no evidence for ties between Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda after 1995, and in New York for the World Economic Forum on February 2, she reportedly asked U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to please not refer to the Philippines as the "second front" in the "war on terrorism."

In November 2002 Arroyo visited Washington and had talks with both President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Bush, eager to expand his terror war, reportedly urged her to accept U.S. ground troops in the southern part of the country to fight Abu Sayyaf. Arroyo had to refuse on constitutional grounds.

The U.S. sent her home with $92.3 million in military equipment, including two C-130 military transport plane, a naval patrol boat, Huey helicopters and 30,000 M-16 rifles plus ammunition, and in January, it was revealed that the U.S. troops would to be sent to "train" the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the combat zone of Basilan island during the Balikatan “Exercises”.

MILITARY AGREEMENTS

1. Overview

The increased U.S. military presence needs to be realized in and supported by concrete national and regional mechanisms. The main U.S. foundations for pursuing its security objectives in Southeast Asia are its bilateral links with its long-standing closest allies – the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – and increasingly also with Malaysia and Indonesia.

The U.S. has in addition started to give increased attention to working at the East Asian level through various initiatives including the APEC forum, and at the Southeast Asian level through the ASEAN.

2. Bilateral Military Treaties (as of 2000) and Agreements

1. Overview

The basic domestic agreements needed to implement the U.S.’s increased stress on a sustained overseas military presence and on creating FOS (forward operating sites) and CSL (cooperative security locations) are those on the temporary presence of U.S. troops and equipment and those on access and war materiel pre-positioning.

These domestic legal frameworks are generically known as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and Access and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), which the U.S. has secured with the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma and Brunei.

2. Philippines

1. In the Philippines, these have taken the form of the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the 2002 Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA). These are both anchored on the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States.

2. Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Mutual defense treaty. (Signed at Washington August 30, 1951; entered into force August 27, 1952. 3 UST 3947; TIAS 2529; 177 UNTS 133.)

• Military Assistance Agreements: 1953, 1955

• Agreement for the establishment of a Mutual Defense Board and the assignment of Phil¬ippine military liaison officers to United States military bases in the Philippines. (Exchange of notes at Manila May 15, 1958; entered into force May 15, 1958. 9 UST 547; TIAS 4033; 316 UNTS 163.)

• Visiting Forces Agreement: 1998 and 1999

• This 2006, Security Engagement Board (SEB), a mechanism for far-reaching military intervention in the country. The SEB is a thoroughgoing military body with an explicit mandate over a wide range of “non-traditional security concerns” going far beyond the 1952 U.S.-RP Mutual Defense Treaty including: terrorism, transnational crimes, maritime security and safety, and natural and man-made disasters. Among the first new major military exercises planned under the SEB are the Kapit-Bisig counter-terrorism “war games” in insurgency areas of Mindanao from late 2006 to the first half of 2007.

3. Mutual Security Treaty:
   Agreement relating to the assurances required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (Ex¬change of notes at Manila January 4 and 7, 1952; entered into force January 7, 1952. 3 UST 4644; TIAS 2617; 179 UNTS 193.)

3. Singapore

Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Agreement relating to the establishment of a United States Air Force management training assistance team in Singapore, with appendices. (Exchange of letters at Singapore February 23 and 24, 1977; entered into force February 24, 1977. 29 UST 1474; TIAS 8889.)

• Memorandum of understanding for the exchange of individual personnel between the United States Army Western Command and the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces. (Signed at Singapore January 5, 1981; entered into force January 5, 1981. NP)

• Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. (Exchange of notes at Singapore May 12 and June 23, 1981; entered into force June 23, 1981. 33 UST 2034; TIAS 10166; 1529 UNTS 491.)

• Memorandum of understanding concerning exchange of service personnel between the United States Navy and Republic of Singapore Air Force. (Signed at Singapore and Washington July 19 and September 1, 1982; entered into force September 1, 1982. TIAS 10482; 1751 UNTS 115.)

• Agreement concerning general security of military information. (Exchange of notes at Singapore June 25, 1982 and March 9, 1983; entered into force March 9, 1983. TIAS 10819; 1590 UNTS 85.)

• Memorandum of understanding concerning configuration management of tactical command, control and communications standards, with annexes. (Signed at Camp Smith, Hawaii February 22, 1991; entered into force February 22, 1991. TIAS 12369.)

• Agreement on the status of Singapore personnel in the United States, with agreed minutes. (Signed at Singapore December 3, 1993; entered into force December 3, 1993. TIAS 12519.)

• Agreement concerning exchange of research and development information, with appendix. (Signed at Washington December 4, 1995; en¬tered into force December 4, 1995. TIAS 12370.)

• Agreement concerning technology research and development projects, with annex. (Signed at Washington May 2, 1998; entered into force May 2, 1998. TIAS)

4. Thailand

1. Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Agreement respecting military assistance (Military Assistance Program). (Signed at Bangkok October 17, 1950; entered into force October 17, 1950. 3 UST 2675; TIAS 2434; 79 UNTS 41.)

• Memorandum of agreement relating to the storage of ammunition in Thailand. (Signed at Bangkok March 22, 1977; entered into force March 22, 1977. 29 UST 743; TIAS 8850.)

• General security of military information agreement. (Exchange of notes at Bangkok March 30 and April 5, 1983; entered into force April 5, 1983. TIAS 10678.)

• Memorandum of understanding on logistic support. (Signed at New York October 3, 1985; entered into force October 3, 1985. TIAS 11232.)

• Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. (Exchange of notes at Bangkok April 15 and July 28, 1986; en¬tered into force July 28, 1986. TIAS 11385.)

• Agreement relating to a war reserve stockpile program in Thailand, with annexes. (Signed at Bangkok January 9, 1987; entered into force March 22, 1988. TIAS 12604.)

• Memorandum of understanding concerning interoperability management of tactical com¬mand and control procedural standards, with annex. (Signed at Bangkok December 3, 1990; entered into force December 3, 1990. TIAS)

• Agreement concerning measures to be taken for the transfer, security and safeguarding of technical information, software and equipment to the Ministry of Defense to enable industry to operate, maintain and expand Royal Thai Air Force air combat maneuvering instrumen¬tation range facilities. (Signed at Washington September 30, 1993; entered into force Sep¬tember 30, 1993. TIAS 11509.)

2. Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S.

• Agreement relating to the assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (Exchange of notes at Bangkok December 27 and 29, 1951; entered into force December 29, 1951. 3 UST 4653; TIAS 2619; 179 UNTS 113.)

5. Malaysia

Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Agreement relating to the purchase by Malaya of military equipment, materials, and services from the United States. (Exchange of notes at Washington June 30 and July 9, 1958; entered into force July 9, 1958. 9 UST 1235; TIAS 4108; 336 UNTS 79.)

• Agreement relating to the deposit by Malaysia of ten percent of the value of grant military assistance furnished by the United States. (Exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur March 8 and April 4, 1972; entered into force April 4, 1972; effective February 7, 1972. 23 UST 294; TIAS 7309.)

• Agreement relating to eligibility for United States military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. (Exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur February 11 and March 14, 1977; entered into force March 14, 1977. 29 UST 663; TIAS 8845.)

• Agreement concerning a military education exchange program. (Exchange of letters at Washington and Kuala Lumpur May 16 and 29, 1991; entered into force May 29, 1991. NP)

• Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. (Signed at Kuala Lumpur March 18, 1994; entered into force March 18, 1994. TIAS 12349.)

6. Indonesia

Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Agreement for a program of military assistance in the form of constabulary equipment to be supplied by the United States to the Republic of Indonesia. (Exchange of notes at Djakarta August 15, 1950; entered into force August 15, 1950. 2 UST 1619; TIAS 2306; 134 UNTS 255.)

• Agreement for the transfer from a grant to an aid on a reimbursable basis of the undelivered balance of constabulary equipment authorized under the agreement of August 15, 1950. (Ex¬change of notes at Washington January 5, and at Djakarta January 12, 1953; entered into force January 12, 1953. 4 UST 113; TIAS 2768; 198 UNTS 400.)

• Agreement relating to the sale to Indonesia of military equipment, materials, and services. (Exchange of notes at Djakarta August 13, 1958; entered into force August 13, 1958. 9 UST 1149; TIAS 4095; 335 UNTS 187.)

• Agreement relating to the furnishing of mili¬tary equipment, materials, and services for a program of civic action. (Exchange of notes at Djakarta April 14, 1967; entered into force April 14, 1967. 18 UST 384; TIAS 6247; 689 UNTS 3.)

• Agreement relating to the provision by the United States of basic pilot training aircraft. (Exchange of notes at Djakarta April 9 and 17, 1969; entered into force April 17, 1969. 20 UST 702; TIAS 6678; 719 UNTS 121.)

• Agreement relating to the furnishing of combat equipment to Indonesia as additional military assistance. (Exchange of notes at Djakarta Au¬gust 18 and 19, 1970; entered into force Au¬gust 19, 1970. 21 UST 2140; TIAS 6959; 764 UNTS 219.)

• Agreement relating to eligibility for United States military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. (Exchange of notes at Jakarta August 3 and 24, 1976; en¬tered into force August 24, 1976. 27 UST 4006; TIAS 8419; 1059 UNTS 131.)

7. Laos

1. Defense Treaties with the U.S.

• Memorandum of understanding concerning payment to the United States of the net pro¬ceeds from the sale of defense articles fur¬nished under the military assistance program. (Signed at Vientiane May 31, 1974; entered into force May 31, 1974; effective July 1, 1974. 27 UST 2989; TIAS 8357; 1066 UNTS 115.)

• Agreement regarding the furnishing of defense articles, related training and other defense serv¬ices from the United States to Laos. (Exchange of notes at Vientiane December 7, 1992 and September 29, 1993; entered into force Sep¬tember 29, 1993. TIAS 12346.)

2. Mutual Treaty with the U.S.

Agreement relating to the assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (Exchange of notes at Vientiane December 18 and 31, 1951; entered into force December 31, 1951. 3 UST 4622; TIAS 2613; 198 UNTS 243.)

8. Myanmar

Defense Treaty with the U.S.:
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. (Exchange of notes at Rangoon April 8 and May 27, 1980; entered into force May 27, 1980. 32 UST 968; TIAS 9745; 1222 UNTS 337.)

9. Cambodia

Defense Treaty with the U.S.

• Agreement relating to the provision of defense articles to Cambodia. (Exchange of notes at Phnom Penh August 20, 1970; entered into force August 20, 1970. 21 UST 2178; TIAS 6965; 764 UNTS 233.)

• Agreement regarding the status of United States military personnel and civilian employ¬ees of the Department of Defense who may be temporarily present in Cambodia in connection with military assistance activities and other of¬ficial duties. (Exchange of notes at Phnom Penh October 12, 1995 and January 22, 1996; en¬tered into force January 22, 1996. NP)

3. Regional Military Agreements

1. ASEAN

1. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

There has been some attempt to forge multilateral solutions to stem terrorist funding in Southeast Asia, but multilateral approaches have been weak and inconsistent. For example, only six of the ten ASEAN states have signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), and only three have ratified it. All ASEAN states.

Table: ASEAN Signatories to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

State	Signed	Ratified
Brunei	—	December 4, 2002
Burma	November 12, 2001	—
Cambodia	November 11, 2001	—
Indonesia	September 24, 2001	—
Laos	—	—
Malaysia	—	—
Philippines	November 16, 2001	—
Singapore	December 18, 2001	December 30, 2002
Thailand	December 18, 2001	—
Vietnam	—	September 25, 2002

2. Joint ASEAN-EU Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism (2002-2003)

2. APEC

1. Particular stress has been given by the U.S. on pushing security issues onto the agenda of APEC, the region’s widest-spanning and highest-level (albeit informal) forum. The U.S. pushed the APEC meetings in 2001 and 2003 to focus on the “war on terror” – despite it being conceived as mainly dealing with economic matters – and apart from this has lobbied hard to sustain APEC discussions on terrorism in its committees, working groups, senior officials meetings, and special task groups.

2. APEC Counter-Terrorism Review, 2001-2003

4. Regional Centers and Conferences

1. Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism (SEARCCT)

Malaysia-sponsored, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism (SEARCCT) was established in 2003 and receives U.S. funding.

The United States, however, will not be playing a major role in the center, which will only serve as a platform for training against terrorism and studying various aspects of terrorism activities, far from what was envisioned by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell when he first mooted the idea last year during a Southeast Asian tour. Powell's idea was for a clearing house for intelligence gathered by Southeast Asian governments as they pursue regional groups with alleged ties to the al-Qaida international terrorist organization.

2. Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference

First hosted by the Australian Army, the Regional Special Forces Counter-Terrorism Conference is an annual event participated by various armed forces and counter-terrorism agencies in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. The conference provides participants the opportunity to share professional insights and discuss ways to enhance information-sharing among counter-terrorism professionals. The conference aims also to develop closer co-operation while strengthening working-level relationship among members of the Special Forces.

The inaugural conference was held in June 2004, hosted by the Australian Army. The second conference was held from 21 to 25 November 2005 in Singapore, hosted by the Singapore Armed Forces commandos.

Anti-Terror Laws (ATL) and Measures

1. Cambodia

1. YES, has 1-page law on terrorism

2. U.S. wants ATL beefed up
   U.S. State Department: “An absence of comprehensive domestic legislation to combat terrorism also hinders the ability to arrest and prosecute terrorists… its existing one-page law on terrorism, as evidenced by the conviction in late December 2004 of six Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorists, each of whom was sentenced to life in prison.”

3. National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC)
   The NCTC a policy-level decision-making body chaired by the Prime Minister that directly addresses the government's domestic and international counterterrorism responsibilities. The NCTC is a new entity that is still developing its operational capabilities. Cambodia seen taking counterterrorism seriously and is attempting to coordinate its efforts.

4. Multinational interagency counterterrorism survey

1. Led by U.S. Pacific Command

2. The survey was conducted to develop methods to assist the Cambodian authorities in improving their overall counterterrorism capacity.  The team made recommendations to various elements responsible for counterterrorism at the tactical, operational, and national levels.

5. Border Control
   The government installed, with U.S. assistance, computerized border control systems at Cambodia's international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at its land border crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong. To monitor terrorists and terrorist entities listed as supporters of terrorist financing.

6. Weapon “Control”
   Ministry of Defense, with U.S. assistance, destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles to remove the possibility of these weapons being acquired by terrorist elements.  That same month, Cambodian authorities collected and dismantled two HNU-5 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) from a police outpost.  These two MANPADS are scheduled for future destruction.
   Prime Minister Hun Sen acknowledged that weapons from Cambodia have been transported to insurgent/terrorist groups in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and to the ethnic Karen people in Burma.

7. Conviction of JI suspects
   In late December 2004 of six Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorists were sentenced to life in prison.

2. Indonesia

1. YES, has an ATL

The Bali bombings in 2002 conveniently provided impetus, however, and the Indonesian counter-terrorism campaign quickly gained momentum with the passage of anti-terror Regulations 1/2002 and 2/2002 and an Anti-Terrorism Law in 2003.

2. Police counterterrorism

Special counterterrorism units within the police still played the lead role in conducting counterterrorism investigations, though the previously power-wielding Indonesian military and intelligence apparatus indicated eagerness to find new relevance by joining in the counterterrorism fight. 

3. Attorney General has Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force: convictions of JI suspects

Before its inception, the United States agreed to provide $750,000 to help implement the creation of the task force.

The Indonesian Attorney General's office initiated 17 new cases under the 2003 antiterrorism law and won convictions in all 17 trials. Among the 17 convicted were Iwan Dharmawan Mutho (alias Rois) and Achmad Hasan (alias Purnomo), both sentenced to death for their roles in the Australian Embassy bombing, and Agung Abdul Hamid, who received life in prison for his role in the December 2002 McDonald's restaurant bombing in Makassar in southern Sulawesi. In 2005, for the first time ever, convicted terrorists had their sentences increased upon appeal under the antiterrorism law, signaling a firmer law enforcement approach by judges.

4. Arrest of JI suspects

1. Since October 2004, the police have arrested more than 50 suspected terrorists, including six key individuals and the field lieutenant of the Australian Embassy bombing.

2. In June and July, police arrested approximately 20 members of the JI-linked Islamic NGO Kompak, including terrorist financier Abdullah Sunata.

3. Within two months of the October suicide bombings in Bali, police had tracked down Azahari, identified the three suicide bombers, and arrested several other associates of Noordin and Azahari's network.  Despite major successes on the JI front, police and prosecutors had relatively little success in the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators of terrorist violence in central Sulawesi and Maluku.

4. JI Arrest: Several members of JI’s regional shura, its leadership body, have been arrested, including operations chief Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), Mohammed Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), Agus Dwikarna, and Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, while its spiritual leader, Abu Bakar

5. Anti-Money Laundering
   The Bank of Lao issued freeze orders for assets of organizations and individuals named in lists provided by the United States.  Lao authorities issued orders limiting the amount of cash that can be withdrawn from local banks and strengthened reporting requirements of state and privately owned commercial banks.  Banking regulation remains extremely weak, however, and the banking system is vulnerable to money laundering and other illegal transactions.

3. Laos

Has NO ATL.

Lao officials at many levels see terrorism as an issue of only marginal relevance to Laos.

Although since 2002, Laos consistently has denounced international terrorism and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international community on counterterrorism.

4. Malaysia

1. Has a Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism

2. Has an Internal Security Act (ISA)

Malaysian authorities have detained more than 110 suspected terrorists since May 2001 under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial on renewable two­year terms.  According to public sources, Malaysia renewed 29 two-year detention orders for terrorist suspects, while nine such detainees were granted conditional release.

It has also passed additional laws and instituted additional measures on top of its infamous Internal Security Act (ISA).

3. Anti-Money Laundering

Malaysia’s Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism, established in July 2003, held its inaugural training course in August 2003—a course on financial accounting and anti-money laundering entitled, “Basic Analysis and Suspicious Transaction Reporting,” which was taught and financed by the United States.

4. Extradition Treaty

Malaysia has a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States and is in the process of negotiating a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), both of which have the potential to aid in counterterrorism cooperation.

5. Arrests of JI suspects through September 2003: 80

5. Thailand

1. NO ATL verified

2. Committee of Counter-International Terrorism (COCIT)

3. Counter International Terrorist Operations Center (CITOC) in the months after 9/11.

4. Arrests of JI suspects through September 2003: 8 in Thailand and Cambodia.

6. Singapore

1. YES, has ATL:
   Singapore passed its Anti-Terrorism Regulations Act in November 2001, besides having and Internal Security Act

2. National security anti-terrorism Executive Group

U.S.-Singapore coordination on specifically security issues deepened further with the signing of a Strategic Framework Agreement in 2005.

3. Security and Intelligence
   During 2005, Singapore continued its intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with a variety of governments, including the United States, to investigate terrorist groups, especially Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  Singapore requested that Indonesia extradite several JI members to face trial for engaging in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Singapore.

4. Arrests of suspected JI and other groups
   In 2005, Singapore detained three members of the regional terrorist group JI under the Internal Security Act (ISA).  As of November, 36 people with links to terrorist groups were in detention. Detainees included members of JI who plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

5. Cyber Terrorism
   In February, Singapore announced it would spend $23 million over three years to enhance computer security and combat cyberterrorism.

6. Anti Money Laundering
   Singapore's Parliament amended the Moneychanging and Remittance Businesses Act in August to strengthen the government's ability to combat money laundering and terrorist finance-related activities in the moneychanging and remittance sector.

1. Singapore and Malaysia, two countries with strong central governments, have outlawed the JI group and arrested suspected members. Singapore, for example, foiled a JI plot to attack U.S., British, and Israeli embassies in Singapore.

2. JI Arrest: arrests of more than 200 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members through September 2003, including more than 30 in Singapore

7. Philippines

1. Has NO ATL, still at the Senate
   U.S. State Department: “The absence of a law defining and codifying terrorist acts, combined with restrictions on gathering of evidence, continues to hinder the building of effective terrorism cases in the Philippines.”

2. Has an Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF)

3. Arrests, Convictions, Slay, and Seizure of materials of suspected members of Abu Sayaff, Rajah Sulaiman Movement

1. The Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) arrested, captured, or killed 83 suspected terrorists.

2. Arrest in October of several members of the ASG-affiliated Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM), including RSM leader Ahmad Santos, and the arrest in December of RSM's alleged second-in-command and operations chief, Pio de Vera.

3. In March, it coordinated operations that led to the seizure of 600 kilos of ammonium nitrate and other bomb making materials stored in an apartment in Quezon City in the metropolitan Manila area.

4. In June, a Philippine court convicted seven members of the Abu Sayyaf Group responsible for the Dos Palmas kidnapping, the Lamitan siege, the Golden Harvest massacre, and the Balobo massacre, which all took place in the Southern Philippines in 2001.

5. In October, a court convicted RSM operative Angelo Trinidad, JI operative Rohmat (aka Zaki), and ASG operative Gamal Baharan for their roles in the February 14 triple-city bombings.

6. SLAYS: Several key ASG figures were also killed during armed encounters with the Philippine armed forces. Wedjimeh Sayad and Ahmad Sabudin, operatives serving under ASG sub-leader Jundam Jamalul, were killed in an encounter in Sulu on September 5.  Jainal Usman, a senior ASG lieutenant who was behind the abduction of six Malaysian resort workers in 2003, was killed in fighting in Tawi-Tawi on November 17 along with two subordinates, Faizal Mohammad and Pula Ali.

4. Anti-Money Laundering
   The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), investigating terrorist finance cases, completed the first phase of its information technology upgrades in 2004. From January to October 2005, AMLC received 1,760 suspicious transaction reports involving 8,144 suspicious transactions, as well as covered transaction reports involving 44 million covered transactions.

CONCLUSION: Geopolitical Objectives of the U.S.

1. Area of Jurisdiction

The Pacific Command’s (PACOM) area of jurisdiction of nearly 272 million square kilometers spans over half of the planet’s surface area and, with some 43 countries within it, nearly 60% of the world’s population. The U.S. is using a variety of ways to meet its objective of maintaining strategic military domination. These include creating rationales, increasing direct military activities in countries, and ensuring that appropriate national and regional mechanisms are in place.

2. Influence over ASEAN is important for the U.S.:

ASEAN can provide additional leverage in the regional security and economic arrangements in which the U.S. already participates or even act as a possible surrogate in those arrangements where it is absent. (example where it is excluded and ASEAN engagement is used as backdoor: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Russia, China, and Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, with Pakistan, India, Mongolia, and Iran as observers)

3. Strategic Objectives (repeat from Intro)

The U.S.’s main strategic objectives in Southeast Asia are to:

1. Ensure dominance in the sub-region and use this for developing and maintaining its hegemony over the rest of Asia, including competing with other major East Asian powers, especially Japan and emerging China.

2. Preserve its free access to, if not outright control of, the major sea lanes from the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean: the strategic Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits as well as the South China Sea. These sea routes transiting Southeast Asia are vital for global seaborne commerce – reportedly accounting for more than half of the world’s annual merchant shipping traffic with trade and energy shipments worth some US$1.5 trillion – and for U.S. military “force projection” in the Indian Ocean to as far away as West Asia. The unique geophysical characteristics of Southeast Asia give it strategic geopolitical significance.

3. Create, deepen and expand trade and investment opportunities. The U.S. here directly competes with Japan, Europe, and to a much lesser degree China. Although manufacturing is a key area, the U.S.’s main thrust is currently in opening up neocolonial financial and service sectors.

4. The Role of the ASEAN in U.S. Strategic Objectives

These three objectives underpin all of U.S. imperialism’s bilateral and regional level maneuvering in Southeast Asia. The U.S. has aggressively pursued these for decades outside and also through ASEAN. It has achieved its military objectives through its important control over individual countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and others. It has attained its economic objectives through the IMF and World Bank (WB), through bilateral economic pressure and arrangements, and through the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet with the onset of the “war on terror” and the increasing political and economic importance of the ASEAN to the whole of Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. appears to be out to increasingly use the organization as a region-wide mechanism for meeting its objectives in the sub-region and beyond. This may even be a factor in the notably increased impetus to ASEAN activities in the last five years.

The U.S. has been notably increasing its involvement in ASEAN since the mid-1990s and especially since 2000 and is developing it further into a regional mechanism in support of U.S. militarism (under the guise of the "war on terror") as well as a regional body to push for greater imperialist "globalization".

Notes:

[1] U.S.-Republic of the Philippines (1952), Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (1952), U.S.-Republic of Korea (1954), Southeast Asia Collective Defense (U.S.-France-Australia-New Zealand-Thailand-Philippines, 1955) and U.S.-Japan (1960).

[2] The EAS’s 16 members are the ten ASEAN nations, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India.

[3] The six parties are the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea.

[4] The ARF’s 25 participants include the ten members of ASEAN, U.S., China, Japan, European Union, Russia, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste.

[5] Adm. William J. Fallon, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (2006), “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture”, March 7, 2006.

[6] According to U.S. military doctrine the various types of stability operations are: humanitarian and civic actions, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, foreign internal defense, security assistance, evacuation of non-combatants, support for insurgencies, support for counter-insurgencies, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, arms control and shows of force.

Greetings of solidarity!

The Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN) and AID/WATCH are pleased to invite you to a strategy workshop on the FTAs entitled: “To Oppose FTAs: Making People Matter”, that will take place on September 4-6, 2007 in Sydney, Australia.

The Strategy Workshop on the FTAs is an open and public gathering of trade campaigners within the region specifically timed to coincide with the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Sydney. It offers a vital platform for the promotion of alternative perspectives on the regional trading system especially since APEC, as one of the most influential regional trade forums has attracted sustained criticism from civil society organizations across the region. The Conference will draw together many of these voices to offer an important counterpoint to the APEC process.

The Strategy Workshop is being convened with the following objectives:

• Advance alternatives to unfair trade regimes promoted by APEC
• Promote a North/South and South/South model of cooperation
• Advance social models of international trading systems based on justice and human rights
• Broaden international global justice campaign networks in the Asia-Pacific Region
• Share international experiences on the impacts of Free Trade Agreements
• Publish current international research on the impacts of FTAs.

Attached you will find a brief background to the Strategy Workshop, a preliminary agenda and registration form. Kindly confirm your participation by sending in the attached Workshop registration form by July 30th. . 

Thank you and looking forward to a meaningful exchange with fellow trade campaigners,

Antonio A. Tujan Jr.
Chairperson
Asia Pacific Research Network

]]> Chairperson Thu, 12 Jul 2007 11:00:00 +0100 http://www.aprnet.org/index.php?a=show&t=conferences&i=98 Organized by Asia Pacific Research Network and AID/WATCH
September 4-6, 2007
Sydney, Australia

CONCEPT PAPER

Over the past decade activists opposed to ‘trade’ liberalisation have tended to focus on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its implications for social justice, poverty, the environment and national sovereignty. The threat posed by the rapid growth of second and third generation bilateral and regional free trade and investment agreements was often less well understood. That has now changed.1 This strategy workshop aims to build a more sophisticated understanding of the forces that are continuing to drive that trend and reflect on the diverse experiences of resistance within the region as the basis for developing more coherent and effective national, sub-regional, regional and sectoral strategies.

Since the 1970s transnational corporations have been demanding a hegemonic regime that would enhance capital accumulation by removing constraints on their profitability, create new markets and entrench neoliberal policies. From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s their efforts were focused at the multilateral level. The pursuit of bilateral and regional ‘free trade’ agreements is more recent, but these have rapidly overtaken the WTO in their scope and the depth of liberalization. In 1990 there were 16 FTAs operating internationally. By 1997, two years after the WTO was created, that had risen to 72 and spread more widely across Europe, the Americas, Asia Pacific and parts of Africa. In 2003, as the Doha round floundered, a staggering 162 had been signed, with a huge increase in the number that crossed geographical regions. Many more were being negotiated or proposed. At the end of 2004, 72 FTA projects involving APEC members were underway.2

Predictably, the most active demandeurs are the US and European Union. Japan, China and India have been late entrants. It is also significant that in 2000 there has been only one agreement that was negotiated between developed countries since 2000, being the US Australia FTA. The rest were North/South or less commonly, South/South.

This surge of bilateral and regional negotiations created a new momentum for neoliberal globalization as the multilateral system stalled. But this momentum disguises fundamental contradictions. These multiple agreements reflect different models of capitalist expansion, and the competing power politics and hegemonic aspirations of larger powers. Their coverage and terms are uneven, making integration of the multiplicity of agreements almost impossible. Moreover, if governments try to implement all the current and proposed agreements they will create major social, economic and political conflict. These contradictions echo, and are likely to intensify, the instability and vulnerability of the multilateral ‘trade’ agenda. Resistance can be expected to intensify as ‘trade’ negotiations more explicitly combine the military, strategic and economic objectives of the major powers.

The South Centre’s Executive Director Yash Tandon divides Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs, the term used by the WTO) into three types: (1) ‘integrative partnerships’ where partners have compatible interests and work on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity to benefit the weakest members; (2) ‘enforced partnerships’ where one side dictates the terms and the other side either has to ‘take it or leave it’; and (3) ‘structured regionalism’ where the partnership is enforced and located in structures that are linked to historical relationships, such as the agreements between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.3 But even South/South ‘integrative partnerships’ have to follow WTO rules if one or more of their parties are WTO members. WTO-compatible agreements mean WTO+ rules and commitments.

It has become fashionable to promote South/South integration as a collective strategy for poorer countries to fend off major power aggressors. But these initiatives are also problematic. They have their own internal power relations, often reinforcing the dominance of the largest regional state. Increasingly, economic integration initiatives distort groupings that were created for broader reasons, making them vehicles for neoliberal globalization and repressive security policies. What is represented as a South/South regional agenda can also be externally imposed, such as the regional Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU under the Cotonou Agreement 2000, or be designed by the international financial institutes, as with NEPAD in Africa. South/South agreements that have the potential to create a genuinely unified counter-force often become targets for major powers to divide and rule; the sub-regional agreements pursued by the US in the Andean community and Central America are classic examples of this strategy. The ability to create genuinely alternative integration models is constrained by the requirement of WTO-compatibility, unless governments are prepared to confront the current hegemonic model. So far, only a handful of Latin American states are willing to do so.

FTAs AND THE WTO

There have been three waves of regional and bilateral ‘trade’ agreements, all of which are directly related to crises in the multilateral trade arena. During the first two phases, the major powers used FTAs to advance their positions at the multilateral level and secure their regional hegemony. The third wave has been much broader in scope and geographical reach. With the WTO now in a perpetual state of crisis, FTAs may remain the primary focus, whatever the outcome of the Doha round.

The first phase began in 1985 with the launch of negotiations for the Canada US FTA (CUSFTA). This aimed to secure US access to Canada’s energy resources and guarantee protections for US corporations. The USTR used CUSFTA and an ‘in principle’ free trade agreement with Israel as leverage to include ‘new issues’ of services and investment measures in the Uruguay round mandate. The European Union was also expanding and deepening its internal integration. However, the Europeans’ preference for regional integration, harmonisation and mutual recognition through political, executive and judicial institutions was very different from the liberalization model of both CUSFTA and the Uruguay round. Australia and New Zealand also signed a Closer Economic Relations free trade agreement in goods in 1983 and in services in 1988. These fed into the Uruguay round, where both countries were aggressive liberalisers.

The Uruguay round began in 1986. By the late 1980s it was paralysed, primarily over agriculture. This prompted a second burst of regionalism focused on three axes: the Americas, Europe and Asia (Africa was irrelevant).

The extension of CUSFTA to Mexico through the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 was seen as the state-of-the-art alternative to the agreements that were emerging from the Uruguay round. The investment chapter covered goods and services, with rights for investors to initiate disputes for ‘takings’ (government measures tantamount to an expropriation). It used a negative list approach to services and investment, with sectoral chapters on finance, telecoms and energy. In 1994 the US announced its plan to extend NAFTA on a hemispheric basis through a Free Trade Area of the Americas.

The second axis was Europe. Member states of the European Community approved the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. When it came into force in 1993 the European Union constituted a massive internal market with free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, with the potential both to expand its membership and deepen its integration.

Australia, New Zealand and Japan feared being left behind as these two blocs consolidated their power. Australia initiated the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989, including the ASEAN countries and (after pressure) the US and Canada. In 1994 APEC members adopted the ‘Bogor goal’ of free trade and investment in goods and services among its richer member ‘economies’ by 2010 and the remainder by 2020. Malaysia, supported by most members of ASEAN, insisted that this goal was voluntary and non-binding. In 1995 APEC members agreed to table annual Individual Action Plans (IAP) setting out their progress towards achieving the liberalisation goal, and Collective Action Plans to promote the economic cooperation objectives of APEC. The IAPs reflected the Anglo-American preference for liberalisation and opening of markets, while the economic cooperation agenda was preferred by Japan and ASEAN. The concept of ‘open regionalism’ was intended to demonstrate support for the multilateral arena, as opposed to the development of new preferential arrangements in North America and Europe.

These developments were followed by a period of inertia in the mid-1990s as the WTO became established. The US goal of a FTAA met sustained resistance. The Europeans signed many bilaterals, but these were mainly to pre-condition Eastern European countries for entry to the EU. APEC expanded to the three Chinas, Russia and much of Latin America, but was little more than a talk shop and earned the title ‘Aging Politicians Enjoying Cocktails’.

The current tidal wave of bilateral negotiations began in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and the failure to launch a new round of WTO negotiations at the Seattle ministerial in 1999. It was propelled by diverse motives.

The major powers began a cycle of competitive bilateralism. The current European Commission’s ‘External Competitiveness’ strategy proposed in 2006 takes a two-track approach to advance the interests of capital internally and externally through a coherent neoliberal regime. The Commission insists that increasing the EU’s external competitiveness requires domestic reform and greater competition, deregulation and flexibility within Europe. The Seattle to Brussels network of NGOs describes the strategy as ‘more competition, more flexibilisation, more deregulation. Good bye European model, here is globalisation for all’.4

The second tier of the European strategy is to export its preference for regional economic and political integration as the basis for poorer countries to engage more effectively in the global economy. The rhetoric of ‘development partnerships’ is used to expand the agenda beyond trade and investment to a broader menu of policies that were rejected at the WTO. It also justifies the alignment of trade and aid, often through technical assistance and capacity building that creates policies and opportunities for its transnationals.

The EU has systematically revisited its historic North/South relationships to allow it to refocus on new sites of commercial opportunity in Africa and Eastern Europe, and later India and Latin America.5 This began with an assault on the Lomé preferences on goods that were enjoyed by former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Under the Cotonou Agreement 2000 these preferences will be replaced by reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EC dictated a regional divide and rule approach that divided the ACP into sub-regions and cut across existing regional initiatives. The Commission refuses to extend the oppressive deadline of 31 December 2007, which is dictated by the expiry of a WTO waiver for the existing trade in goods preferences. This is despite the overwhelming evidence that this would cripple ACP economies and the requirement in Cotonou that it consider alternatives that ensure that no ACP country is worse off under an EPA.

The EPA negotiations have allowed the EU to develop and refine its template, including the ‘new issues’ of investment, government procurement and competition that the ACP governments defeated in Cancun. The Commission insists the EPAs must provide for liberalization of services, even though Article 41 says this should occur ‘after they have acquired some experience in applying MFN treatment under the GATS’. Most ACP countries have minimal GATS commitments. Many are least developed countries. Some, especially in the Pacific, are not even WTO members. Draft services chapters presented to the Pacific and Caribbean negotiators sought aggressive GATS+ commitments and described this as a ‘not-to-be-missed opportunity’ for ACP states ‘to foster the development of their own services’.6

The Commission has negotiated a separate agreement on ‘trade, development and cooperation’ with South Africa, again cutting across the Southern Africa Customs Union and the South African Development Community. Continuing the euphemism of ‘economic partnership’, the Europeans have strategically targeted entry points through Mexico, Chile and South Africa, with its eyes set on Mercosur, India, South Korea and ASEAN.

The US has more explicitly pursued strategic alliances in diverse parts of the world to reward its allies and secure both its geopolitical and economic supremacy. USTR Robert Zoellick responded to the EU’s African strategy with threats that the US ‘will seek to level the playing field in areas where U.S. exporters are disadvantaged by the European’s free trade agreement with South Africa’.7 One African commentator drew parallels with ‘the 1884 Berlin conference, where developed nations scrambled for African resources and markets’.8

Unlike the EU, the US FTAs follow the more traditional model of trade and investment liberalization. The US typically offer selective access to US markets that protects its sensitive sectors, stretching the WTO rules to defend its domestic political and economic interests. Increasingly, it also imposes foreign policy conditionalities on trade preferences to poorer and dependent countries.

The US became more active in seeking FTAs out of concern that new trade and investment regimes were being created over which it had no control. When Zoellick asked Congress to renew the president’s ‘fast track’ negotiating authority in 2002 he warned that ‘each [bilateral] agreement made without us may set new rules for … countless areas of the modern, integrated economy – rules that will be made without taking account of American interests’.9

The US objectives extend far beyond the interests of their corporations. Freed from the relative constraints of the WTO, its economic and security objectives have converged. The first free trade agreement after NAFTA was a politically motivated deal with Jordan in 2000.10 US ‘security alliance diplomacy’ intensified post ‘9/11’. Other US allies seemed eager to prove their fidelity by matching military sacrifice with economic surrender. The US Australia FTA was a ‘reward’ to Australia’s liberal government for its support of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars – yet merchandise trade figures showed the US was the major economic beneficiary in the first two years and it continued to attack concessions it agreed to on cultural services and medicare.11

Governments within Asia and the Pacific have very diverse motivations for entering FTAs. Ideologically driven free traders, such as Australia and New Zealand, initially promoted bilaterals for their ‘demonstration effect’ in maintaining the momentum of neoliberal globalization as the multilateral process stalled. More recently, they h