APPENDIX

Social Indicators and Human Rights Across Asia
Bilateral and Regional Trading Arrangements in Asia
About the Asia Pacific Research Network
About Rights & Democracy

REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION

Regionalism, most often embodied by regional trade agreements (RTAs), is on the rise even as the World Trade Organization (WTO) seeks global integration. However, regionalism also offers States the opportunity to collaborate in other areas of mutual concern such as cultural identity, development, political stability and the protection of human rights.

For example, the recently created African Union includes a number of formal processes dealing with a wide-range of policy issues, including economic development, trade and the protection of human rights. The Organization of American States has adopted a number of regional treaties including the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and is in the process of negotiating a regional trade agreement.

In the vastness of Asia, cooperation arrangements exist only at the sub-regional level and are less developed than in either the African Union or the Organization of American States. They tend to focus on trade and investment and there is no pan-Asian human rights protection system.

It is in this context that civil society and people's movements across Asia are seeking to identify strategies to addresses the growing disparity both between and within countries. Poverty is a violation of human rights. Those affected by poverty are the most vulnerable sectors of society - workers, peasants, women and children.

This paper was written as the background document for a seminar on regional integration and human rights, held in Olongapo City in the Philippines on June 4-7, 2004. The paper reviews existing processes of regional integration in Asia, in the areas of both economic integration and human rights. Although it was not possible to give adequate attention to all the issues relevant to this vast topic, the authors hope that the paper will become a useful tool for those seeking a broad picture of the current state-of-play.

II. INTEGRATION THROUGH REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

a. The nature of regional trade agreements

RTAs play an important role in the global economy because economic barriers are dismantled more swiftly in regional blocs. Nevertheless, for developing countries, they are often seen as a positive response to global pressures exemplified by the dominance of developed countries in trade negotiations. Still, the inequality of economic development, diverse cultures and different ideologies are challenges that regionalism continues to face.

There are more than 200 RTAs currently in force around the world. Canada, Mexico and the United States have their North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The North and South American economies are now linked through the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Africa has defined its NEPAD arrangement as part of the new African Union. The EU has forged free trade agreements with Africa, Latin America and the emerging economies of Europe and Central Asia.

RTAs can take various forms such as preferential trade areas, free trade areas, custom unions, common markets or economic union. Under preferential trade areas, trading partners grant partial preferential tariff reductions to each other. In a free trade area, members eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers among themselves, but each member country can set its own tariff rates for non-members. While customs union is free trade, its members adopt a common external tariff for non-members. Common markets extend beyond customs union by allowing the free movement of factors of production. An economic union, meanwhile, involves integration of national economic policies, like fiscal and monetary policies.

RTAs differ in configuration, and can be either bilateral or plurilateral (an agreement between three or more parties). RTAs also differ in scope. The simplest form involves the exchange of preferences on a number of limited products among parties. The more complex ones go beyond tariff elimination to include services, investments, competition policy, government procurement, and intellectual property rights.

Trade agreements in Asia

In Asia, regional integration is a relatively new development. In Southeast Asia for instance, there had been resistance to regionalism, particularly in the form of trade agreements, before the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA).

In recent years a new trend has emerged and regional and bilateral initiatives are now gaining momentum. Singapore leads the pack, having signed bilateral free trade agreements with New Zealand, Australia, Japan and the United States. Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia appear ready to follow suit. There have also been discussions regarding a Japan-Korea bilateral free trade area and, in 2000, the East Asia Vision Group proposed an East Asia Free Trade Area (ASEAN plus Korea, Japan and China).

In South Asia, the process of economic integration gathered momentum with the implementation of the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1995, although preferential trade liberalization had been underway since the establishment in 1985 of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). SAPTA is viewed to be the initial stage in SAARC's transition to a deeper form of cooperation under a proposed South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).

Coherence with multilateral processes

RTAs are encouraged under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Article XXIV of the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) permit the formation of RTAs.

The provisions under Article XXIV include: establishment of a free trade area among members within a reasonable period of time; reduction of tariffs to zero and the elimination of other restrictive regulations on substantially all trade between the participants; and duties and other regulations to third countries are not raised.

Article V of GATS permits: substantial sector coverage (in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply with no a priori exclusion of any modes; and, the elimination of existing discriminating measures and/or the prohibition of new discriminatory measures.

b. South Asian Cooperation

With the rise of powerful regional blocs in North America, Europe and Southeast Asia, South Asian economies turned their attention towards strengthening regional trade cooperation by creating a preferential trading agreement in December 1995.

As mentioned above, it was under the broad framework of the SAARC, that in 1996 during the ninth SAARC Summit, South Asian governments proposed the creation of a free trade area "" SAFTA "" to be implemented by 2001. This has proven too ambitious a target. An Eminent Persons Group appointed to examine the implications of the transition to SAFTA recommended that the timeframe be revised. As a result, non-Least Developed Country (LDC) states of SAARC are now required to implement the terms of the agreement by 2008 and for LDC member states by 2010. The SAFTA was finally signed at a summit held in Islamabad in January 2004.

The SAARC integration initiatives have taken place in the context of a significant liberalization process in all member countries. This involved both trade and investment liberalization, and the adoption of pro-foreign direct investment (FDI) policies. Though significant trade and investment barriers remain in place in many countries, the regional economies are today far more open than they were before the late 1980s.

The opening of South Asian economies

South Asian countries, which had very open economies in the immediate post-independence period in the 1940s, had become some of the most highly protected markets in the world by the 1970s. Tariff and, even more importantly, non-tariff barriers were very high, state interventions in economic activity were prevalent, foreign investments was discouraged and stringent exchange controls were in place. This began to change in the late 1970s.

In 1977, Sri Lanka initiated a liberalisation process. It was followed by other countries during the 1980s. This process was rather tentative and uneven between different countries. It was during the 1990s, with the start of a major reform process in India that the region as a whole really began to liberalize. By the end of the decade, although important policy barriers to trade and foreign investment remained in place, the region had opened up considerably.

Despite continued tariff reductions, most of the South Asian countries continue to maintain significant quantitative restrictions (QRs). In the case of Sri Lanka, practically all import licenses have been removed with the exception of approximately 12 items on the grounds of national security, public health or environmental concerns. On the other hand, India restricted the import of consumer goods on Balance of Payments (BOP) considerations until 2001, while some 210 agricultural, mineral and metal items are still under export restrictions. Bangladesh maintains QRs on 40 imported items while a large number of  ƒÆ’ ¢ ƒÂ¢ ¢â‚¬Å¡ ¬ ƒâ€¹ …“essential' items such as livestock, fruits, vegetables, sugar and edible oils are highly protected.

Even with considerable liberalisation, intra-SAARC trade represents but a small fraction of total trade of the region. Regional trade is constrained not only by the political and policy situation, but also by the basic similarity of the economies which limits comparative advantage-driven trade. It must be noted, however, that for some of the smaller economies, bilateral trade with a SAARC partner, typically India, constitutes a large and important component of total trade figures.

Intra-SAARC investment also remains low. Many South Asian nations are poor, net capital importing countries having few nationally-based businesses capable of undertaking significant outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Moreover, until recently, stringent controls on outward and inward FDI have been in place in most countries.

The stated commitment of governments in South Asia to accelerate the process of regional economic integration is now over a decade old. At the start of this process, total intra-SAARC trade was quite small, accounting for less than three percent of total South Asian trade. Now, almost ten years later, it remains low at approximately five percent.

Slow progress and insufficient benefits

In many cases, the scope of preferential market access offered to member countries is rather limited and often largely irrelevant to their export interests. This can be illustrated by the case of India and Sri Lanka. Most of the items offered by India are chemical products, machinery and textiles. Concessions on the latter two categories were extended only to the Least-developed Countries (LDC) members in SAPTA. Yet concessions in the chemicals sector are hardly likely to generate significant gains given that chemicals exports account for less than five percent of Sri Lanka's total exports to South Asia.

The only concessions from India that are likely to benefit Sri Lanka are those granted on vegetable products, plastics and rubber products. Here again, most of the concessions in these two categories are either reserved for LDC member states in SAARC or are subject to import licensing requirements.

"Fast-tracking" liberalization

In practice "" given the strained ties between the two largest economies, India and Pakistan "" the political constraints to freeing trade within the framework of a regional arrangement are formidable. The slow progress of the SAPTA process has led to attempts to develop a "fast-track" liberalization of trade through bilateral agreements.

India , which had already signed bilateral free trade agreements with Nepal and Bhutan in 1996, agreed to the extension of such an arrangement to Sri Lanka "" first proposed as far back as 1992 - in December 1998. Under the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, India agreed to remove tariffs on about 1000 products, immediately when the treaty came into force. Both countries agreed to phase in reductions in trade barriers across a range of other products over several years. These products were to be named within 60 days of the signing of the agreement.

The exchange of lists was delayed until March 2000 due to various reasons, including opposition by both Indian and Sri Lankan interest groups. Both countries eventually agreed to maintain negative lists that would safeguard domestic industry, agriculture and fisheries and that the Agreement would not apply to items placed under such a list. Though the scope of the tariff reductions has therefore narrowed considerably, the Agreement does provide for some significant improvement in market access to exporters in each country in certain product categories.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement was seen as a possible precursor to  ƒÆ’ ¢ ƒÂ¢ ¢â‚¬Å¡ ¬ ƒâ€¹ …“fast-track' trade liberalization under SAFTA. India is now contemplating similar pacts with Bangladesh and the Maldives. Such agreements, though they may produce fast-track liberalization, run the risk of alienating the spirit of consensus on which the success of a larger South Asian free trade area will depend. Even allowing for the fact that there is considerable unrecorded trade between some neighbouring countries, it is obvious that initiatives taken so far have had only very limited impact in stimulating intra-SAARC trade (3% during the 1970s and 1980s to only 4% by the end of the 1990s).

Future prospects

There are a number of reasons for the low level of intra-regional trade. South Asian countries share some basic similarities; low income, relative abundance of labour, similar commodities. These similarities reduce the potential for comparative advantage-driven trade. The low per capita income level also constrains potential for intra-industry trade, generally associated with higher income countries.

On the other hand, the existence of significant differences among the SAARC countries should not be overlooked. For example, India dominates in terms of size and Sri Lanka has a relatively more educated workforce with higher per capita income and wage levels. The potential for expanding economic cooperation within SAARC, still holds promise.

b. Southeast Asian Cooperation

The growing interdependence of East Asian economies during the 1990s occurred through a market-led process without formal economic and institutional arrangements. The developing economies in the region ( Japan being the only developed country) have now substantially liberalized trade and investment, either unilaterally or through the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are also several sub-regional cooperation processes which have various areas of focus and levels of influence.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ASEAN was formed in 1967 with broad objectives encompassing political, social, developmental, economic, cultural and environmental issues. In 1993, its scope expanded to economic cooperation with the goal of establishing a free trade area in the region. By 2020, the same year set by the WTO as the deadline for developing countries to open their economies, the ASEAN aims to create an ASEAN Economic Community similar to the European Community.

Unlike the EU, however, where there is supranational policy coordination under the direction of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, the ASEAN is devoid of bodies to implement its programs. Instead, the ASEAN process involves numerous meetings amongst its members at all levels involving heads of governments, foreign ministers, economic ministers and committees.

The most important of these meetings are the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) during which major agreements and policies are formulated, and the formal Summit Meetings of the Heads of Government, held every three years, where policy announcements are made and declarations adopted. For politically sensitive issues, ASEAN adopts a second-track process involving non-governmental organizations engaged in people-to-people cooperation and diplomacy.

The decision-making process in all the meetings is guided by the principle of consensus. Over the years, the consensus-based decision-making process has been viewed as a weakness, limiting the growth of the ASEAN as an organization. There has been increasing demands that ASEAN adopt a flexible consensus or  ƒÆ’ ¢ ƒÂ¢ ¢â‚¬Å¡ ¬ ƒâ€¹ …“coalition of the willing' approach for it to remain relevant and effective.

The original six member countries of the ASEAN established the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. In tune with the WTO, the AFTA seeks the standardization of non-tariff barriers such as quotas, as well as broad economic cooperation. This free trade agreement involves the abolition of tariffs or taxes on traded goods and the elimination of quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers that limit the entry of imports. It aims to create an integrated market among ASEAN's 500 million people, rendering the ASEAN economies more efficient, competitive and attractive to foreign investments.

The Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT) scheme is the main instrument for implementing the AFTA commitment. It is a cooperative arrangement among ASEAN Member States that reduces intra-regional tariffs and removes non-tariff barriers over a ten-year period commencing January 1993. As of 1 January 2003, tariffs on 44,160 tariff lines (about 99.5% of total) have been reduced to the 0-5% tariff range.

The CEPT Scheme covers all manufactured products, including capital goods and processed agricultural products. The major exclusion is basic agriculture or unprocessed agricultural products. Products traded under the AFTA-CEPT must consist of at least 40% local content; otherwise, they shall not enjoy reduced tariffs under the AFTA-CEPT.

Meanwhile, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) is the counterpart agreement of the AFTA in the field of investment. The framework agreement on the AIA was signed in October 1998 during the 30th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in the Philippines. One of the most striking provisions of the AIA is the granting of national treatment to investors coming from within the ASEAN region.

Another instrument for cooperation under the AFTA is the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) Scheme, wherein participating corporations within the ASEAN enjoy low tariff rates way ahead of the CEPT schedule of tariff reductions. Participating corporations under the AICO include predominantly automotive, electrical and semiconductor companies, as well as a number of food processing ventures.

When ASEAN leaders met in Bali, Indonesia in October 2003, they further consolidated members' commitment to create a single market by 2020 through the following procedures:

• The facilitation of trade in goods : zero tariffs, removal of red tape and faster customs clearance by 2004 in seven priority sectors including electronics, automotive, and textiles.
• The Expansion of the liberalization of services : liberalization of health care, air travel and electronic commerce sectors by 2010; liberalization of all service sectors by 2012.
• The facilitation of the mobility of travelers : visa-free travel for all ASEAN nationals by 2005, and for international travelers, a plan to move towards a common visa for the whole region.
• The establishment of a mechanism for dispute settlement : a new network to ensure the speedy resolution of problems faced by businessmen and an impartial panel to adjudicate economic disputes between member countries.

ASEAN Economies under the AFTA

According to the ASEAN Secretariat, the AFTA has now been virtually realized. The six original signatories have reduced tariffs on all products listed in their 2002 Inclusion List (IL) to 0-5 percent. Since 1 January 2003, tariffs on 99.5% representing 44,160 tariff lines have been reduced to the 0-5% tariff range. Remaining products which continue to maintain tariffs of above five percent, are those that were transferred from the Sensitive List and General Exception List in 2003.

The average tariff for ASEAN-6 under the CEPT Scheme is now down to 2.39% from 12.76%, when the tariff-cutting exercise started in 1993. The newer members of ASEAN still must reach the 0-5% tariffs for intra-ASEAN trade "" Viet Nam in 2006, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 2008, and Cambodia in 2010. Ultimately, tariffs will be completely abolished by 2010 for the ASEAN-6 and, by 2015 for the newer members with flexibility on some sensitive products until 2018. Only one percent of the products are completely excluded from the CEPT for non-trade reasons.

ASEAN Plus 3

ASEAN plus 3 links the 10 ASEAN members with China, South Korea and Japan. The cooperation was born out of the financial crisis and was initiated as the result of cooperation in international finance driven by the need to avoid future currency crises within the region.

The process began with the First Summit Meeting of the ASEAN+3 Leaders in 1997. After two more summit meetings, the Chiang Mai Initiative was launched in 2000, under which the 13 economies agreed to establish a network of bilateral currency swap agreements. Under the arrangement, participating economies experiencing short-term liquidity shortfalls due to sudden attacks to their currencies can borrow from one another. The initiative provided a mechanism for the economies to borrow funds to address currency problems without having to undertake austerity measures under the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In the short span of time since the first leaders' summit, other areas of cooperation have evolved and expanded to include not only finance but also trade, investment, technology transfer, information and communication technology, e-commerce, human resource development, industrial cooperation, tourism, small and medium enterprises and supporting industries, and political/security concerns.

A proposal had been put forward to form a free trade area comprising the ASEAN+3 members but it lost momentum following the formation of an ASEAN-China free trade agreement (FTA), and Japan's subsequent proposal the same. Despite these diversions, ASEAN+3 now hosts annual meetings of its economic and foreign ministers, as well as senior officials.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Strictly speaking, the Asia Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) is not a preferential trading arrangement. It seeks only to promote trade liberalisation as a political objective. APEC is interesting for two reasons. First its members are "economies", not states, thereby undermining democratic oversight. Second, APEC's membership spans the Pacific Ocean including, significantly, the Americas with East Asia.

The APEC's goal is to achieve a free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region no later than 2010 for its developed member economies and 2020 for its developing member economies. It aims to do so through a three-pillar agenda of trade and investment liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, as well as economic and technical cooperation. Its institutional arrangement follows market initiatives as exemplified by its principle of open regionalism, which does not allow APEC to introduce measures that discriminate against countries and regions outside APEC.

Each member economy under APEC prepares its own liberalization program and implements it according to its own pace or schedule of domestic rules. Each member economy observes the implementation of each other's program, building pressure for each member to put its own program in place. The program is implemented through individual action plans (IAP) and the collective action plan (CAP). All APEC decisions are arrived at through consensus, but enforcement of commitments is left to each member economy.

APEC governance is not centralized in a supranational institution. Instead, the APEC adopts an annual rotation of Chairmanship, allowing each member economy to host a full year of meetings and to influence APEC's agenda during that process. APEC operates through a series of working groups, sub-committees, senior officials' meetings and the annual Leaders' Meeting. APEC also includes a parallel process for the private sector through the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), and for academia through the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the APEC Study Centers.

Weak Economic Foundations

Even as the ASEAN Secretariat boasts the almost complete CEPT implementation, trading between the ASEAN remains insignificant, as observed in South Asia. In 2001 intra-ASEAN trade constituted only 22.75% of total trade. This share was 21.14% in 1993 when AFTA was launched. The United States, the European Union, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continue to be ASEAN's largest exports markets. On the import side, Japan, followed by the US and EU, China and the ROK, are the largest sources.

Economic reviews by both the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations paint a rather weak picture of ASEAN's economic base. Southeast Asia's heavy dependence on trade and external finance for its economic growth has been identified by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP) as a major weakness of the regional trade bloc. Moreover, the biting effects of the global slowdown grossly affected the ASEAN from the 2nd half of 2000 with the Gross Domestic Product decreasing throughout the region in 2001. Countries with the greatest reliance on exports of electronics and electrical products to Japan and the US were the hardest hit.

The dismal performance of ASEAN economies in the last ten years and their failure to achieve regional integration manifest weak economic foundations and reinforce the arguments against export-oriented and debt driven economies. ASEAN's dependence on export production renders the region's economies vulnerable to external uncertainties.

c. The Influence of Dominant Economies: partnership or rivalry?

The emergence of China

China 's accession to the WTO is expected to create a significant change in the global trade and investment environments. Its huge market presents new opportunities for exporters to enter or to expand commercial interests. Given its success in exports of labour-intensive products, China is a threatening competitor for developing countries.

The emergence of China has changed the regional landscape in two ways. On one hand, China's new role as a key link in the production network contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade. Between 1990 and 2000, for example, China's trade with ASEAN increased 6-fold. China also became an active player in developing institutional frameworks to promote regional integration. The first element firmly positioned China as an indispensable member of regional economic frameworks in East Asia and thereby reinforced its influence over the development of institutional frameworks.

China 's engagement in regional frameworks began in 2000 following earlier moves by Japan and the ROK. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, both Japan and the ROK had begun to explore bilateral trade agreements as a trade policy option while shifting away from dependence on the WTO. Japan's decision to engage in bilateral negotiations triggered reactions from both the United States and China. A month later, the US agreed to launch negotiations with Singapore and China proposed an agreement with the ASEAN.

Since its proposal to ASEAN in November 2000, China has moved swiftly. In October 2001, China and ASEAN completed the joint feasibility study for a FTA, and in November 2001, China convinced ASEAN to agree to establish an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area within ten years. In November 2002, the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Economic Cooperation was signed, committing members to the establishment of a free trade area by 2010 for long-standing ASEAN members and 2015 for newer members. In October 2003, beginning with Thailand, China started to implement the so-called early harvest measures to eliminate tariffs on some fruits and vegetables.

China 's moves prompted Japan to accelerate its steps toward the economic integration agreement with ASEAN that it had contemplated since the launch of FTA negotiations with Singapore. The US also boosted its interest in the region and announced the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative in October 2002 and the launch of FTA negotiations with Thailand in October 2003.

Growing ties between India and China

Meanwhile, India, with its population also more than one billion, assumed a leadership role among developing countries at the WTO. It sought to establish closer ties with key neighbours, namely ASEAN and China. In June 2003, India signed a Declaration on Bilateral Ties with the People's Republic of China. The agreement includes statements of intent on a broad range of issues including cooperation in the areas of bilateral trade, investment, finance and security. The Declaration also reinforces a mutual commitment to regional and sub-regional cooperation processes in Asia. India and China further agreed to present a report and recommendations "on measures for comprehensive trade and economic cooperation by the end of June 2004".

The failure of the multilateral system in Cancun in September 2003 increased pressure on India to establish cooperation agreements with existing trading blocks. As such, in October 2003, India took steps to finalize a bilateral agreement with ASEAN. Attending the ASEAN leaders meeting in Bali, Indian delegates cited the need for cooperation not only in the area of trade, but also in investment, the sharing of technology and in regional security. During the Summit, India signed a framework agreement with ASEAN leading towards a free trade arrangement.

Other interests

These new developments have dealt a blow to Japan's traditional leadership in the region. Japan has reacted by developing its own bilateral agreements. Following the 2001 agreement between China and Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed a Japan-ASEAN comprehensive economic initiative - which would include a Japan-ASEAN free trade agreement. He also made clear that Japan-ASEAN cooperation should be linked to East Asian cooperation as a whole, with ASEAN, Japan, China, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand at its core.

What implication Japan's proposal might have for India-ASEAN cooperation remains to be seen. There is little doubt however, that rivalry between the three great powers of Asia will certainly define regional relations in the coming decade. Japan has long enjoyed economic leadership in the region but its decade long recession has weakened that position. China's new approach of preferential trading with the rest of Asia could open the door for it to replace Japan as the primary driving force for economic growth and integration in the region.

The emergence of both China and India as influential powers at the both the regional and international levels makes US involvement in the region all the more critical for its political and economic interests. In 2002 the US sold $57 billion in goods and services in Southeast Asia alone and it invested another $53 billion in the ASEAN countries even though the ASEAN-US pact is still not in force. In addition, the US is pursuing bilateral trade relations with individual ASEAN member nations such as Viet Nam, Singapore and the Philippines.

III. REGIONAL PROCESSES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Unlike in the Americas or Africa, there is no regional human rights body in Asia. There are several reasons for this but most observers would agree that the vastness of the region (divided as South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Asia and Central Asia), combined with the problem of multiple languages and the lack of a historical cohesion based on a regional identity have been contributing factors.

Despite the lack of a regional mechanism however, there are a number of existing processes that could potentially serve the needs of individuals and groups seeking remedies to human rights violations in Asia. These include constitutional provisions and human rights institutions at the national level, fledgling cooperation arrangements at the regional level and multilateral processes that are available, in theory at least, to people living in anywhere in the world.

a. National Provisions

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Development Program (UNDP) have established a collaborative project to encourage the development of national human rights plans, in accordance with the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action that was adopted by consensus at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. The program encourages broadly based consultation and an implementation phase, which includes various activities such as the creation of national human rights institutions.

There are currently 8 national human rights institutions operating in Asia under a set of guidelines known as the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles require that the institutions be independent by statute or constitution; that they are autonomous from government; that they respect pluralism, including in membership; and that they promote a broad mandate based on human rights standards.

In addition, some Asian countries have human rights protections within their constitutions. For example, the citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right, under article 45(1) of their constitution, to material assistance from the state and society when they are old, ill or disabled. In India, article 47 of the constitution affirms that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people, as well as the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. In Bangladesh, article 15 of the constitution places responsibility on the state for the "steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view to securing to its citizens the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care.

b. Regional Initiatives

The Asia Pacific Forum

The Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) was established in 1996 as an umbrella body to support the establishment and functioning of human rights institutions in the region. It provides training and educational services, organizes meetings and seminars and investigates reports of human rights violations in its member countries. The APF requires that each member organization adhere to the Paris Principles mentioned above.

The APF hosts annual meetings, the most recent being in Kathmandu, Nepal in February 2004. It focused attention on the issues of torture, rights of the disabled and the rule of law in the context of anti-terrorism measures. In addition to annual meetings the APF hosts regular thematic workshops on the rights of the disabled; HIV/AIDS; racism; economic, social and cultural rights; and women's rights. It has also identified human trafficking and the death penalty as priority issues. The APF participates at the UN Commission on Human Rights and in the UN General Assembly.

APF events and conferences are said to allow for the participation of UN agencies and civil society, but the accreditation process has been uneven and some non-governmental groups have complained about being excluded.

The Tehran Framework

The Tehran Framework for Regional Technical Cooperation in the Asian and Pacific Region (sometimes referred to as the Asia-Pacific Framework) was adopted in 1998 following an initiative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The goal of the initiative was to establish a step-by-step approach towards the establishment of a regional arrangement for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The Tehran Framework is fundamentally a means for the provision of technical cooperation in four specific areas: the development of national plans for the strengthening of human rights at the national level; human rights education; the establishment of national human rights institutions; and the promotion of the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights.

As part of its implementation of the Tehran Framework, the OHCHR has conducted a number of activities aimed at the promotion of human rights in the region. These activities include inter-sessional workshops on issues such as the impact of globalization on human rights and the justifiability of economic, social and cultural rights. The OHCHR has also secured an agreement to have its representative housed at UN-ESCAP.

Plurilateral initiative by Canada, China & Norway

In addition to the activities of the OHCHR, the Governments of Canada, Norway and the People's Republic of China have launched a plurilateral process for the purpose of discussing various human rights principles outside of the context of specific country situations. Entitled the "Plurilateral Symposium on Human Rights", the process began in 1997 and consists of yearly conferences with a changing list of approximately 21 Asian governments.

Credibility of this process is hampered, however, by its lack of transparency and openness. The annual conferences take place in closed session. There is no civil society or media participation in the process although selected NGOs have been invited to participate in parallel meetings organized outside of the official agenda. For example, Canada invited Amnesty International to speak on the issue of prisoner rights at the 2003 session held in China in December 2003.

Critics claim that the symposium process itself actually undermines the UN Commission on Human Rights and its regional initiatives by establishing a closed-door process for the discussion of human rights rather than promoting the more open and transparent UN process, despite its problems.

Human rights within SAARC and ASEAN

Both SAARC and ASEAN have fledgling human rights initiatives within their mandates, but these have not been able to exercise the influence originally hoped for and there is growing disquiet among non-governmental groups in the region that neither SAARC nor ASEAN are appropriate forums for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The SAARC actually contains two sub-regional treaties related to human rights protections: the Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children in Prostitution and the Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia. Both treaties focus on prevention, training and awareness building rather than the more active "violations approach". Nevertheless, they do represent an effort to approach these pressing issues from a human rights perspective and they have also created a space for regional cooperation in the area of human rights.

Within ASEAN, there has been virtually no interest from member countries in pursuing a human rights agenda. Following the UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, there appeared to be some momentum at the ministerial level in establishing a regional human rights monitoring mechanism. Despite the efforts of a few non-governmental organizations in pursuing this idea however, there has been no support from peoples' movements in the region and ASEAN itself has shelved the discussion. The initiative now appears hopelessly relegated to an academic discourse.

c. Access to Multilateral Processes

Several Asian countries have signed and/or ratified international treaties governing the promotion and protection of human rights. These treaties have formal monitoring mechanisms in the form of committees of experts, who consider written reports from States Parties at regular intervals. The committees respond to States Parties' reports with written conclusions and recommendations. While the process provides for no financial or other penalty when a state is judged to have violated its treaty obligations, it does serve to keep the public eye on compliance at the national level.

The treaties most relevant to economic integration are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Individuals and groups living in countries that have ratified these treaties are increasingly making use of the Committee monitoring mechanism. For example, women's organizations in Asia have sent written reports and witnesses to the CEDAW committee in New York and their interventions have effected the outcome of the evaluation.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights encourages the submission of "shadow" reports from civil society and regularly questions government representatives based on information provided in these reports. In recent years, the Committee has come under increasing pressure to evaluate State compliance within the context of globalization, trading arrangements and investment regimes. Partly in order to do so, it has issued a number of interpretive statements, known as "General Comments", for example on food, on water, on poverty, on health and on education.

IV. THE ADVOCACY CHALLENGE

a. Resistance, Participation and Democracy

The political situation in which human rights defenders operate has an impact on the degree to which they can advocate for human rights. In countries where civil and political rights such as the right to association, to freedom of expression and opinion and the right to privacy are not respected, public debate and participation in political processes becomes dangerous. Many activists have been imprisoned for speaking out and many others have been pushed into underground movements.

It is in this context that a regional or multilateral system of human rights protection could provide the failsafe. Unfortunately, the same countries that withhold political rights at the national level also block the development of human rights norms and processes at the regional level. Even if a regional human rights mechanism did exist and was operating effectively, the ability of individuals in non-democratic states to access that process would be fraught with dangers. For those living under such conditions, there are few options.

For example, Malaysia has a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is guaranteed under its Constitution. These rights include the right to practice religion, right to education, and the right to own property. Despite this fa ƒÆ’ †' ƒâ€š §ade however, Malaysian citizens live under an Internal Security Act (ISA) which over-rides many of their constitutional protections. For example, the ISA allows the government to detain individuals without trial for up to two years or indefinitely if authorities suspect that the person is a terrorist, a threat to national security or public order. Human rights defenders, if they are arrested in demonstrations or rallies, risk a minimum two year sentence under the ISA before they can even defend themselves in a court of law.

Malaysia also restricts the right to freedom of expression and opinion, through its Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA), which prohibits the publishing of "false news". It was under the PPPA that Irene Fernandez, Director of the non-governmental organization, Tenaganita, was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment in October 2003. The charges had been filed in 1996, following the release of a Tenaganita report exposing human rights violations in camps for detained migrant workers. For eight years, Fernandez had lived under constant intimidation and harassment and her case continues to this moment, under appeal.

Burma has been under a military dictatorship since 1962. In 1990, when the National League for Democracy (NLD) won the national election, the military refused to hand over power to the NLD and arrested its leader, Nobel Laureate Aung San Su Kyi. In the years since 1990, the Burmese people have suffered egregious and systemic rights abuse. Su Kyi remains under house arrest. Foreign investment, mostly from China, but also from Japan and other developed countries, has subsidized the repressive military regime rendering it complicit with further human rights abuse. Burma's membership in ASEAN has not resulted in any substantive change in this situation. Military control over every aspect of society continues to cause severe restrictions on human rights. Civil society lacks the ability to advocate around any issue, be it related to economic justice or political rights.

Cambodia 's political deadlock following the July 27 th 2003 elections left the country without the political will to pursue any form of human rights protection at the national level. Within a political climate plagued by corruption, citizens are powerless. Arbitrary arrests are common and the judicial system suffers from chronic dysfunction. The state does not provide legal assistance to its citizens. Although the constitution protects freedom of association and assembly, the government continues to violently suppress any activity critical of the government. For example, in May 2003, during a peaceful rally in front of the National Assembly, more than 100 heavily armed police officers attacked the crowd, wounding several and arresting a dozen individuals. In this context, any person expressing a dissenting view or organizing opposition to a government policy faces the risk of violence and imprisonment by the State.

These are only three examples of Asian countries that suffer a democratic deficit. The ability of people to participate in their political process has a concrete impact on their ability to influence economic decisions that affect their livelihoods and well-being. Efforts to promote regional cooperation must include recognition of these problems if regionalism is to become a force for good in Asia.

b. National Security Laws and the War on Terror

National security laws have taken on a new dimension since the events of September 11, 2001 and they have conspired with the democratic deficit in many countries to further constrain the activities of civil society and people's movements. These laws, such as Malaysia's ISA described above, are found in a majority of countries in the region. They usually allow the government or head of state to curtail some or all of an individual's human rights if that individual is perceived to be engaged in activities that threaten national security. In the context of the "war on terror", national security provisions have been used as a method-of-convenience to crack down on groups legitimately expressing dissent or to silence political opposition.

The recently signed anti-terror pact between the ASEAN and the US raised serious concerns about the fate of human rights in the region. Formally called the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, the pact marks a turning point in ASEAN politics, being the regional grouping's first bilateral agreement on security. What have prevailed until now are individual security agreements between Washington and ASEAN's various members, specifically Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Civil society organizations fear that ASEAN's members will use this pact to pursue their own political agendas by targeting genuine dissidents, human rights activists and even political opponents. For example, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have strengthened efforts to crack down on certain groups on the pretext that they are linked to international terror networks. In China, the government has waged an escalating battle against its Islamic western province of Xinjiang ( East Turkestan). The Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, which comprises the membership of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, was originally a joint Russia-China initiative dealing with border disputes, but has since expanded and is now concerned primarily with security issues in Central Asia.

c. The Influence of the Private Sector

In the era of diminishing trade and investment barriers, and the seemingly mad rush of developing countries to open up their economies to global competition, it is the transnational corporations or TNCs that benefit most from the generous incentives offered. Aside from the lowered duties on imports, these incentives include 100% repatriation of profits, tax holidays, government guarantees on debts incurred by private corporations, foreign currency and inflation adjustments. The number of TNCs worldwide has expanded from 7,000 in 1970, to 37,000 in 1990, and to 60,000 in 2001. Two-thirds of the TNCs are based in fourteen industrialized countries. These TNCs have 800,000 foreign affiliates worldwide.

In the AFTA investment agreement, TNCs enjoy national treatment and are actively lobbying for the quick implementation of the AFTA's liberalisation agenda. In the ASEAN, the call for regional integration has come primarily from the business sectors of Japan and the United States. The US-ASEAN Business Council co-sponsors various ASEAN symposia and fora and is ASEAN's leading advocate with the US government, Congress, business community, and media.

The Japan-ASEAN Business Council has ensured that Japanese corporations become the gainers from the AICO Scheme of the AFTA. Most of the AICO applications approved are Japanese-owned corporations led by Toyota Motors. Even while they have taken on the national identity of their host nations, most of these corporations are 100% owned by the Japanese. This is particularly true in the Philippines.

Exploiting labour, violating workers' rights

The wealth of TNCs does not come only from advances in technology and expanding markets. Their riches come from the exploitation of working people including the millions of peasants, workers and professionals worldwide. TNCs characteristically transfer from one ASEAN member country to another, wherever labour and the overall cost of producing specific product lines is cheaper.

There are numerous examples. Japan's Toyota transferred the labour-intensive portion of its machinery production to ASEAN countries where wages are only a tenth of the wages received by workers in Japan. Food giant Nestl ƒÆ’ †' ƒâ€š © in the Philippines used its economic power to influence government policy when Nestl ƒÆ’ †' ƒâ€š © workers in Cabuyao, Laguna engaged the food giant in a long battle over unfulfilled collective bargaining agreement conditions. Despite a Supreme Court ruling favouring the union workers, Nestl ƒÆ’ †' ƒâ€š © persuaded the Philippine Department of Labour and Employment to take its side. As a result, contractual and non-unionized workers replaced over 600 employees who were subsequently dismissed by Nestl ƒÆ’ †' ƒâ€š ©.

As TNCs amass wealth, income inequalities widen. Asia's working classes are denied the human right to an adequate standard of living. Meanwhile, repression of labour activists and human rights defenders is increasing across the region as governments compete to provide the most "attractive" climate for foreign investment.

In The East Asian Miracle, a 1991 WB study commissioned by Lawrence H. Summers when he was the bank's chief economist, economists embraced what they called the "labour trade-off". The study pointed to Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China (and to a lesser extent Malaysia) where governments restructured their labour sectors, abolished trade-based labour unions and pushed the creation of company or enterprise-based unions. The report highlighted the key advantage derived from this suppression of fundamental labour rights - namely, that it frees government bureaucracies to implement the economic austerity measures and structural adjustment measures that open the doors to private investment. This benefit was referred to in the report as "insulating the economic technocracy." The WB team concluded that the principal benefit of wage suppression was "higher profits" for private firms.

V. CONCLUSION

The complexities of regional cooperation in an era of globalisation are daunting. In a region as vast and diverse as Asia, one might refer to them as overwhelming. Whether or not pan-Asian cooperation agreements are possible can be debated, but sub-regional agreements such as SAARC and ASEAN already offer opportunities to address many of the development challenges facing civil society and people's movements across the region.

For this reason, the many problems identified in this paper do not necessarily make the concept of regionalism undesirable. Indeed regionalism can, in certain conditions, uplift Asian nations and allow them to participate in international fora from a position of greater strength.

From the perspective of human rights, however, regional cooperation appears a distant goal. More work is needed to press governments to respect human rights at the national level and to ensure that the human rights treaties most governments have signed become more than forgotten pieces of paper. For these goals to be realized it is civil society, people's organizations and the academic community who must come together and forge cooperation projects in the interests of social progress.

Social Indicators and Human Rights across Asia

* Source : United Nations Human Development Report 2003

The total GDP (PPP US$) is calculated by multiplying the total population by GDP per capita
Out of a total of 175 countries
National Human Rights Institutions
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
National or internal security legislation

 

Examples of Bilateral & Regional Trading Arrangements in Asia

EFTA "" Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
Pacific 5 "" Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, USA, Chile

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

1. Pangestu, Mari. "Finding a Safe Route for East Asian Free Trade." The World Trade Brief, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, 10-14 September 2003.

2. Austria, Myrna S. "East Asian Regional Cooperation: Approaches and Processes." PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2003-02, March 2003.

3. ______________. "The Philippines in the Global Trading Environment: Looking Back and the Road Ahead." PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2002-15, November 2002.

4. Guste, Maria Jennifer H. "The ASEAN Economic Community?" IBON Facts & Figures, 15 & 30 September 2003.

5. "Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Integration in the SAARC Region." Paper presented by the Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka at the Second Conference of the South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes (SANEI), Kathmandu, 28-29 August 2000.

6. " U.S. Trade and Commercial Policy Toward Southeast Asia." Testimony of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House International Relations Committee. Washington, DC, 25 June 2003.

7. "Globalization's Challenge to Regional Economic Integration." Address of Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN Secretary General at the Symposium of AFTA and Beyond. Manila, 30 March 2002.

8. Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2002. UN Economic and Social Commission of Asia and the Pacific, 2002.

9. Corporate Power and People's Power: Transnational Corporations and Globalization. Asia Pacific Research Network, 2002.

10. Human Rights in Asia: Annual Human Rights Report 2000. Forum-Asia, 2000.

11. Macan-Markar, Marwaan. "US-ASEAN Pact Pushes Security Above Human Rights." Inter Press Service.

12. "A Primer on New Developments in Trade and Tariff Policy." Philippine Tariff Commission, August 2003.

 

Websites:

ASEAN - www.asean.sec.org

APRN - www.aprnet.org

FORUM-ASIA - www.forumasia.org

FTA Watch - www.ftawatch.org

BFA - www.boaoforum.org

AMRC - www.amrc.org.hk

US Department of State - www.state.gov

 

ASIA PACIFIC RESEARCH NETWORK (APRN)

The Asia Pacific Research Network, established in 1999, has grown to include 33 leading research organizations in 15 countries in Asia Pacific. It's main objective is to develop cooperation among alternative research centers, NGOs, and social movements in Asia and the Pacific in order to strengthen advocacy from the community to the global level. It promotes exchange in researches and cooperates on raising research capacity among its members as well as non-members.

Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN)
Secretariat: IBON Foundation, Inc.
Address: 3/F SCC Bldg., Interior Old Sta. Mesa, Manila, 1008 Philippines
Tel. Nos: +632 7132729, 7132737
Fax: +632 7160108
Website: www.aprnet.org
E-mail: secretariat@aprnet.org

The APRN holds annual conferences attended by members, other non-member international delegates, and local participants from the host country. The first APRN conference, held in Manila, focused on trade liberalization. The second was held in Jakarta, with the theme of financing underdevelopment. The third, held in Sydney, discussed TNCs and globalization. The fourth APRN conference held in Guangzhou tackled the accession of China into the WTO. A research conference on Women and Globalization was held in Thailand in 2003, which led to coordinated researches on the impact of globalization on women in agriculture, fisheries, migrant and labor sectors.

APRN members give lectures on various national and international issues like trade, globalization, TRIPS, WTO, finance, and others as service to requesting organizations. The APRN also gives training and seminar workshops on skills for capacity building such as databanking and information management system, policy research, advocacy, research methodologies and media work.

The APRN supports advocacy activities of its members and involves itself as a network in international campaigns through various advocacy activities, especially by actively disseminating information.

IBON Foundation serves as the secretariat of the APRN. IBON is a research-education-information development institution with focus on socio-economic issues. Based in the Philippines, IBON has evolved as an institution with distinct centers committed to fulfill IBON's research; education and information work locally and internationally since it was established in 1978.

It has conducted major researches on globalization and its effects on various industries; the WTO and its impact on agriculture and other sectors; the global financial system and implications for the Philippines; privatization and its socio-economic impact, among many others. IBON also convenes international conferences and conducts national and international networking and advocacy on globalization and international trade issues, official development aid and poverty issues, food sovereignty, etc.

The following are the APRN member organizations: Aidwatch (Australia), Mineral Policy Institute (Australia), Public Interest Advocacy Center (Australia), UBINIG (Bangladesh), Ecumenical Center for Research, Education and Advocacy (Fiji Islands), Asia Monitor Resource Center (Hong Kong), Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants (Hong Kong), Documentation for Action Groups in Asia (Hong Kong), Public Interest Research Centre (India), Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (India), Society for Rural Education and Development (India), Institute for Motivating Self-Employment (India), International NGO Forum for Indonesian Development (Indonesia), Institute for Global Justice (Indonesia), KONPHALINDO (Indonesia), Network for Safe and Secure Food and Environment (Japan), Pacific Asia Resource Center (Japan), Korean House for International Solidarity (Korea), Education and Research Association for Consumer (Malaysia), Consumer Association of Penang (Malaysia), Consumer International Regional Office for the Asia and the Pacific (Malaysia), Pesticides Action Network Asia Pacific (Malaysia), Third World Network (Malaysia), GATT-Watchdog (New Zealand), ARENA Foundation (New Zealand), Pakistan Institute for Labor Education and Research (Pakistan), Roots for Equity (Pakistan), Bisan Center for Research and Development (Palestine), Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (Philippines), IBON Foundation (Philippines), Center for Women's Resources (Philippines), Transnationals Information Exchange-Asia (Sri Lanka) and NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (Thailand).

 

RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY

Rights & Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development) is a non-partisan organization with an international mandate. It was created by Canada's Parliament in 1988 to encourage and support the universal values of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions and practices around the world. (View the Act of Parliament to establish the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development )

Rights & Democracy works with individuals, organizations and governments in Canada and abroad to promote the human and democratic rights defined in the United Nations' International Bill of Human Rights . Although its mandate is wide-ranging, Rights & Democracy currently focuses on four themes: democratic development, women's human rights, globalization and human rights, and the rights of indigenous peoples. It also has two special operations: Urgent Action/Important Opportunities, to respond to human rights crises and seize important opportunities as they arise, and International Human Rights Advocacy, to enhance the work of human rights advocates, in Canada and internationally, in the effective use of regional and international human rights mechanisms of the United Nations and regional human rights systems.

Rights & Democracy enjoys partnerships with human rights, indigenous peoples' and women's rights groups, as well as democratic movements and governments around the world with whom it cooperates to promote human rights and democracy. It is therefore uniquely placed to facilitate dialogue between government officials and non-governmental organizations in Canada and abroad. It is one of the very few organizations with the necessary credibility on both sides to play this bridge-building role.

It initiates and supports projects that advocate the protection of human rights and the strengthening of democratic development and facilitates the capacity of its partners to do the same.

Rights & Democracy
1001, boul. de Maisonneuve east, Suite 1100
Montreal , Quebec
Canada H2L 4P9
Tel: 514-283-6073
Fax: 514-283-3792
www.ichrdd.ca

 

SAARC members are Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Bangladesh. See www.saarc-sec.org

ASEAN members are Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos. See www.aseansec.org

APEC members are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, People' Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), Thailand, United States, Vietnam. See www.apecsec.org.sg

Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, Beijing, June 23, 2003

See www.unhchr.ch/pdf/nhrap.pdf for more information.

These examples have been compiled by the FAO in its "Dimension of constitutional protection of the right to food in the world". (MAP.No.1)

APF members are Australia, Fiji, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. See www.asiapacificforum.net

For a review of OHCHR activities under the Tehran Framework, see E/CN.4/2003/109 (March 2003) at www.unhchr.ch

To read the General Comments, please refer to http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/comments.htm

The East Asian Miracle has been largely discredited in recent years. Nevertheless, it cites more than 50 members of the WB staff, as well as two dozen economists from universities and think tanks around the world, for carrying out and commenting on the study. Lawrence H. Summers became former US President Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury in the second Clinton term. (Information downloaded from www.nikeworkers.org)

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